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A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE:
A WORK IN PROGRESS OR A REVOLUTION THAT FAILED?
Barry C. Feldt
I. INTRODUCTION

A century ago, Progressive reformers adopted a more modem construction of
childhood as a developmental period of innocence, dependence, and
vulnerability. They embraced a more scientific understanding of social control positive criminology - and tried to identify the causes of crime and to treat,
rather than to punish, offenders. Reformers combined the new vision of
childhood with new insights into criminality to create a judicial-welfare
alternative to the adult criminal process. Jurisdiction over dependent as well as
delinquent children reflected juvenile courts' broader role as a child-saving
welfare agency and not simply a "junior" criminal court.'
Juvenile courts simultaneously asserted families' responsibility to raise their
children and expanded states' prerogative to act as parens patriae or "superparent." Because some poor and immigrant parents failed to meet their
responsibilities, juvenile courts intervened to socialize and control their
children.2 At its inception, they attempted to assimilate and "Americanize" the
children of southern and eastern European immigrants pouring into industrial
cities of the East and Midwest. 3 A century later, one of juvenile courts' primary
missions is to control young black males in America's post-industrial cities.
For most of its existence, juvenile courts' rehabilitative goals and
discriminatory means remained unquestioned and unchallenged. Systematic
t Barry C. Feld, 2006. Centennial Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. B.A.,
University of Pennsylvania, 1966; J.D., University of Minnesota Law School, 1969; Ph.D. Harvard
University (Sociology), 1973. I presented an earlier version of this article at the Salmon P. Chase
College of Law Conference on "Re-envisioning the Role of the Juvenile Court in the 21st
Century," September 29, 2006.
1. See, e.g., DAVID S. TANENHAUS, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE MAKING 4 (2004) (emphasizing
that juvenile court legislation "asserted state responsibility for both dependent and delinquent
children and thus merged concerns about child welfare with crime control.").
2. See, e.g., W. NORTON GRUBB & MARVIN LAZERSON, BROKEN PROMISES: How AMERICANS
FAIL THEIR CHILDREN (1982); BARRY FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
JUVENILE COURT 55-60 (1999).
3. See, e.g., JOHN SUTrON, STUBBORN CHILDREN: CONTROLLING DELINQUENCY IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1640-1981 122 (1988); ANTHONY PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF
DELINQUENCY 75-83 (1977); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM
AND ITS ALTERNATIVE IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 221-22 (2002); STEVEN SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE AND
THE AMERICAN DELINQUENT: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PROGRESSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE, 1825-

1920 58 (1977); TANENHAUS, supra note 1, at ix (noting "the consistent and core role of the juvenile
court as an instrument of the crime control industry - controlling those who might produce unrest
or disturb the social order (immigrants, the poor, children of color, wayward girls).").
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criticism emerged in the 1960s and culminated in the Supreme Court's In re
Gault4 decision in 1967. Critics contested both the underlying theory of the
"Rehabilitative Ideal" and the legitimacy of coercive intervention. They
disputed the benevolence of juvenile justice officials, questioned whether
correctional personnel could treat offenders effectively, and objected to
discretionary decisions that treated minority offenders more harshly. During the
1960s, the Warren Court increasingly emphasized procedural formality to
Court decisions
regulate criminal and juvenile justice decision-making.
formalized delinquency hearings, transformed the juvenile court from a welfare
agency into a legalistic one, and fostered a convergence between the juvenile and
criminal justice systems. 5
As in so many domains of public policy, the role of race provides a window
through which to view changes in juvenile justice policies. During the secondhalf of the twentieth century, race had two distinct and contradictory influences.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Supreme Court overturned Southern states' "separate
but equal" Jim Crow legal system and imposed national norms affirming equality
and the rule of law. 6 The Court's school desegregation, criminal procedure and
juvenile justice decisions reflected a broader constitutional agenda to protect
individual rights and the civil rights of racial minorities.
Juvenile justice policies changed initially in response to In re Gault and
subsequently with "get tough" legislation during the late-1980s and early-1990s.
Beginning in the 1960s, Republican politicians attributed rising "baby boom"
crime rates and urban race riots to the Court's judicial activism which led to a
breakdown of "law and order." They pursued a "Southern Strategy" to mobilize
white voters' opposition to school integration and suburban voters' racial
antipathy and to realign the political parties around issues of race.7 During the
4. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
5. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REv. 691,
718-22 (1991) (summarizing the procedural and substantive convergence between juvenile and
criminal courts) [hereinafter Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court]; Barry C. Feld, The
Transformation of the Juvenile Court-PartII: Race and the "Crack Down" on Youth Crime, 84
MINN. L. REv. 327, 357-69 (1999) (arguing that social structural changes and race account for
adoption of more punitive juvenile justice policies) [hereinafter Feld, Race and the "Crack
Down "].
6. See generally LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 490
(2000) (arguing that the Court, beginning with Brown v. Board of Education, and reinforced by the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, altered the "southern way of life."
"[T]he legal regime of race was nationalized with a single operative standard for the entire country.
But the effort ... was directed exclusively at the South and was designed to force the South to
conform to northern - that is, national - norms."); see generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM
CROW TO CIvIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004);
MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WNANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960s TO
THE 1980s 55-56 (2nd ed. 1994).
7. THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT OF RACE,
RIGHTS AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS 11-14 (1991); KEvIN PHILLIPS, THE EMERGING
REPUBLICAN MAJORITY (1969).
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1970s-1990s, conservative politicians used crime as a "code word" for race and
advocated "get tough" policies. When black youth homicide rates peaked in the
early 1990s, politicians advocated a "crack down" on youth crime and enacted
tougher juvenile transfer and sentencing laws to garner electoral advantage.
This article analyzes changes in juvenile justice policies over the past
century. Part I provides a brief history of the juvenile court, highlights the
discriminatory premises embedded in its processes, and provides a baseline
against which to measure subsequent changes. Part H examines the Court's
juvenile justice decisions and puts them in the broader context of the civil rights
movement and the quest for racial equality. Part I analyzes structural,
criminological, racial, and political dynamics in the 1980s and 1990s to explain
the ascendance of "get tough" juvenile justice policies.8 Part IV reviews recent
developmental psychological research on adolescents' competence and
culpability and explores their implications for a justice system for children. It
focuses on three policy issues: 1) procedural justice and delivery of legal
services; 2) waiver of youths to criminal court for sentencing as adults; and 3)
disproportionate confinement of minority offenders. It concludes with an
assessment of the contemporary juvenile court.
II. THE PROGRESSIVE JUVENILE COURT - PROCEDURAL INFORMALITY AND THE
"REHABILITATIVE IDEAL"

A century ago, economic modernization transformed America from a rural,
agricultural, Anglo-Protestant society into an ethnically diverse, urban and
industrial one. 9 The growth of manufacturing spurred a massive influx of
immigrants from southern and eastern Europe.10 They crowded into ethnic
8. See, e.g., DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 3 (2001) (analyzing repudiation of "penal welfarism" since the 1970s);

MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT 81-123 (1995) (analyzing political backdrop of war on drugs);
FELD, supra note 2, at 189 (describing politics of war on juveniles).
9. See generally ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920 (1967) (impact of
industrialization on growth of bureaucracy); PLATT, supra note 3, at 101-36 (discussing the role of
women child-savers in promoting the first juvenile court in Cook County, Illinois, 1899); see
generally ROTHMAN, supra note 3 (discussing social structural changes associated with
modernization); ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS: AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT

125-136 (1978) (analyzing influence of social science research on formulation of juvenile court's
treatment ideology); MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE

POLITICS OF ANTI-POVERTY POLICY 14 (1999) ("In the span of seventy years, an economy
dominated by agriculture was transformed into a modem industrial economy in which a majority of
workers were employed in manufacturing, mining, construction, trade, finance, and
transportation.").
10. See generally JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM

1860-1925 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that the new immigrants differed in language, religion, and
culture from the Anglo-Protestant American and these differences hindered their assimilation);
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 94-130 (1955); STANLEY
LIEBERSON, A PIECE OF THE PIE: BLACK AND WHITE IMMIGRANTS SINCE 1880 20-30 (1980)

(changing patterns of European immigration and difficulties of assimilation because of religious,
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ghettos around industrial factories." The rise of manufacturing reallocated work
from farms, homes, and family-shops to larger industrial settings and modified
the roles of women and children in the family. 12 The idea of childhood is
socially constructed and during this modernizing era upper- and middle-class
women promoted a vision of children as vulnerable, fragile, dependent, and
innocent who
required protection and supervision in their transition to
13
adulthood.

The Progressive movement addressed many social problems associated with
modernization including economic regulation, criminal justice, and political

linguistic and cultural differences).
11. See, e.g., FELD, supra note 2, at 27 ("Industrial growth spurred population increases and
altered the urban landscape. The immigrant poor crowded into the urban center surrounding the
industrial core ....
"); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 26 (1993) ("Dense clusters of tenements and
row houses were constructed... to house the burgeoning work force.").
12. Children have less economic value in an industrial economy than in an agricultural
economy and the shift from the family farm to industry encouraged a reduction in the number and
spacing of children. JOSEPH F. KETT, RITES OF PASSAGE: ADOLESCENCE IN AMERICA, 1790 TO THE
PRESENT 114-16 (1977) (modernization modified the roles of women and children); CARL N.
DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUrION TO THE PRESENT

178-209 (1980); TANENHAUS, supra note 1, at 58 (arguing that "Progressive reformers were
concerned about whether the family could survive in the modem world. The expansion of the wage
economy and the spread of market processes, the rise of large-scale industrialization, rapid
urbanization, and mass immigration were all radically transforming American life. The family,
symbolized by the image of the home, appeared to be fracturing under these new pressures.").
13. The idea of childhood is a social construct that embodies cultural understandings of how
children differ from adults. Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the
Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1083, 1091, 1093
(1991) ("[Tlhe life-stage we call 'childhood' is likewise a culturally and historically situated social
construction .... The definition of childhood-who is classified as a child, and what emotional,
intellectual, and moral properties children are assumed to possess-has changed over time in
response to changes in other facets of society."); DAVID ARCHARD, CHILDREN: RIGHTS AND
CHILDHOOD 16-17 (1993) (The modem construction of childhood views the period between infancy
and adulthood as a separate stage of development and does not perceive children as miniature
adults); PHILLIPPE ARIES, CENTURY OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE FAMILY 365-404
(1962) (tracing the modernizing conception of childhood to the upper classes in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries). By the early nineteenth century, a newer view of childhood began to alter
child-rearing practices in America. By the end of the century, urban upper and middle-class
parents restricted children's autonomy to prepare them for adult roles. DEGLER, supra note 12, at
66 ("[C]hildren began to be seen as different from adults; among other things they were considered
now more innocent; childhood itself was perceived as it is today, as a period of life not only worth
recognizing and cherishing but extending. Moreover, simply because children were being seen for
the first time as special, the family's reason for being, its justification as it were, was increasingly
related to the proper rearing of children."). Middle and upper class women assumed a greater role
in supervising children's moral and social development. David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of
Juvenile Courts in the Early Twentieth Century: Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, in
A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 46 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al., eds., 2002) ("The inventors of
the juvenile court considered themselves part of a humanitarian movement which, in the nineteenth
century, had transformed the status of children from the sole property of their fathers into a
dependent class in need of state protection.").
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reforms. 14 Progressives created and expanded private and public agencies to
assimilate and "Americanize" immigrants and their children. They enacted
child-centered reforms - juvenile courts, child labor laws, social welfare laws,
and compulsory school attendance laws - which reflected the new construction
of children as different from adults and in need of protection.' 5 The presence of
children in police stations, jails, criminal courts and prisons appalled Progressive
reformers and led to the quest for institutional alternatives for misbehaving
youths. 16 The first function of the juvenile court was simply to provide a
diversion from the adult criminal justice system.' 7
Ideological ferment provided Progressives with a criminological rationale to
treat children differently and apart from adults. Positive criminology supplanted
classical criminal law's emphasis on crime as a free-will choice and supported a
more scientific conception of social control. 18 Progressives attributed criminal
14. HOFSTADTER, supra note 10, at 131-73 (arguing that social structural changes associated
with modernization sparked the Progressive Movement). The Progressive Movement addressed a
broad spectrum of social, political, and economic issues. See, e.g., GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH
OF CONSERVATISM, 1900-1916, 195-99 (1963) (economic regulation); ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at
5-13 (criminal and juvenile justice); WALTER TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A
HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA 108-54 (3d ed. 1984) (urban welfare); SUSAN TIFFIN, IN
WHOSE BEST INTEREST? CHILD WELFARE REFORM IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 141-61 (1982) (child
welfare).
15. Many Progressive programs focused on controlling, molding, and protecting children. See,
e.g., WIEBE, supra note 9, at 169 ("The child was the carrier of tomorrow's hope whose innocence
and freedom made him singularly receptive to education in rational, humane behavior. Protect
him, nurture him, and in his manhood he would create that bright new world of the progressives'
vision."); LAWRENCE CREMIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SCHOOL: PROGRESSIVISM IN AMERICAN
EDUCATION, 1876-1957 (1961) (attributing compulsory school attendance laws to efforts to
structure childhood); WALTER TRATTNER, CRUSADE FOR THE CHILDREN: A HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL CHILD LABOR COMMrITEE AND CHILD LABOR REFORM IN NEW YORK STATE 119-142

(1970) (attributing child labor laws to protection of children).
16. TANENHAUS, supra note 1, at 6.
17. Franklin E. Zimring, The Common Thread: Diversion in Juvenile Justice, 88 CAL. L. REV.
2477, 2481 (2000) (Prof. Zimring argues' that diversion from the criminal process constituted an
improvement per se in the handling of children. "The first belief was that a child-centered juvenile
court could avoid the many harms that criminal punishment visited on the young. The reformers
found penalties unnecessarily harsh, and considered places of confinement to be schools for crime
that corrupted the innocent and confirmed the redeemable in the path of chronic criminality.").
18. Ideological assumptions about the causes of crime shape criminal justice policies. DAVID
GARLAND, PUNISHMENT IN MODERN SOCIETY 195 (1990) (noting that ideologies of crime "structure
the ways in which we think about criminals, providing the intellectual frameworks (whether
scientific or religious or commonsensical) through which we see these individuals, understand their
motivations, and dispose of them as cases."). For example, classical criminal law assumed freewilled actors made blameworthy choices to commit crimes and that they deserved punishment. At
the turn of the 20th Century, new theories about human behavior and social deviance led
Progressives to reformulate the ideology of crime and to modify criminal justice administration.
Positive criminology asserted that antecedent forces-biological, psychological, social, or
environmental-determined or caused criminal behavior. See, e.g., ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 5052. It sought to scientifically identify the causes of crime and to prescribe appropriate remedies.
FRANCIS A. ALLEN, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, in THE BORDERLAND OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY 26 (1964) [hereinafter Allen, Legal Values and
the Rehabilitative Ideal]; DAVID MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT 1-32 (1964). Positivism
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behavior to deterministic forces that reduced personal responsibility for crime
and they employed medical analogies to rationalize treating rather than
punishing offenders. 19 Several criminal justice reforms - probation, parole,
indeterminate sentences, and the juvenile court - reflected their "Rehabilitative
Ideal."2 °
Combining the new ideologies of childhood with positivist criminology
provided the rationale for "an institution that would intervene forcefully in the
lives of all children at risk to effect a rescue.'
Zimring argues that despite
juvenile courts' ambitious interventionist and rehabilitative justifications, they
provided a diversionary alternative to criminal courts regardless of whether they
treated youths successfully. 2
Although rehabilitation provided a more
politically attractive and impressive rationale for Progressive reformers,
diversion was then and remains today an important part of juvenile courts'
mission.23
Despite standard historical accounts, the juvenile court did not emerge fullyformed in Cook County, Illinois, in 1899, but rather constituted an evolutionary

attributed criminal behavior to deterministic forces that compelled offenders to act as they did.
Because antecedent forces determined offenders' behavior, they bore less responsibility for their
crimes and criminal justice agencies sought to reform rather than to punish them. FRANCIS A.
ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILTATIVE IDEAL 3-7 (1981); KATHERINE BECKE'rr, MAKING

CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITIcs 8 (1997) ("[D]eviant behavior

is at least partially caused (rather than freely chosen). Progressive reformers therefore identified
rehabilitation - operationally defined as the use of 'individualized corrective measures adapted to
the specific case or the particular problem' - as the appropriate response to deviant behavior.").
19. MATZA, supra note 18, at 12-21; ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 50-52; RYERSON, supra note
9, at 22.
20. Francis Allen describes the central assumptions of the "Rehabilitative Ideal:"
The rehabilitative ideal ... assumed, first, that human behavior is the product
of antecedent causes. These causes can be identified. . . Knowledge of the
antecedents of human behavior makes possible an approach to the scientific
control of human behavior. Finally .... it is assumed that measures employed
to treat the convicted offender should serve a therapeutic function; that such
measures should be designed to effect changes in the behavior of the convicted
person in the interests of his own happiness, health, and satisfactions and in the
interest of social defense.
ALLEN, Legal Values and the RehabilitativeIdeal, supra note 18, at 26. Progressives believed that
the social and behavioral sciences provided them with the ability to systematically change people.
21. Zimring, supra note 17, at 2480. See also, Franklin E. Zimring, The Common Thread:
Diversion in the Jurisprudence of Juvenile Courts, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 145
(Margaret K. Rosenheim et al., eds., 2002). Zimring argues that "the interventionist argument
emphasized the positive good that new programs administered by child welfare experts could
achieve. A child-centered court was an opportunity to design positive programs that would
simultaneously protect the community and cure the child." Zimring, supra note 17, at 2482-83.
22. Zimring, supra note 17, at 2480 (Prof. Zimring describes the two justifications for the
juvenile court as diversionary and interventionist. "The diversionary goal of the court was to save
kids from the savagery of the criminal courts and prisons. The interventionist goal was to create
programs that would rescue delinquents from crime and truancy.").
23. Id.
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"work-in-progress., 24 "Juvenile courts ... were not immaculate constructions;
they were built over time. 25 Tanenhaus argues that "significant changes in the
structure, rules, and self-conception of juvenile justice have been a part of its
history from the beginning. Juvenile justice grew by accretion, and its
experiential growth was largely fueled by local politics." 26 Understanding the
juvenile court as a "work-in-progress" emphasizes its historically contested
structure and functions and on-going debates about its jurisdiction and who
would decide how to handle different categories of children.2 7 In re Gault's
"constitutional domestication" of the juvenile court in 1967 and "get tough"
policies of the 1980s and 1990s reflect the on-going politically and legally
contested, "work-in-progress" character of juvenile courts.
The juvenile court melded the ideology of childhood with positivist
conceptions of social control, introduced a judicial-welfare alternative to the
criminal justice system, and provided the organizational mechanism to empower
the state as parens patriae.28 Progressive "child-savers" described the juvenile
court as a benign, non-punitive, and therapeutic agency.29 Its jurisdiction over
both delinquent and dependent children melded child welfare and crime control
goals. 30 Because reformers characterized intervention as a civil, child-welfare
proceeding rather than as a criminal prosecution, they enjoyed wide latitude to
supervise children. Juvenile courts' status jurisdiction allowed them to control
non-criminal behavior such as "sexual precocity," truancy, and "immorality" as
well as criminality.3'
24. See, e.g., Tanenhaus, who emphasizes that:
Illinois's pioneering juvenile court act read like a rough blueprint. Most of the
features that later became the hallmarks of progressive juvenile justice - private
hearings, confidential records, the complaint system, detention homes, and
probation officers - were either omitted entirely from the initial law or were
included without any provisions for public funding. As a result, the world's
first juvenile court opened on July 3, 1899, with an open hearing, a public
record, no means to control its calendar (i.e.
no complaint system), and without
public funds to pay either the salaries of probation officers or to maintain a
detention home for children.
Tanenhaus, supra note 13, at 42-43 (citation omitted).
25. Id. at 43.
26. TANENHAUS, supra note 1, at xxvii.
27. TANENHAUS, supra note 1, at xxvii-xxix.
28. FELD, supra note 2, at 55-57; ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 205-35.
29. PLATr, supra note 3, at 176-181; SCHLOSSMAN, supra note 3, at 58; SUTTON, supra note 3,

at 232-58.
30. FELD, supra note 2, at 46; TANENHAUS, supra note 1, at 22. Tanenhaus argues that
"progressive child savers conceived of all children as being different from adults and, accordingly,
did not draw sharp distinctions between dependents and delinquents and believed that a unified
children's court could serve both." Id. at 59.
31. Reformers conceived juvenile courts as a social welfare system to control behaviors that
criminal courts previously ignored or handled informally. PLATT, supra note 3, at 46-74; SutrroN,
supra note 3, at 121-53. Its broader jurisdiction included not only criminal acts but also a child's
"status" and social circumstances. See, e.g., SCHLOSSMAN, supra note 3, at 151-53; RYERSON,
supra note 9, at 47. The "status jurisdiction" reflected the newer conception of childhood and the
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Progressives separated children from adults, diverted them to a judicialwelfare alternative to the criminal justice system, and rejected the criminal law's
procedural safeguards and jurisprudence.32 Juvenile courts used informal
procedures, excluded lawyers and juries, and adopted a euphemistic vocabulary
to de-emphasize any resemblance to criminal proceedings.33 Juvenile courts
increasingly employed separate detention homes to remove delinquents from
adult jails.34 The original Cook County juvenile court initially conducted public
hearings because of concerns by political interests and religious groups about
state intrusions into the lives of working-class and ethnic families. 35 Within a
decade of its creation, the juvenile court closed its doors to the public and press
and conducted confidential hearings. 36 Judges imposed indeterminate and nonproportional dispositions to achieve offenders' "best interests" and future
welfare rather than to punish them for past offenses.37 By the 1920s, "childlegal differentiation between children and adults. "Through truancy, compulsory education, and
child labor laws aimed to keep children off the streets, in school, and out of the labor market,
progressives attempted to prolong youth dependency." Tanenhaus, supra note 1, at 61.
32. See ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 212; FELD, supra note 2, at 60-63.
33. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL & INST. OF MEDICINE, JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE
JUSTICE 154 (Joan McCord et al. eds., 2001) summarize the Progressive's conception of juvenile
court procedures:
It was to focus on the child or adolescent as a person in need of assistance, not
on the act that brought him or her before the court. The proceedings were
informal, with much discretion left to the juvenile court judge. Because the
judge was to act in the best interests of the child, procedural safeguards
available to adults, such as the right to an attorney, the right to know the
charges brought against one, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront
one's accuser, were thought unnecessary. Juvenile court proceedings were
closed to the public and juvenile records were to remain confidential so as not
to interfere with the child's or adolescent's ability to be rehabilitated and
reintegrated into society.
34. TANENHAUS, supra note 1, at 34-35.
35. Tanenhaus notes that:
[t]he progressive efforts to extend the reach of the state into the everyday lives
of predominantly working-class urban dwellers raised troubling questions
about the proper relationship of new institutions, such as the juvenile court, to
"the public.". . . The process ... of making the juvenile court into a sheltered
place to protect children.., would take more than two decades.
TANENHAUS, supra note 1, at 25.
36. TANENHAUS, supra note 1, at 49.
37. See Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REV. 104 (1909); THOMAS J.
BERNARD, THE CYCLE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 83 (1992) ("It was a social welfare agency, the central
processing unit of the entire child welfare system. Children who had needs of any kind could be
brought into the juvenile court, where their troubles would be diagnosed and the services they
needed provided by court workers or obtained from other agencies."). Juvenile court judges
imposed indeterminate and non-proportional dispositions that could continue for the duration of
minority. FELD, supra note 2, at 69-74. "Indeterminate" meant that the dispositions had no set
limit and could continue indefinitely until adulthood. Id. at 70. "Non-proportional" meant that no
relationship existed between what the child allegedly did and the length of disposition. Id. The
particular behavior that brought a child before the court affected neither the degree, the duration,
nor the intensity of intervention. Id. Each child's circumstances differed and judges based
dispositions on their future "needs" rather than their past "deeds." RYERSON, supra note 9, at 39-
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savers" further "medicalized" delinquency and described it as a mental disorder
that required an individualized treatment plan.38 Judges enjoyed broad discretion
to diagnose and treat a child based on her lifestyle and "real needs" rather than
simply her crime.3 9
Progressive reformers recognized that real differences existed in children's
lives and circumstances, and they expected juvenile courts to discriminate and to
exercise greater control over poor and immigrant children because they had
greater needs. 40 They did not regard racial and ethnic discrimination as
invidious, but rather as an opportunity to make "other peoples' children" more
like "our children.'
Probation was the disposition of first resort for most
delinquents,4 2 but because poor and immigrant children had farther to go and
required greater controls, they quickly filtered through the benevolent system
into its more punitive institutions.4 3

40. The emergence of the "therapeutic state" affected children's families as well as the delinquents
themselves. Tanenhaus, supra note 13, at 53. Tanenhaus futher states that:
The child who got into trouble with the law ... not only brought the state into
his or her life, but also opened up the family home to state intervention and
extended supervision. Thus, the entire family, not only the child, became the
subject for extended case work, which could involve demands to change jobs,
find a new residence, become a better housekeeper, prepare different meals,
give up alcohol, and abstain from sex.
Tanenhaus, supra note 13, at 53-54 (citation omitted).
38. TANENHAUS, supra note 1, at 111-37 (describing the medicalizing of delinquency and
placing it in the broader context of the increased influence of psychology and psychiatry in matters
of public policy).
39. ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 38; RYERSON, supra note 9, at 40-41; SCHLOSSMAN, supra note
3, at 157-80.
40. GRUBB &LAZERSON, supra note 2, at 69 (describing selective application ofparens patriae
ideology in a class-based society); ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 222; PLATr, supra note 3, at 36-39;
FELD, supra note 2, at 75-76; NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL ET AL., supra note 33, at 154-155 (tension
between social control and social welfare and balancing best interest of the child with protection of
society).
41. FELD, supra note 2, at 75-76.
42. See, e.g., TANENHAUS, supra note 1, at 35 (Tanenhaus argues that "[p]robation officers
were the 'right arm of the court' because they investigated homes; interviewed neighbors, teachers
and employers; made recommendations to the judge about what should be done with children;
represented them during hearings; and supervised those on probation."); SCHLOSSMAN, supra note
3, at 77.
43. Steven Schlossman & Stephanie Wallach, The Crime of Sexual Precocity: Female Juvenile
Delinquency in the ProgressiveEra, 48 HARV. ED. REv. 65, 66 (1978); ROTHmAN, supra note 3, at
103 (Rothman notes that "[t]he exercise of judicial discretion helped to effect a dual system of
criminal justice: one brand for the poor, another for the middle and upper classes. Judicial
discretion may well have promoted judicial discrimination."). TANENHAUS, supra note 1, at 37-39
(arguing that the unwillingness of private institutions to accept dependent and delinquent black
children caused juvenile courts to commit them to institutions more quickly and for less serious
offenses than they did their white counterparts).
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1I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF THE JUVENILE COURT DECISIONS
In the decades before and after World War II, Blacks migrated from the rural
south to the urban north and the "great migration" made race a national rather
44
than a regional issue and fostered a more assertive civil rights movement.
These broader structural changes contributed to the Warren Court's civil rights,
criminal procedure, and juvenile court decisions during the 1960s. 5 The Court's
decisions and Congressional passage of Civil Rights and Voting Rights laws in
the mid-1960s coincided with "baby boom" increases in youth crime and urban
racial riots. By the end of the decade, conservative politicians began to exploit
the volatile issues of race and crime for political advantage.
A. Racial Demographics and Legal Change

Black migration from the rural South to the industrial cities of the North and
West in the decades before and during World War II put the quest for racial
equality and civil rights on the national political agenda. In 1914, World War I
curtailed European immigration and created a demand for southern Blacks to
work in northern factories.46 Between World Wars I and II, the mechanization of
cotton-picking further reduced the need for black laborers in the South. 47 Halfmillion southern Blacks migrated north between 1910 and 1920 and threequarters of a million moved in the following decade.48 During the Great
Depression, dire economic conditions caused an out-migration of another
400,000 Blacks to northern cities.49 Jim Crow laws, segregated schools, job
discrimination, and Ku Klux Klan violence drove more Blacks out of the
South. 50 During World War II, one and one-half million Blacks left the rural
44. See generally NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND: THE GREAT BLACK MIGRATION
AND How IT CHANGED AMERICA (1991); see generally THE GREAT MIGRATION IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE: NEW DIMENSIONS OF RACE, CLASS & GENDER (Joe William Trotter, Jr. ed., 1991).
45. See POwE, supra note 6, at 437-39; FELD, supra note 2, at 97-106; KLARMAN, supra note 6,
at 344-64.
46. See, e.g., LEMANN, supra note 44, at 15-17 (arguing that World War I reduced the flow of
European immigrants and labor recruiters solicited rural southern Blacks to work in northern
factories); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 11, at 28-29 (attributing the beginning of the "great
migration" to the outbreak of World War I in 1914).
47. See, e.g., LEMANN, supra note 44, at 5-6 (noting that in the 19th Century, the cotton gin
made the growing of cotton commercially viable and slavery became the economic foundation of
the pre-Civil War southern economy; in the 20th Century, the mechanical cotton picker
dramatically reduced the need for cheap, black laborers); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 11, at 2729 (noting the impact of the boll weevil that devastated cotton crops and shifted southern
agriculture from cotton to less labor-intensive food and livestock production); MARC MAUER, RACE
TO INCARCERATE 52 (1999) ("Blacks had been disproportionately affected by the shift to
mechanized agriculture in the South, which was contemporaneous with the increased demand for
labor in the growing northern economies.").
48. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 11, at 29.
49. See id. at 29-38; FELD, supra note 2, at 84.
50. See LEMANN, supra note 44, at 14-15 ("push" factors as well as "pull" factors motivated
black migration).
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South to work in northern defense-industries 51 and another one and one-half
million followed during the 1950s.52
Blacks settled primarily in urban ghettos when they migrated.53 Northern
Whites' racial hostility and violence reinforced segregation in housing,
education, and employment.54 After World War II, northern Whites began to
move to suburbs and to isolate Blacks in inner-city ghettos.5 5 A variety of public
and private policies - federal mortgage, insurance, housing, tax, and highway
construction - contributed to the growth of predominantly white suburbs
surrounding poor and minority neighborhoods within most major cities. 56
51. See, e.g., EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 7, at 33; GILENS, supra note 9, at 104-05 ("The
average black out-migration from the South between 1910 and 1939 was only 55,000 people per
year. But during the 1940s it increased to 160,000 per year, during the 1950s it declined slightly
(to 146,000 per year), and between 1960 and 1966 it fell to 102,000 per year."); ANDREW HACKER,
Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 24 (rev. ed. 1995) ("The real

changes began during the Second World War, when for the first time black Americans were
courted by white society. A shortage of civilian labor forced employers to offer jobs to workers
who previously had been excluded."); Lieberson states that:
[i]n 1920, only a few years before massive new European immigration was to
end, 85 percent of all blacks lived in the South. Three-fourths were still in the
South when the United States entered World War II. This figure decreased in
succeeding decades, thanks to the massive changes during and after the war,
but in 1970 a bare majority of blacks was still living in the South.
LIEBERSON, supra note 10, at 9.
52. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 11, at 45 (noting that 1,500,000 migrated during the 1950s
and 1,400,000 during the 1960s); LEMANN, supra note 44, at 6 (between 1940 and 1970, five
million blacks moved out of the South and reduced the proportion of Blacks remaining in the South
from three-quarters to half.
53. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 11, at 45 (during the "great migration" southern blacks
flooded Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia and other northern and midwestern industrial centers); see
generally TROTTER, supra note 44 (analyzing causes and impact of great migration in different
regions of the country); In 1910, fewer than one-quarter of Blacks lived in cities. MASSEY &
DENTON, supra note 11, at 21. By 1940, half of Blacks lived in cities, and by 1960, more than
three-quarters did. Id.; FE.D, supra note 2, at 85. In 1870, 80% of black Americans lived in the
rural south; by 1970, 80% of black Americans resided in urban locales, half in the North and West.
See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 11, at 68; see also GILENS, supra note 9, at 105. Although

African-Americans comprised only 2% of northerners in 1910, by 1960, they accounted for 7% of
the northern population and 12% of urban residents. Id. at 105.
54. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 11, at 30 (describing upsurge of racial violence in
northern cities between 1900 and 1920 and attacks on individual blacks); LIEBERSON, supra note
10, at 260 ("[B]lack segregation in the urban North increased from 1900 onward not only because
their proportion of the population grew, but also because the same composition led to more
isolation than it had during earlier decades."); HACKER, supra note 51, at 18.
55. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 11, at 44-45; MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR:
FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON WELFARE 133-37 (1989).

56. Federal mortgage, housing, and tax policies subsidized construction of privately-owned
single-family homes in almost exclusively white suburbs. The federal interstate highway program
facilitated suburban expansion. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 11, at 44-45 ("In making this
transition from urban to suburban life, middle-class whites demanded and got massive federal
investments in highway construction that permitted rapid movement to and from central cities by
car."); KATZ, supra note 55, at 134. ("Federal policy ensured that housing development happened
in suburbs rather than within cities and favored the white middle classes rather than minorities and
the poor."). Interstate highways and housing projects disrupted many black urban communities and
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During the 1950s and 1960s, the Civil Rights movement confronted racism
and segregation in the South, demanded racial equality and social justice, and
ultimately transformed both political parties.57 Until the 1960s, southern Jim
Crow laws, customs, and violence enforced an apartheid system of white
supremacy and black subordination.5 8 The Warren Court's school desegregation,
civil rights, and criminal procedure decisions attempted to dismantle the white
southern racial regime.59 In Brown v. Board of Education, the Court repudiated
the "separate but equal" doctrine and initiated efforts to desegregate public
schools.6 ° Southern politicians condemned Brown as illegitimate judicial
activism and urged "massive resistance" to its intrusion on states' prerogatives.6 1
Southern opposition to desegregation in the 1950s and Republican presidential
campaigns of Barry Goldwater in 1964 and Richard Nixon in 1968 underscored
the political value of appeals to white voters' racial antipathy.62
created physical barriers to contain their expansion. See id. at 135-36 ("Not only did new
highways and expressways encourage commuting and population dispersal; they also divided cities
into new sections, creating walls between poor or minority neighborhoods and central business
districts."); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 11, at 55-56 ("During the 1950s and 1960s, local elites
manipulated housing and urban renewal legislation to carry out widespread slum clearance in
growing black neighborhoods that threatened white business districts and elite institutions.").
57. See OMI & WINANT, supra note 6, at 95-100 (arguing that during the 1950s, the race-based
Civil Rights movement contested the social construction of race).
58. POWE, supra note 6, at 490, concludes that the Warren Court explicitly intended to change
southern legal and cultural traditions.
By 1953 the South had created, by law and custom (backed by whatever force
necessary), a caste system based on white supremacy. From laws against
miscegenation, to laws mandating segregation, to subterfuges maintaining a
basically all-white electorate, to the use of peremptory challenges to ban
African-Americans from juries, to the enforced customs of better jobs for
whites, to mandating social deference. . . the southerners lived in a society that
told all whites, no matter how poor, ignorant, or illiterate, that they were better
than any African-American.
59. See POWE, supra note 6, at 492-96; Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modem
Criminal Procedure,99 MICH. L. REv. 48, 94 (2000) ("[T]he Supreme Court probably was a better
gauge of national opinion on race than was a United States Congress in which white supremacist
southern Democrats enjoyed disproportionate power because of Senate seniority and filibuster
rules.").
60. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see G. Edward White, Warren Court (19531969), in AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY:

SELEcTIONS

FROM THE ENCYLOPEDIA OF THE

AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 279, 280 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986) ("The context of the Warren
Court's first momentous decisions was decisive in shaping the Court's character as a branch of
government that was not disinclined to resolve difficult social issues, not hesitant to foster social
change, not reluctant to involve itself in controversy.").
61. See POWE, supra note 6, at 47 (white southern leaders urged resistance and described
Brown as a decision by "a lawless Court, abandoning the Constitution ('a mere scrap of paper') for
the personal and political values of unelected judges").
62. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 7, at 77-79; PowE, supra note 6, at 60-62 (Powe is
describing southern congressional Democrats drafting the "Southern Manifesto" which denounced
Brown as an abuse of judicial power and advocating non-compliance with an unlawful decision. In
the aftermath of Brown, Southern racial moderates virtually disappeared under the pressure of more
hard-line racists.).
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The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of
1965 created a national legal standard and imposed racial equality on the
South.63 The majority of white Americans at least tacitly subscribe to cultural
and legal norms of racial equality. 64 Although a commitment to equality
prohibits de jure segregation or expressing racist opinions, American society,
then and now, remains deeply divided over matters of race and65some politicians
have exploited those racial resentments for electoral advantage.
B. Civil Rights as Impeiusfor Juvenile Justice Decisions
Criminal procedure and juvenile justice reforms further advanced the
Warren Court's civil rights agenda because the poor, minorities, and the young
disproportionately comprised those accused of crimes. 66 During the 1960s, the
Court's decisions endorsed adversarial procedures and adopted constitutional
rules to limit police discretion, to protect minorities from state officials, and to
protect defendants' rights.67 The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights
provided the Court with the constitutional authority to limit the state, to expand
equality for minorities, and to control criminal justice decision-making.68
63.

TALI MENDELBERG, THE RACE CARD: CAMPAIGN STRATEGY, IMPLICIT MESSAGES, AND THE

NORM OF EQUALITY 18 (2001) (arguing that the norm of racial equality emerged in the United States
during the 1950s and 1960s as cultural leaders and influential elites attacked segregation, lynching
and brutality, and denial of the right to vote); GILENS, supra note 9, at 108 (noting that passage of
the Voting Rights Act led to increased registration of Blacks nationwide from 29 percent in 1962 to
67 percent in 1970); POWE, supra note 6, at 232 (104 of the 130 congressional votes cast against
the Civil Rights Act were by southern Democrats "who fully understood that this bill was aimed
directly at the white South").
64. MENDELBERG, supra note 63, at 18 ("In the age of equality, neither citizens nor politicians
want to be perceived or to perceive themselves as racist. The norm of racial equality has become
descriptive and injunctive, endorsed by nearly every American.").
65. Id. at 19 ("Because the civil rights era came and went without fully resolving the problems
of racial inequality, individuals and institutions are forced to continue to reach decisions about
racial matters, matters that count among the most difficult of our national problems.").
66. E.g., POWE, supra note 6, at 198; Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Questfor Penal Justice:
The Warren Court and the CriminalCases, 1975 U. ILL. L. FORUM 518.
67. See, e.g., FRED P. GRAHAM, THE DUE PROCESS REVOLUTION: THE WARREN COURT'S IMPACT
ON CRIMINAL LAW at 110-11 (1970); GARLAND, supra note 8, at 57 ("In effect, the new critique of
rehabilitation was the extension of civil rights claims to the field of criminal justice, a process that
had already begun with the Warren Court of the 1960s and its extension of due process protections
to suspects and juveniles."); POWE, supra note 6, at 386 ("African-Americans were
disproportionately affected by whatever abuses or inequities there were in the criminal justice
system"); Note, Developments in the Law: Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1472, 1488-94 (1988) (equality principle in reform of criminal procedures after Brown v. Board of
Education); White, supra note 60, at 288 ("By intervening in law enforcement proceedings to
protect the rights of allegedly disadvantaged persons-a high percentage of criminals in the 1960s
were poor and black-the Warren Court Justices were acting as liberal policymakers."); See, e.g.,
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(exclusionary rule); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (protection of privilege against selfincrimination).
68. See, e.g., GRAHAM, supra note 67, at 41-66; POWE, supra note 6, at 412 ("[T]he Court
recognized that the Bill of Rights offered national standards for criminal procedure regardless of
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The Supreme Court critically re-examined juvenile justice administration in
the 1960s.69 In Kent v. United States, the Court observed that that "the child
receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded
to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for
children" and required procedural safeguards in judicial waiver proceedings.7 °
In 1967, the Court in In re Gault emphasized disjunctions between the theory
and the practice of rehabilitation, the differences between criminal procedural
safeguards adult defendants enjoyed and those used for delinquents, and ordered
a major procedural overhaul.71 It rejected Progressives' claims that delinquency
proceedings were civil, non-adversarial, and rehabilitative.7 2 Instead, it focused
on high recidivism rates, the stigma of a delinquency label, and the arbitrariness
of the process.7 3 In re Gault required states to adopt "fundamentally fair"
procedures for delinquents charged with criminal offenses that could lead to
76 assistance
confinement.74 These protections included notice, 75 a fair hearing, 76
77
of counsel, opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses,7 8 and the

how the states wished to conduct trials, and it quickly applied all the relevant provisions of the Bill
of Rights to the states to create minimum national guarantees of fairness in criminal trials."); Jerold
H. Israel, CriminalProcedure,the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L.
REV. 1320, 1323-25 (1977) (three themes of the Warren Court's due process "revolution" were:
"selective incorporation of Bill of Rights' guarantees," "equality," and "expansive interpretations
of constitutional rights that protect the accused").
69. See, e.g., Joel Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of
Function and Form, 1965 WiS. L. REV. 1, 3; Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts,
and Individualized Justice, 79 HARv. L REV. 775, 775-76 (1966); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
LAW

ENFORCEMENT

AND

ADMINISTRATION

OF

JUSTICE,

TASK

FORCE

REPORT:

JUVENILE

DELINQUENCY (1967).
70. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966). The Court concluded that the loss of the
special protections of the juvenile court-closed proceedings, confidential records, and protection
from a criminal conviction-as a result of a waiver decision was a "critically important" action that
required a hearing, assistance of counsel, access to social investigations, and written findings and
conclusions that an appellate court could review. Id. at 553-63. See generally Monrad Paulsen,
Kent v. United States: The ConstitutionalContext of Juvenile Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 167.
71. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
72. See id.
73. Seeid.at2l.
74. The Court only considered the constitutional contours of a delinquency trial. See In re
Gault, 387 U.S. at 13. The Court specifically held that "[w]e do not in this opinion consider the
impact of these constitutional provisions upon the totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the
state. We do not even consider the entire process relating to juvenile 'delinquents'." Id. See also
Frances Barry McCarthy, Pre-Adjudicatory Rights in Juvenile Court: An Historical and
ConstitutionalAnalysis, 42 U. Prr. L. REv. 457, 459-60 (1981) (discussing the limitations on
juveniles' procedural rights). The Court's holding did not address a juvenile's rights in either the
pre-adjudicatory (i.e., intake and detention) or post-adjudicatory (i.e., disposition) stages of the
proceeding, but narrowly confined itself to the actual adjudication of guilt or innocence in a
trial-like setting. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 13, 31 n.48.
75. In re Gault,387 U.S. at 33.
76. Id. at 36.
77. Id. at 4l.
78. Id. at 57.
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privilege against self-incrimination.7 9
In re Gault endorsed adversarial
procedures both to determine the truth - factual accuracy - and to limit the
power of the state - prevent governmental oppression - and asserted that
"fundamentally fair" procedures would not impair courts' ability to treat
juveniles. 80 In re Gault based delinquents' rights to notice, counsel, and
confrontation on generic Fourteenth Amendment "fundamental fairness" rather
than the Sixth Amendment, 8' but explicitly relied on the Fifth Amendment to
grant juveniles the privilege against self-incrimination. 82
Subsequent decisions further elaborated the criminal nature of delinquency
proceedings. In In re Winship, the Court required states to prove delinquency
"beyond a reasonable doubt," rather than by the civil preponderance of evidence
standard.83 For the majority in In re Winship, preventing factually erroneous
convictions and limiting the power of the state outweighed the dissent's concern
79. Id. at 31-57; see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 22, 24, 27 (discussing whether juveniles
should be afforded constitutional protection through procedural safeguards); Irene Rosenberg, The
Constitutional Rights of Children Charged with Crime: Proposalfor a Return to the Not So
Distant Past, 27 UCLA L. REV. 656, 662-63 (1980) (arguing that constitutional protections should
attach in proceedings that may result in incarceration of a child); Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing
Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedurefor the Juvenile Court,69 MINN. L. REv. 141, 155-56 (1984).
80. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 21.
81. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In re Gault made no reference to the Sixth Amendment's
provision for notice; rather, the Court held that "due process of law requires notice of the sort we
have described-that is, notice which would be deemed constitutionally adequate in a civil or
criminal proceeding." In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 33. Similarly, although the Court described a
delinquency proceeding as "comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution," id. at 36, the Court
grounded the right to counsel in a delinquency proceeding in the "Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment" rather than the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel. Id. at 41. Finally,
the Court's analysis of the right to confront and examine witnesses rested on "our law and
constitutional requirements" rather than the language of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 57. In
deciding the applicability of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, however,
the majority used an analytical strategy akin to selective incorporation, finding a functional
"equivalence" between a delinquency proceeding and an adult criminal trial. See id. at 50; see,
e.g., Louis Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L. J. 74
(1963); Sanford H. Kadish, Methodology and Criteriain Due ProcessAdjudication - Survey and
Criticism, 66 YALE L. J. 319, 327-33 (1967) (analyzing historical constitutional debate between
proponents of "selective incorporation" and proponents of "fundamental fairness" and "total
incorporation" of provisions of the Bill of Rights).
82. In re Gault holds that:
It would be entirely unrealistic to carve out of the Fifth Amendment all
statements by juveniles on the ground that these cannot lead to "criminal"
involvement. . . . [J]uvenile proceedings to determine "delinquency," which
may lead to commitment to a state institution, must be regarded as "criminal"
for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 49-50. Because In re Gault applied the privilege against self-incrimination
to delinquency proceedings, juvenile courts' proponents could no longer characterize delinquency
proceedings as either "noncriminal" or "nonadversarial."
83. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). The Bill of Rights does not define the standard
of proof in criminal cases so In re Winship first held that the constitution requires proof beyond a
reasonable doubt in adult criminal proceedings as a matter of "due process." See id. at 361-64.
The Court then extended the same standard of proof to juvenile proceedings for the same reason.
See id. at 365-67.
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that criminal procedural safeguards would impair juvenile courts' ability to
rehabilitate delinquents or erode their differences with criminal courts. 84 The
Court in Breed v. Jones applied the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy
provision to state delinquency trials because of their functional equivalence with
criminal trials.85
The Court in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania rejected delinquents' appeal for a
constitutional right to a jury trial.86 McKeiver relied on the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process clause rather than the Sixth Amendment's jury clause,
reasoned that delinquency trials required only "accurate fact finding," and
concluded that a judge could find facts as well as a jury. 87 McKeiver employed
"rehabilitative rhetoric," ignored the reality of juvenile "treatment," and
exhibited no awareness of the dangers that closed and confidential proceedings
posed for accurate fact-finding.88
Despite McKeiver's constitutional retreat, In re Gault provided impetus to
transform the juvenile court from a social welfare agency into a scaled-down
criminal court. In re Gault and In re Winship fostered adversarial delinquency

84. See id. at 376-77 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). According to the majority, while parens
patriaeintervention may be a laudable goal to deal with miscreant youths, "that intervention cannot
take the form of subjecting the child to the stigma of a finding that he violated a criminal law and to
the possibility of institutional confinement on proof insufficient to convict him were he an adult."
Id. at 367.
85. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1975). With respect to the risks associated with
double jeopardy, the Court concluded that "we can find no persuasive distinction in that regard
between the [juvenile] proceeding . .. and a criminal prosecution, each of which is designed to
'vindicate [the] very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws."' Id. at 531 (bracketed "the" in
original).
86. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). Even though the Court noted that the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial applied to state criminal proceedings by its incorporation into
the Fourteenth Amendment, McKeiver relied on the Fourteenth Amendment due process and
"fundamental fairness." See id. at 540. The Court insisted that "the juvenile court proceeding has
not yet been held to be a 'criminal prosecution,' within the meaning and reach of the Sixth
Amendment, and also has not yet been regarded as devoid of criminal aspects merely because it
usually has been given the civil label." Id. at 541. The Court cautioned that "[tihere is a
possibility, at least, that the jury trial, if required as a matter of constitutional precept, will remake
the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary process and will put an effective end to what has
been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding." Id. at 545.
87. See id. at 543. In concluding that due process required only accurate fact finding,
however, the Court departed significantly from its prior emphasis on the dual rationales of accurate
fact finding and protection against governmental oppression. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. at
363-64; In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 47.
88. See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 547-48, 550 (criticizing advocates of procedural formality and a
jury trial for ignoring "every aspect of fairness, of concern, of sympathy, and of paternal attention
that the juvenile court system contemplates."). There are reasons to question the accuracy of fact
finding in the juvenile justice system. See, FELD supra note 2, at 153-57 (describing the inherently
prejudicial nature of juvenile court fact-finding); Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension
Between Apprendi and McKeiver: Sentence Enhancements Based on Delinquency Convictions and
the Quality of Justice in Juvenile Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1111, 1140-60 (2003)
(analyzing differences between judge and jury application of "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden
of proof).
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proceedings - attorneys, privilege against self-incrimination, and criminal
standard of proof. Providing procedural safeguards shifted the focus of a
delinquency trial from a child's "real needs" to proof that she committed a crime
and made the connection between criminal conduct and delinquency sanctions
explicit.
C. The Politicsof Crime and Race Riots - Blame the Warren Court
The Supreme Court's criminal procedure and juvenile justice decisions
during the 1960s coincided with increased crime rates and urban race riots.
Crime rates escalated dramatically as "baby boom" children began to reach
adolescence, 90 more so in urban areas where crime rates generally are higher, and
especially in areas of black population concentration. 91 In the mid-1960's riots
erupted in black ghettoes in cities across the nation. 92 The National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders - the Kerner Commission - attributed the riots
to historic and continuing racial discrimination in employment, education, social
services, and housing.93 The Kerner Commission warned that America was
moving "toward two societies, one black, one white - separate and unequal," 94

89. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (application of Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule to the states); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (right to counsel at preindictment police interrogation); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requirement of warning
of rights prior to police interrogation); See GRAHAM, supra note 67, at 67-85 (discussing political
reactions to Supreme Court's decisions); FELD, supra note 2, at 87-88 (increased crime rates
associated with the demographics of the "baby boom" generation and increased urbanization of
Blacks); Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the
Conservative "Backlash," 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1480-1501 (2003) (analyzing political backlash
to Supreme Court's criminal procedure and juvenile decisions).
90. As the children of the baby boom reached their crime prone teenage years beginning in the
mid-1960s, the rates of serious violent and property crimes increased more than 75 percent. The
simple changes in the age structure of the population accounted for most of that rise. See, e.g.,
JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1975); POwE, supra note 6, at 408 (between 1963 and
1970, the homicide rate doubled from 4.6 to 9.2 per 100,000); ALLEN, supra note 18, at 30
("Perceptions of increasing crime in the late 1960s brought with them a heightened sense of
insecurity and fears of a collapse of public order. These perceptions were based in part on
demographic realities.").
91. See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAwKINS, CRIME Is NOT THE PROBLEM: LETHAL
VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 66 (1997) ("Homicide rates are highest in the slum neighborhoods of big
cities that exclusively house the black poor. The race of the residents, the socioeconomic status of
the neighborhood, and city size are all associated with elevated rates of homicide victimization.");
MAUER, supra note 47, at 51-52 ("[U]rbanization is generally equated with higher rates of crime.").
92. HACKER, supra note 51, at 22; see generally UNITED STATES NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS REPORT

(1968),

available at

http://hdl.handle.net/2027/lmc.95032.1968.001

[hereinafter

KERNER

COMMISSION]; LEMANN, supra note 44, at 190 ("[I]t seemed at least possible that a full-scale

national race war might break out."); POWE, supra note 6, at 276 (noting that three years of riots
left more than 200 dead, thousands wounded, and property damage in the tens of billions of dollars
and that the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1968 provoked hundreds more urban riots).
93. KERNER COMMISSION, supra note 92, at 1.
94. Id.
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and cautioned that to continue policies that contributed to racial segregation,
discrimination, and poverty would divide the nation and "would lead to the
permanent establishment of two societes: one predominately white and located in
the suburbs, in smaller cities, and in outlying areas, and one largely Negro
located in central cities. 95
Beginning in the mid-1960s, crime and race became potent political issues.
Liberals echoed the Kerner Commission and emphasized the need to address
social-structural conditions and racial and economic inequality to reduce crime.9 6
Conservatives emphasized personal responsibility and minimized the role of
poverty, poor education, and lack of jobs.97 Many Whites associated the Court's
criminal procedure decisions with urban riots and rising crime rates.9 8
Conservative critics encouraged those perceptions and simplistically blamed
increasing crime and urban disorder on the Warren Court's criminal procedure
and civil rights decisions. 99
Violent riots affected many Whites' views of the legitimacy of Blacks'
grievances' ° and inclined them to attribute criminality to personal choices rather
than to structural forces.' 0' Conservative politicians appealed to white voters'
racial resentments and exploited the coincidence between rising crime rates and
95. Id. at 220.
96. See, e.g., POWE, supra note 6, at 495; see also

KATHERINE BECKETT & THEODORE SASSON,
THE POLrTICS OF INJUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 53-54 (2000).
97. See, e.g., POWE, supra note 6, at 495; BECKETr & SASSON, supra note 96, at 53-54.

Beckett argues that the competing views of crime reflect a political contest about the balance of
social welfare and social control as elements of public policy:
As the civil rights, welfare rights, and student movements pressured the state to
assume greater responsibility for the reduction of social inequalities,
conservative politicians attempted to popularize an alternative vision of
government-one that diminishes its duty to provide for the social welfare but
enlarges its capacity and obligation to maintain social control. . . The
conservative view that the causes of crime lie in the human "propensity to
evil," rests on a pessimistic vision of human nature, one that clearly calls for
the expansion of the social control apparatus.
BECKETr, supra note 18 at 10.
98. GILENS, supra note 9, at 107-10; EDSALL & EDSALL supra note 7, at 74-77 (Richard
Nixon's presidential campaign in 1968 focused on Supreme Court decisions that he found "highly
problematic," and he resolved the conflict by "simultaneously affirming his belief in the principles
of equality while voicing opposition to the use of federal intervention to enforce compliance.").
99. See MAUER, supra note 47, at 53.
100. GARLAND, supra note 8, at 97 ("Televised images of urban race riots, violent civil rights
struggles, anti-war demonstrations, political assassinations, and worsening street crime reshaped
");POWE, supra note 6, at 277-78
the attitudes of the middle-American public in the late 1960s ....
("black power" advocates frightened white voters); LEMANN, supra note 44, at 200 ("The
beginning of the modern rise of conservatism coincides exactly with the country's beginning to
realize the true magnitude and consequences of the black migration, and the government's response
to the migration provided the conservative movement with many of its issues.").
101. HACKER, supra note 51, at 22 ("As the 1970s started, so came a rise in crimes, all too many
of them with black perpetrators .... Worsening relations between the races were seen as largely
due to the behavior of blacks, who had abused the invitations to equal citizenship white American
had been tendering."); GILENS, supra note 9, at 110.
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urban riots and the Court's decisions. 102 Beginning in 1966, Republicans scored
electoral gains by blaming liberal
social programs and the Warren Court for
03
urban riots and increased crime. 1
IV. THE BROADER CONTEXT OF THE "GET TOUGH" ERA OF JUVENILE JUSTICE

Rehabilitation provided the dominant criminal and juvenile justice paradigm
from its Progressive origins until the early 1970s.1°4 Beginning in the 1960s,
several forces combined to erode support for indeterminate sentences and
rehabilitation programs. 10 5 By the early 1970s and for different reasons, liberal
and conservative critics endorsed "just deserts," penal proportionality, and
determinate sentences.10 6 Critics on the political Left described indeterminate
102. See GRAHAM, supra note 67, at 71-85; Feld, supra note 89, at 1494-1501; Edsall & Edsall
argue that:
[T]he fusion of race with an expanding rights revolution and with the new
liberal agenda, and the fusion, in turn, of race and rights with the public
perception of the Democratic party, and the fusion of the Democratic party with
the issues of high taxes and a coercive, redistributive government, that created
the central force splintering the presidential coalition behind the Democratic
party throughout the next two decades....
EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 7, at 72.
103. See POWE, supra note 6, at 278 (in the 1966 election, Republicans gained 47 House seats
and three Senate seats and California voters elected Ronald Reagan governor by a landslide);
HACKER, supra note 51, at 56 ("Conservatives believe that for at least a generation, black people
have been given plenty of opportunities, so they have no one but themselves to blame for whatever
difficulties they face.").
104. From its Progressive foundations until the early 1970s, "correctionalist commitment to
rehabilitation, welfare and criminological expertise" provided the intellectual framework, cultural
vocabulary, and the shared professional understandings that defined criminal justice policy and
practices. GARLAND, supra note 8, at 27. The central tenets of the "Rehabilitative Ideal" include a
focus on the individual offender, justice administration by clinical specialists and expert
professionals, and welfare-oriented, indeterminate and discretionary decision-making practices.
ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 53-61; FRANCIS A. ALLEN, The Juvenile Court and the Limits of
Juvenile Justice, in THE BORDERLAND OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY

44-61 (1964).
105. GARLAND, supra note 8, at 60 ("The movement for determinate sentencing reform created
an unusually broad and influential alliance of forces. The campaign included not only radical
supporters of the prisoners' movement, liberal lawyers and reforming judges, but also retributivist
Left-wing critics
philosophers, disillusioned criminologists and hard-line conservatives.")
characterized the criminal justice system as a repressive institution of social control to maintain the
status quo. See, e.g., MAUER, supra note 47, at 45. Beckett and Sasson argue that:
since the late 1960s, conservative politicians, together with the mass media and
activists in the victim rights movement, have kept the issue of crime at the top
of the nation's political agenda. Focusing on the most sensational and violent
crimes, these actors have promoted policies aimed at "getting tough" and
"cracking down."
BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 96, at 4.
106. See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 31-39 (1976); AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE
COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 83-97 (1971). During the 1970s, empirical evaluation studies

questioned both the effectiveness of rehabilitative programs and the scientific expertise of those
who administered the enterprise. ALLEN, supra note 18, at 33-59. In the 1970s, determinate
sentences based on present offense and prior record increasingly supplanted indeterminate
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sentences and rehabilitation programs as disguised instruments of social control
with which the State oppressed minorities and the poor.'0 7 Liberals objected that
correctional personnel treated similarly-situated offenders differently and
discriminated against minorities.10 8 Conservatives perceived a breakdown of
"law and order" and advocated more punitive policies. 1°9 Criminological studies
of career criminals provided theoretical support for selectively incapacitating
serious and persistent offenders.110
Evaluations of treatment programs
sentences for adults as "just deserts" and retribution displaced rehabilitation as the underlying
rationale for criminal sentencing. Id. By the mid-1980s, about half the states enacted determinate
sentencing laws, ten eliminated parole boards, and many more used guidelines to structure sentence
decisions. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 6-13 (1996). Similar jurisprudential
changes occurred in sentencing and waiving delinquents, as "just deserts" concerns spilled-over
into the juvenile justice system as well. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the
Principle of Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 471, 483-87 (1987) [hereinafter Feld, Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver
Statutes]; Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems' Responses to Youth Violence 24
CRIME AND JUST. 189, 220-22 (1998) [hereinafter Feld, Responses to Youth Violence]; FELD, supra
note 2, at 208-31. These changes affected the sentencing of ordinary delinquents as state laws and
judicial practices emphasized offense criteria rather than a child's "best interests." See, e.g., Barry
C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the
Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 835-36 (1988) [hereinafter Feld, Punishment, Treatment,
and the Difference it Makes]; Julianne P. Sheffer, Serious and HabitualJuvenile Offender Statutes:
Reconciling Punishment and Rehabilitationwithin the Juvenile Justice System, 48 VAND. L. REV.
479 (1995); Feld, Responses to Youth Violence, supra note 106, at 220-43; FELD, supra note 2, at
249-86.
107. See AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMIT'EE, supra note 106 (arguing that no criminal

justice programs or reforms could ameliorate or avoid the consequences that flowed from racial
inequality and economic and social injustice in the larger society); FRANCIS T. CULLEN & KAREN E.
GILBERT, REAFFIRMING REHABILITATION 39-40 (1982); GARLAND, supra note 8, at 55; MAUER,

supra note 47, at 44 (rehabilitation incompatible with coercive institution such as prison; personal
change requires voluntary involvement which cannot be compelled).
108. See ALLEN, supra note 18, at 87-88; GARLAND, supra note 8, at 36; ROTHMAN, supra note
3, at 82-84 (arguing that liberal disenchantment with the "Rehabilitative Ideal" reflected a broader
disillusionment about the ability of the State to "do good" and its failure to deal justly with its most
vulnerable citizens).
109. Conservatives' efforts to "get tough" have produced a succession of "wars" on crime and
later on drugs, longer criminal sentences, increased prison populations; and disproportional
incarceration of racial minority offenders. See TONRY, supra note 8, at 94-95. For conservatives,
the confluence of rising youth crime rates, civil rights marches and civil disobedience, students'
protests against the war in Viet Nam, and urban and campus turmoil indicated an even deeper
moral crisis and breakdown of traditional society. CULLEN & GILBERT, supra note 107, at 4;
HACKER, supra note 51, at 22; EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 7, at 49-52.
110. See generally CRIMINAL CAREERS AND "CAREER CRIMINALS" (Alfred Blumstein et aL, eds.,

1986).

Beginning in the 1970s, longitudinal research has focused on the development of

delinquent and criminal careers. MARVIN WOLFGANG, ROBERT FIGLIO, & THORSTEN SELLIN,
DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT (1972); DONNA M. HAMPARIAN ET AL., THE VIOLENT FEW: A
STUDY OF DANGEROUS JUVENILE OFFENDERS 128-30 (1978); Joan Petersilia, Criminal Career

Research: A Review of Recent Evidence, 2 CRIME & JUST. 321 (1980). The criminal career research
initially offered the prospect that sentencing policies significantly might reduce or prevent crime
through "selective incapacitation" of the most active career offenders. Unfortunately, selective
incapacitation strategies founder on the inability prospectively to predict who the high base-rate
offenders will be. Jacqueline Cohen, Incapacitationas a Strategy for Crime Control: Possibilities
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questioned clinicians' ability to coerce behavioral changes and highlighted the
subjectivity inherent in therapeutic justice."' The cumulative criticism of the
"Rehabilitative Ideal" prompted calls for a return to classical principles of
criminal law and shifted sentencing decisions from broad consideration of each
offender to narrower, offense-based factors. The cultural and criminological
erosion of support for rehabilitation combined with increases in serious and
violent crimes, especially by Blacks, to push public opinion in a markedly more
conservative direction." 2 Politicians discovered that "law and order" provided
issues of criminal
them with a coded method by which to discuss legitimate
3
1
fears."
racial
Whites'
exploit
simultaneously
and
policy
A. De-Industrializationand the Black "Underclass"
Macro-economic and racial demographic changes in American cities during
the 1970s and 1980s contributed to an escalation in black youth homicide rates
in the late-1980s. The epidemic of crack cocaine spurred gun violence and
homicides. 114 That increase fueled the politics of crime that produced "gettough" juvenile justice policies. Conservative politicians used youth violence as
a way 5to evoke anti-black animus and pledged to "crack down" on youth
crime."1
During the post-World War II period, federal housing and highway policies
and private banks' mortgages and real estate sales practices spurred the growth
cores.1 16
of predominantly white suburbs surrounding poor and minority urban
As Blacks migrated from the rural South to urban areas, Whites increasingly
moved from cities to 7the suburbs and these population shifts altered the
configuration of cities."l
and Pitfalls, 5 CRIME AND JUST. 1 (1983); Jan Chaiken, Marcia Chaiken, & William Rhodes,
Predicting Violent Behavior and Classifying Violent Offenders, in 4 UNDERSTANDING AND
PREVENTING VIOLENCE: CONSEQUENCES AND CONTROLS 217 (Albert J. Reiss, Jr., & Jeffrey A. Roth,

eds., 1994).
111. See, e.g., Robert Martison, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform,
35 PUB. INT. 22, 25 (1974) ("[W]ith few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have
been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on rehabilitation."); ALLEN, supra note 18, at
57-58; MAUER, supra note 46, at 48-49.
112. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 7, at 111-12 ("By 1977, the percentage describing court
treatment of criminals as too harsh or about right had fallen to a minimal 11 percent, and those who
said the courts were not harsh enough had risen to 83 percent.").
113. MENDELBERG, supra note 63, at 90-98; EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 7, 69-73.
114. See Alfred Blumstein, Youth Violence, Guns, and the Illicit-DrugIndustry, 86 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 10 (1995).
115. See e.g., FELD, supra note 2, at 206-07.
116. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 11, at 19-59. During the 1960s, "urban renewal"
projects eliminated about 20% of the housing available in central cities in which Blacks resided.
BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 96, at 39; MAUER, supra note 47, at 123; KATZ, supra note 55, at
136 (arguing that in the 1950s and 1960s, urban renewal and highway construction disrupted and
destroyed many urban black communities).
117. See supra notes 46-56 and accompanying text; see also GARLAND, supra note 8, at 84 (the

NORTHERN KENTUCKY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:2

From the end of World War II until the early 1970s, men with only a high
school degree could get good jobs in the automobile, steel, construction, and
manufacturing industries. 1 8 Beginning in the 1970s, the transition from an
industrial to an information and service economy reduced workers' prospects in
the manufacturing sectors and many of them lacked the skills or education
needed to succeed in the post-industrial economy." 9 The globalizing economy
adversely affected the domestic automobile and steel industries and the black
workers who had arrived more recently to work in them. 120 The most severe
losses occurred in higher-paying, lower-skilled manufacturing jobs which
benefited urban minority workers. 12 1 Job growth occurred primarily in suburbs
and in information and service industries that required higher levels of education
than most urban minority workers possessed. 122 Over several decades, the
economic, spatial, and racial reconfiguration of cities led to an urban black
23
underclass living in concentrated poverty and in social and cultural isolation.'
automobile and the accompanying construction of highways and the large-scale migration of whites
from cities to suburbs constitute major developments in post-War urban social ecology); KATZ,
supra note 55, at 134 ("After 1945, suburbanization accelerated. Massive increases in automobile
ownership, the federal highway program, and federal housing policies that underwrote suburban
mortgages and redlined cities composed one set of factors speeding its development."); LEMANN,
supra note 44, at 118 ("The interstate highway program was encouraging the flight of the white
middle class to the new, sterile, soulless suburbs...").
118. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS 25-34 (1996); KATZ, supra note 55, at

128-29.
119. The transition to a post-modem society produced a bifurcation of economic opportunities
based on education and training. Garland notes that the revolution in technology:
[Glave rise to the 'information society' that we now inhabit; made possible the
cities and suburbs in which we dwell; linked the four comers of the globe into a
single accessible world; and created new social divisions between those who
have access to the high-tech world and those who do not.
GARLAND, supra note 8, at 78; KATz, supra note 55, at 124-25 (describing the post-industrial city
as a study in contrasts-the shiny towers of revitalized commercial centers near the closed factories
of the industrial districts, wealthy "yuppies" living in gentrified older neighborhoods and
impoverished minorities living in concentrated poverty).
120. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 7, at 27 (noting that the "political consequences of a
globalized economy provide a case study of how race interacts catalytically with seemingly raceneutral developments to produce a powerful reaction"). The effects of declining industrial
productivity and global competition eroded jobs, wages, and employment security. Id. at 201-02.
See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 118, at 25-100; KATz, supra note 55, at 130 ("Economic stagnation,
the disproportionate growth of low-wage jobs, the declining minimum wage, the mismatch between
better jobs and the education of the urban poor, and shifts in occupational structure have worsened
poverty within America's cities.").
121. KATZ, supra note 55, at 130; WILSON, supra note 118, at 39-46.
122. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED:
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 100-02 (1987).

THE INNER-CITY,

THE

123. See generally CHRISTOPHER JENCKS & PAUL E. PETERSON, THE URBAN UNDERCLASS (1991);
MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDERCLASS DEBATE: VIEWS FROM HISTORY 3 (1993); KATz, supra note 55,
at 199 ("Blacks' detachment from 'the standardized institutions' feeding the primary labor market
reinforced their entrapment in the underclass."). Edsall and Edsall note that:
The concentration among the black poor of single motherhood, crime and
withdrawal from the labor market - combined with an intensified geographic
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B. Crack + Guns = Black Youth Homicide
In the mid-1980s, entrepreneurs introduced crack cocaine into devastated
urban areas and the drug trade produced a sharp escalation in black youth
homicides. 124 Crack cocaine spawned a violent drug industry in large cities and
led to a sharp increase in gun murders committed by black youths. 125 Youths in
the drug industry arm themselves for self-protection and take more risks than do
during illegal drug transactions can quickly
adults. 126 The presence of guns
127
escalate to homicidal violence.
The crack cocaine epidemic exacerbated racial differences in arrest rates for
violent crimes committed by juveniles. 128 Police arrest black youths for violent
crimes-murder, rape, robbery, and assault-about five times more frequently
than they do white juveniles. 129 Between 1986 and 1993, as youth homicide
isolation - has made it possible to partially segregate this segment of the
population from the political, social, and economic mainstream.... [T]he
emergence of the underclass and of an expanding body of the black urban poor
has created a growing perception of a society in which the poor are no longer
linked to the larger social network... .The black urban poor have increasingly
come to constitute a divergent and threatening segment of society from which
ties to the mainstream through work, neighborhood, and shared communal
values have been severed.
EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 7, at 244.
124. See, e.g., ALFRED BLUMSTEIN, Disaggregatingthe Violence Trends, in THE CRIME DROP IN
AMERICA 13-20 (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., 2000); Philip J. Cook & John H. Laub,
The Unprecedented Epidemic in Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & JUST. 27, 51-58 (1998); FRANKLIN E.
ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE 3-16 (1998); FELD, supra note 2, at 197-202; HOWARD N.
SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1999
NATIONAL REPORT 13 (1999); BLUMSTEIN, supra at 13.
125. See Blumstein, supra note 114, at 39 ("introduction of crack in the mid-1980s; recruitment
of young minority males to sell the drugs in street markets; arming of the drug sellers with
handguns for self-protection; diffusion of guns to peers; irresponsible and excessively casual use of
guns by young people, leading to a 'contagious' growth in homicide..."); BECKETT & SASSON,
supra note 96, at 8, 28 (high homicide rate attributable to interaction of numerous factorsprevalence of guns, economic and racial inequality reflected in concentrated poverty, traffic in
illegal drugs such as crack, and a "code of the streets" that encourages violent responses to
disrespect); MAUER, supra note 47, at 97 (as many as half of murders may be drug-related and so
changes in drug markets affect homicide rates); Cook & Laub argue that:
The leading explanation for why youth-homicide rates began increasing in the
mid-1980s is the introduction of crack cocaine and, in particular, the conflict
that attended its marketing . . . . [f]or many youths, the response to the
increased threat of violence was to carry a gun or join a gang for selfprotection, while adopting a more aggressive interpersonal style.
Cook & Laub, supra note 124, at 53-54; Alfred Blumstein & Daniel Cork, Linking Gun
Availability to Youth Gun Violence, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 9-10 (1996).
126. Blumstein & Cork, supra note 125, at 9-12.
127. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE 256-260
(Albert J. Reiss, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Roth eds., 1993).
128. FELD, supra note 2, at 199-205.
129. See, e.g., FELD, supra note 2, at 197-206; ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 91, at 76
(blacks about seven times as likely as whites to be arrested for violent crimes and eight times as
likely for homicide); Cook & Laub, supra note 124, at 42-43 ("half of all juvenile violence arrests
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rates escalated sharply, police arrests of white juveniles increased about 40%,
while arrests of black youths increased 278%. 13 0 Guns accounted for most of the
131
increase as well as for the racial differences in youth homicide arrests.
Between 1984 and 1994, the juvenile homicide rate nearly tripled 132 and the use
of guns by juveniles to kill their victims quadrupled. 33 Because of the nexus
between the crack industry and inner cities, almost all of the increases in
homicides involved urban black males.134
Policies to "get tough" on youth violence effectively meant targeting young
black men. 135 Because the public views juvenile courts' clientele primarily as
poor, urban black males, 136 politicians could exploit these perceptions for
political advantage with demagogic pledges to "crack down" on youth crime
which served as a "code word" for black males. 37 In response to the spike in
youth homicide arrests, legislators
changed states' juvenile waiver and
38
delinquency sentencing laws.

were of blacks, implying an arrest rate over five times as high as for whites").
130. See MELISSA SICKMUND, HOWARD N. SNYDER & EILEEN POE-YAMAGATA, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1997 UPDATE ON VIOLENCE 13 (1997); MAUER, supra

note 47, at 84 (between 1984 and 1993, the homicide rate for white males ages 14-17 doubled from
6.9 to 14.4 per 100,000, while the black male homicide rate quadrupled from 33.4 to 151.6 per
100,000); ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 91, at 66 ("Homicide rates are highest in the slum
neighborhoods of big cities that exclusively house the black poor. The race of the residents, the
socioeconomic status of the neighborhood, and city size are all associated with elevated rates of
homicide victimization.").
131. The number of deaths that juveniles caused by means other than firearms averaged about
570 per year and fluctuated within a "normal range" of about 10%. See, e.g., Franklin E. Zimring,
Kids, Guns, and Homicide: Policy Notes on an Age-Specific Epidemic, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
25, 29 (1996); ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 91, at 106-23; FELD, supra note 2, at 207-08.

132. See Zimring, supra note 131, at 29; ZIMRING, supra note 124, at 89 (rate of homicide
arrests for offenders under eighteen for gun killings more than tripled between 1985 and 1994).

133. Zimring, supra note 131, at 29; see also ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 91, at 108 (guns
account for more than twice as many murders as all other methods combined); Blumstein, supra
note 114, at 29-30, 32 (weapons involved in adolescent conflict shifted to handguns and semiautomatic weapons; between 1985 and 1993, juveniles' use of guns nearly quadrupled).
134. See Cook & Laub, supra note 124; Blumstein, supra note 114, at 16-22; Blumstein &
Cork, supra note 125, at 15-16.
135. The politicization of crime policies and the connection in the public and political minds
between race and youth crime provided a powerful political incentive for changes in waiver
policies and juvenile court sentencing policies that coincided with escalating rates of youth crime
and violence in the late 1970s and again in the late 1980s. FELD,supra note 2, at 197-202.

136. FELD, supra note 2, at 205-09 (concentration of gun violence within the urban black male
population creates a misleading perception of juvenile courts' larger role in dealing with generic
youth crime).
137. BECKETr, supra note 18, at 83-88.
138. See, e.g., PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS
AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME: RESEARCH REPORT 3-9 (1996); FELD, supra note 2, 192-95.
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C. "Get Tough" Politics and the War on Juveniles
The confluence of guns, homicide and race provided the impetus for a
political "crack down" on youth crime generally and tougher juvenile justice
waiver and sentencing policies. Conservative politicians exploited the public's
fears of a "blood-bath" and warned of a coming generation of "superpredators."1 39 Public officials proposed to transfer more youths to criminal court
to staunch the flood. 4°
The politicization of crime policies and the adoption of harsher juvenile
transfer and sentencing laws culminated a process that began decades earlier. In
the 1950's, conservative southerners ascribed a link between race and crime as
part of a strategy to discredit the civil rights movement. Civil rights activism to
desegregate schools and public facilities included civil disobedience and sitins.141 Southern politicians and sheriffs variously described protesters as
"criminals," "outside agitators," and "mobs."'' 42 Conservative politicians
equated political dissent and civil disobedience with criminality and reinforced
the connection between race and crime. 143 During the 1960s, the increase in
139. See, e.g.,

JAMES ALAN

Fox, U.S. DEP'T

TO THE UNITED STATES ATrORNEY

JUSTICE, TRENDS IN JUVENILE VIOLENCE: A REPORT

GENERAL ON CURRENT AND FUTURE RATES OF JUVENILE

OFFENDING (1996); WILUAM J. BENNETr ET AL., BODY COUNT (1996).
140. See, e.g., JEROME G. MILLER, SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES IN THE

CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1996); Zimring argues that:
To talk of a "coming storm" creates a riskless environment for getting tough in
advance of the future threat. If the crime rate rises, the prediction has been
validated. If the crime rate does not rise, the policies that the alarmists put in
place can be credited with avoiding the bloodbath. The prediction cannot be
falsified, currently or ever.
ZIMRING, supra note 124, at 63; MAUER, supra note 46, at 12 ("as the image of the criminal as an
urban black male has hardened into public consciousness, so too, has support for punitive
approaches to social problems been enhanced").
141. See, e.g., OMI&WNANT,supra note 6, at 98.
142. See, e.g., BECKET-r & SASSON, supra note 96, at 49 (Southern officials called for a
crackdown on "'hoodlums,' 'agitators,' 'street mobs,' and 'lawbreakers' who challenged
segregation and Black disenfranchisement, [and] these officials made rhetoric about crime a key
component of political discourse on race relations."); BECKETT, supra note 18, at 28 ("discourse of
law and order was initially mobilized by southern officials in their effort to discredit the civil rights
movement"); Feld, supra note 89, at 1538-52 (analyzing the politicization of crime policies and the
political exploitation of those differences).
143. BECKETT, supra note 18, at 32 argues that
the introduction and construction of the crime issue in national political
discourse in the 1960s was shaped by the definitional activities of southern
officials, presidential candidate Goldwater, and the other conservative
politicians who followed his cue. Categories such as street crime and law and
order conflated conventional crime and political dissent and were used in an
attempt to heighten opposition to the civil rights movement. Conservatives
also identified the civil rights movement-and in particular, the philosophy of
civil disobedience-as a leading cause of crime. These forms of protest were
depicted as criminal rather than political in nature, and the excessive "lenience"
of the courts was also identified as a main cause of crime. Countering the trend
toward lawlessness, they argued, would require holding criminals-including
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crime and urban disorders evoked further fears of "crime in the streets" and a
breakdown of "law and order."'" Republican politicians blamed rising crime
rates, urban riots, and social
disorder on the Warren Court and liberal
45
Democratic social policies.
Clear differences between the political parties about race-related policy
issues emerged during the 1964 presidential race between Lyndon Johnson and
Barry Goldwater.' 46 Democrats' support for the civil rights movement alienated
white southerners and other voters who began to see differences between the two
parties.147 Republicans used several race-related "wedge issues" - crime,
affirmative action, and welfare - to distinguish themselves from Democrats and
to make crime policies a partisan issue.

48

In 1968, George Wallace 149 and

protesters-accountable for their actions through swift, certain, and severe
punishment.
144. GARLAND, supra note 8, at 97 argues that:
Appealing to the social conservatism of 'hard-working', 'respectable' (and
largely white) middle classes, 'New Right' politicians blamed the shiftless poor
for victimizing 'decent' society-for crime on the streets, welfare expenditure,
high taxes, industrial militancy-and blamed the liberal elites for licensing a
permissive culture and the anti-social behaviour it encouraged.
145. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 7, at 51-73; GILENS, supra note 9, at 116-23; MENDELBERG,
supra note 63, at 93-98; BECKETr & SASSON, supra note 96, at 10 ("In response to the civil rights
movement and the expansion of the War on Poverty programs of the 1960s, conservative
politicians highlighted the problem of 'street crime' and argued that this problem was caused by an
excessively lenient welfare and justice system that encouraged bad people to make bad choices.");
BECKETr, supra note 18, at 87 ("By attributing the very real economic plight of 'taxpayers' and
'working persons' to the behavior of the 'underclass,' conservatives diminish the likelihood that
these grievances will give rise to policies aimed at redistributing opportunities and resources in a
more egalitarian fashion."); HACKER, supra note 51, at 210 ("playing on white fears of 'black
crime' has moved to the center of political campaigns. Even though most white Americans do not
live in or near areas where violence stalks the streets, the issue crops up in every poll and has
become a conversational staple.").
146. Lyndon Johnson's presidential leadership led to passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
which Barry Goldwater, a staunch conservative, opposed. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 7, at
35. The 1964 Republican party convention rejected a party platform in favor of civil rights by a
two-to-one margin. Id. at 44.
147. Id. at 74-80; BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 96, at 52-58; GILENS, supra note 9, at 116-22;

supra note 63, at 81-93.
148. See, e.g., BEcKETr, supra note 18, at 30-43; GILENS, supra note 9, at 4-8; EDSALL &
EDSALL, supra note 7, at 4 (noting that "race has become a powerful wedge, breaking up what had
been the majoritarian economic interests of the poor, working, and lower-middle classes in the
traditional liberal coalition"). In the pre-civil rights era, poor southern whites supported liberal
policies on a host of economic issues and a larger governmental role in medical care, education,
and employment. Id. at 41-42. Southern populism and economic liberalism foundered on their
hostility to blacks and the perception that federal programs primarily benefited blacks. Id. at 41.
OMI & WINANT, supra note 6,at 149 (describing racial politics as a powerful wedge issue that
fractured the New Deal economic coalition of the poor, working, and middle-classes).
149. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 7, at 77, 79; OMI & WINANT, supra note 6, at 124
(calling Wallace a law and order, anti-State, southern populist who made racial appeals the
centerpiece of his campaign); Phillips argues that:
The common denominator of Wallace support, Catholic or Protestant, is
alienation from the Democratic Party and a strong trend - shown in other years
MENDELBERG,
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Richard Nixon attributed rising crime rates and urban riots to liberal
"permissiveness" and Warren Court decisions "coddling criminals."'150 Against
this backdrop, conservatives' calls for "law and order" acquired a racial
subtext. 15 1 "Code words" implicitly invoke racial stereotypes without explicitly
seeming racist or discriminatory. 152 Conservative politicians could talk about
voters' negative views of Blacks
crime and simultaneously activate white
153
without explicitly playing the "race card."'
Republican strategists pursued a "southern strategy" to realign the political
154
parties around racial issues and to achieve a stable electoral majority.
Republicans spoke to white southern and suburban constituencies with code
words like "law and order" and knew that they carried racial meanings. 5 5 By
and other contests - toward the GOP. Although most of Wallace's votes came
from Democrats, he principally won those in motion between a Democratic
past and a Republican future.
PHILLIPS, supra note 7, at 463.
150. TED GEST, CRIME & PoLmcs: BIG GOVERNMENT'S ERRATIC CAMPAIGN FOR LAW AND

ORDER 14 (2001) (during the 1968 presidential campaign, Nixon gave 17 speeches on law and
order); BECKETT, supra note 18, at 38 (as a result of political and media attention to crime during
the 1968 campaign, by 1969, 81% of poll respondents asserted a breakdown in law and order had
occurred and attributed it to communists and Negroes who start riots); POWE, supra note 6, at 399
(Nixon's domestic policy stump speech emphasized "crime in the streets" and urban riots).
151. After three years of urban riots, rising youth crime rates, anti-Vietnam protests, and the
assassinations of Robert F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr., a climate of fear and anger
produced political demands for "law and order." BECKETr & SASSON, supra note 96, at 51 ("The
racial subtext of these arguments was not lost on the public: Those most opposed to social and
racial reform were also most receptive to calls for law and order.").
152. See, e.g., OMI & WINANT, supra note 6, at 123 (code words are "phrases and symbols

which refer indirectly to racial themes, but do not directly challenge popular democratic or
egalitarian ideals"); Richard Dvorak, "Cracking the Code: 'De-Coding' Colorblind Slurs During
the CongressionalCrack Cocaine Debates," 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 611, 615 (2000) ("[Llegislators
can appeal to racist sentiments without appearing racist"); GILENS, supra note 9, at 67 ("Although
political elites typically use race-neutral language in discussion poverty and welfare, it is now
widely believed that welfare is a 'race-coded' topic that evokes racial imagery and attitudes even
when racial minorities are not explicitly mentioned.").
153. See OMI & WINANT, supra note 6, at 123 (defining racial "code words" as "phrases and
symbols which refer indirectly to racial themes, but do not directly challenge popular democratic or
egalitarian ideals (e.g., justice, equal opportunity)."); see also Martin Gilens, "'Race Coding' and
White Opposition to Welfare," 90 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 593,595 (1996); Dvorak, Cracking the Code,
supra note 29, at 615; ROBERT M. ENTMAN & ANDREW ROJECKI, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE
MIND 20 (2000) ("Whites whose animosity is inflamed-including ambivalent Whites responding
to specific situations and stimuli-become receptive to coded campaign appeals designed to
mobilize them into coalitions with traditional racists.").
154. GARLAND, supra note 8, at 96-97 (arguing that "growing crime, worsening race relations,
family breakdown, growing welfare rolls, and the decline of 'traditional values'-together with
concerns about high taxes, inflation, and declining economic performance-created a growing
anxiety about the effects of change that conservative politicians began to pick up on and
articulate"); LEMANN, supra note 44, at 201 ("The great migration then delivered the coup de grace
to the Democrats as a presidential party: it hastened the movement of millions of middle-class
white voters to the Republican suburbs, and it caused millions more blue-collar voters who didn't
move to stop voting for the Democratic candidate for president.").
155. See, e.g., PHILLIPS, supra note 7, at 22; OMI & WINANT, supra note 6, at 124 (Phillips
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conflating race and crime and associating both with the Democrats, Republicans
turned criminal justice policies into hotly contested partisan issues. 156 Over the
next two decades, they highlighted the symbolic relationship between race and
crime with campaign advertisements focused on drugs, the death penalty, youth
crime, and "Willie Horton.' 57 By the late-1980s, voters understood campaigns
to "get tough" and "crack down"58 on "youth crime" as code words for harsher
treatment of young black males. 1
V. COMPETENCE AND CULPABILITY IN THE CONTEMPORARY JUVENILE JUSTICE
SYSTEM:

ACCESS TO COUNSEL; WAIVER AND CRIMINAL SENTENCING; AND
DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONFINEMENT

Against the backdrop of the politicization of crime policies, some politicians
blamed the increase in youth violence in the late-1980s on the failure of juvenile
courts adequately to punish young offenders. 159 By the early 1990s, nearly every
state amended its laws to transfer more youths to criminal courts and to sentence
delinquents more severely. 160 The changes in waiver and sentencing laws

suggested "coded" strategy of anti-black rhetoric to appeal to conservative blue-collar and southern
voters); EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 7, at 98 (arguing that "[riace was central ... to the
fundamental conservative strategy of establishing a new, non-economic polarization of the
electorate, a polarization isolating a liberal, activist, culturally-permissive, rights-oriented, and problack Democratic Party against those unwilling to pay the financial and social costs of this
reconfigured social order").
156. TONRY, supra note 8, at 10; GARLAND, supra note 8, at 153 (arguing that "anxieties about
crime, on top of the more inchoate insecurities prompted by rapid social change and economic
recession, paved the way for a politics of reaction in the late 1970s").
157. The 1988 Bush campaign used symbols and images - ACLU, Willie Horton, the death
penalty-to appeal to white voters' concerns about race, morality, and cultural values and to
associate Democratic candidate Michael Dukakis with criminal defendants' rights, black crime, and
the erosion of traditional values. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 7, at 215-16; DAVID C. ANDERSON,
CRIME AND THE POLITICS OF HYSTERIA: How THE WItIE HORTON STORY CHANGED AMERICAN
JUSTICE 224 (1995); BECKETr & SASSON, supra note 96, at 68 (Bush campaign director described
Horton as "a wonderful mix of liberalism and a big black rapist."); ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note
153, at 92 (Bush's blatant anti-Black Horton advertisements deliberately raised the crime issue to
arouse the fear in many Whites of dangerous Blacks).
158. See BECKETr, supra note 18; HACKER, supra note 51, at 57 (arguing that "when crime rates
rise, conservatives do not call for confronting basic causes-unemployment, for example, or
inferior education-but rather invoke a firmer use of force."); MILLER, supra note 140, at 149
(arguing that "welfare and crime have never been far from the reach of any politician who wishes to
posture on race without ever having actually to mention it"); Gilens, supra note 153, at 602
(arguing that public officials who use crime and welfare as "code" to mobilize anti-black
sentiments for electoral advantage among white voters practice a politics of division).
159. See, e.g., GARLAND, supra note 8, at 108; BERNARD, supra note 37, at 3-5 (cyclical pattern
of oscillation between severity and leniency in juvenile justice policy).
160. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL ET AL., supra note 33, at 223. It states that:
Policies of the last decade have become more punitive toward delinquent
juveniles, but especially toward juveniles who commit violent crimes. Punitive
policies include easier waivers to adult court, excluding certain offenses from
juvenile court jurisdiction, blended juvenile and adult sentences, increased
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emphasized punishment and focused primarily on juveniles' present offense and
prior record.'16 The shift from rehabilitation to retribution marked a substantial
departure from traditional juvenile court sentencing policies. 62
As a
consequence, harsher waiver and sentencing policies raise important questions
about the quality of procedural justice in juvenile courts 63and states' compliance
with Gault's mandate to provide adequate legal services.1
A. Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court
Progressive reformers used informal procedures to adjudicate and to impose
dispositions in the child's "best interests." Gault granted delinquents greater
procedural safeguards because of the gap between Progressives' rhetoric and
juvenile courts' reality. However, Gault's increased procedural formality
legitimated punishment and contributed to greater severity in juvenile
jurisprudence and practice. 164 Although juvenile courts increasingly converge
with criminal courts, states do not provide delinquents with all adult criminal
procedural safeguards, such as the right to a jury trial, or with special procedures
to protect them from their own immaturity, such as mandatory appointment of
counsel. Perversely, states put juveniles on an equal footing with adults when
formal equality places them at a practical disadvantage. 65 For example, states
use the adult waiver standard - "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" under the
totality of the circumstances - to gauge juveniles' waivers of rights including the
right to counsel.
authority to prosecutors to decide to file cases in adult court, and more frequent
custodial placement of adjudicated delinquents.
161. See, e.g., PATRICIA TORBET Er AL., supra note 138; Feld, Responses to Youth Violence,
supra note 106, at 189-261.
162. See, e.g., Feld, Responses to Youth Violence, supra note 106; NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL ET
AL., supra note 33, at 210 ("State legislative changes in recent years have moved the court away
from its rehabilitative goals and toward punishment and accountability... include[ing] blended
sentences, mandatory minimum sentences, and extended jurisdiction."); MAUER, supra note 47, at
137-38 (sentencing discretion shifted from judges to prosecutors and "judicial discretion is
exercised in an open courtroom subject to public scrutiny, but the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion is conducted behind closed doors with little accountability").
163. N. Lee Cooper et al., Fulfilling the Promise of In re Gault: Advancing the Role of Lawyers
for Children, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 651, 652 (1998) (describing changes in juvenile codes waiver of younger youths, exclusion of more offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction, wider
sharing of records and erosion of confidentiality, greater emphasis on punishment - and the
increased importance of effective representation).
164. See Feld, Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, supra note 106 (describing
changes in juvenile court sentencing statutes to impose longer and determinate sentences); Feld,
Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, supra note 106 (describing legislative changes in
waiver statutes to make it easier to transfer more youths to criminal court for prosecution as adults);
Feld, supra note 88, at 1140-81 (criticizing procedural deficiencies of juvenile courts in light of
states' use of prior delinquency convictions to enhance adult criminal sentences).
165. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 79, at 272-76 (arguing that states treat juveniles just like adults
when formal equality results in practical inequality and enables the state to take advantage of
juveniles' immaturity).
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Gault likened the seriousness of a delinquency proceeding to a felony
prosecution and granted juveniles the right to counsel.' 66 But, the Court based
juveniles' right to counsel on the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause,
rather than the Sixth Amendment which protects adult defendants' right to
counsel.167 Gault relied heavily on the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice which recommended that juvenile
courts appoint counsel "wherever coercive action is a possibility, without
requiring any affirmative choice by child or parent."'' 68 By contrast, Gault relied
only on "fundamental fairness" and did not mandate appointment of counsel for
delinquents, but instead only required that "the child and his parents must be
notified of the child's right to be represented by counsel retained by them, or if
they are169unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to represent the
child."'

When the Supreme Court decided Gault, lawyers seldom appeared in
juvenile courts. 70 After Gault, states amended their codes to conform with the
constitutional requirement to make counsel available to delinquents. Despite
formal changes of the "laws on the books," the "law in action" lagged behind
and most states failed to deliver legal services. Evaluations of initial compliance
with Gault found that most judges did not advise juveniles of their right to or
appoint counsel.' 17 A survey of judicial compliance conducted in Kentucky two
years after Gault reported that about two-thirds of judges appointed lawyers for
72
fewer than half of delinquents and one-third for fewer than 10% of juveniles.
Studies of counties or courts in several jurisdictions in the 1970s and 1980s73
reported that juvenile courts failed to appoint counsel for most juveniles.
166. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 36-38 (asserting that as a matter of due process "the assistance of
counsel is.. . essential for the determination of delinquency, carrying with it the awesome prospect
of incarceration in a state institution").
167. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344 (granting criminal defendants a Sixth Amendment right to
counsel because "in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is
too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him").
168. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 39 n. 65 (quoting recommendations of the President's Commission
on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice which emphasized the importance of
counsel); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME INA FREE SOCIETY (1967); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT:

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME

(1967).
169. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 41.
170. See, e.g., Note, Juvenile Delinquents, supra note 69, at 796-99 (attorneys appear for
juveniles in no more than five percent of cases).
171. Norman Lefstein et al., In Search of Juvenile Justice: Gault and Its Implementation, 3 LAW
& SOC'Y REv. 491, 506-16, 537 n.92 (1969); Elyce Z. Ferster et al., The Juvenile Justice System:
In Search of the Role of Counsel, 39 FORDHAM L. REv. 375 (1971).
172. Bardley C. Canon & Kenneth Kolson, Rural Compliance with Gault: Kentucky, A Case
Study, 10 J. FAM. L. 301, 316 (1971) (reporting that most Kentucky juvenile courts failed to
achieve compliance with Gault's requirement to appoint counsel).
173. See, e.g., Stevens H. Clarke & Gary G. Koch, Juvenile Court: Therapy or Crime Control,
and Do Lawyers Make a Difference?, 14 L. & Soc'Y REv. 263, 297 (1980) (reporting that in North
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Research in Minnesota in the mid-1980s reported that most youths appeared
without counsel,174 that rates of representation varied widely in urban, suburban
and rural counties,175 and that a substantial minority of youths whom judges
removed from their homes or confined in institutions had no lawyer at their trial
or sentencing hearing. 176 Feld's comparative study of six states reported that
only three of them appointed counsel for a substantial majority of juveniles in
delinquency proceedings.1 77 Studies in the 1990s continued to describe juvenile
court judges' failure to appoint lawyers for many youths who appear before
them. 78 In 1995, the General Accounting Office replicated and confirmed
Feld's findings that rates of representation varied widely among and within
179
states and that juvenile courts tried and sentenced many unrepresented youths.
Burruss and Kempf-Leonard's study in Missouri found urban, suburban and
rural variation in rates of representation (73%, 25%, and 18%) and reported that
after controlling for other variables, an attorney's presence consistently and
adversely affected
juveniles' likelihood of receiving out-of-home placements in
180
all settings.
In the mid-1990's the American Bar Association (ABA) published two
reports on the legal needs of young people. In America's Children at Risk, the
ABA reported that "Many children go through the juvenile justice system
without the benefit of legal counsel. Among those who do have counsel, some
Carolina, the juvenile defender project represented only 22.3% of juveniles in Winston-Salem,
N.C., and only 45.8% in Charlotte, N.C.); David P. Aday, Jr., Court Structure, Defense Attorney
Use, and Juvenile Court Decisions, 27 SOC. Q. 107, 114 (1986) (reporting rates of representation
of 26.2% and 38.7% in the jurisdiction he studied); M. A. BORTNER, INSIDE A JUVENILE COURT: THE
TARNISHED IDEAL OF INDIVIDUALIZED JUSTICE 139 (New York University Press 1982) (studying a
large, mid-western county's juvenile court and reporting that "[o]ver half (58.2 percent) [of the
juveniles] were not represented by an attorney"); KIMBERLY KEMPF LEONARD ET AL., MINORITIES IN
JUVENILE JUSTICE 82 (1995) (reporting that substantial majority of urban and rural juveniles in
Missouri appeared in juvenile court without counsel).
174. Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court: An Empirical Study of When
Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1214 (1989)
(reporting that in 1986, overall rate of representation was 48% with rates ranging from a high of
100% in some counties to a low of less than five percent in other counties); see also, BARRY C.
FELD, JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES: THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE JUVENILE COURTS (1993).
175. Barry C. Feld, Justice by Geography: Urban, Suburban, and Rural Variation in Juvenile
JusticeAdministration, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 156 (1991); FELD, supra note 174.
176. Feld, supra note 174, at 1238 (reporting that 31% of juveniles removed from their homes
and 27% of those incarcerated were not represented by counsel).
177. Barry C. Feld, In re Gault Revisited: A Cross-State Comparisonof the Right to Counsel in
Juvenile Court, 34 CRIME & DELINQ. 393, 401 (1988) (reporting that interstate rates of
representation were highly variable: California, 85%; Minnesota, 48%; Nebraska, 53%; New York,
96%; North Dakota, 38%; and Pennsylvania, about 90%).
178. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, JUVENILE JUSTICE: REPRESENTATION RATES
VARIED AS DID COUNSEL'S IMPACT ON COURT OUTCOMES 15 (1995); George W. Burruss, Jr. &
Kimberly Kempf-Leonard, The QuestionableAdvantage of Defense Counsel in Juvenile Court, 19
JUST. Q. 37 (2002).
179. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 178, at 15.
180. Burruss & Kempf-Leonard, supra note 178.
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are represented by counsel who are untrained in the complexities of representing
juveniles and fail to provide 'competent' representation." 181 In A Call for
Justice, the ABA focused on the quality of lawyers in juvenile courts and again
reported that many delinquents appeared without an attorney. 82 Since the late1990s, the ABA has conducted a series of state-by-state assessments of
juveniles' access to counsel and the quality of representation they receive.
These studies consistently report that many, if not most, juveniles appear without
counsel and that lawyers who represent them often provide substandard services
Moreover,
because of structural impediments to effective advocacy. 183
regardless of the inadequacy of a youth's representation, the juvenile justice
process is nearly incapable of correcting its own errors.1 84 Juvenile defenders
often lack even a record with which
rarely, if ever, appeal adverse decisions and
85
to challenge an invalid waiver of counsel. 1
181.

A.B.A., AMERICA'S CHILDREN AT RISK 60(1993).

182. A.B.A., A CALL FOR JUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF
REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 45 (1995).
AN
183. See e.g., GABRIELLA CELESE & PATRICIA PURITz, THE CHILDREN LEFT BEHIND:
ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF LEGAL PRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY

PROCEEDINGS IN LOUISIANA 59-62 (2001) (reporting that observers in several parishes estimated

that 80-90% of delinquents appeared without counsel) [hereinafter CELESE & PuRrrz, THE
CHILDREN LEFT BEHIND]; PATRICIA PuRrrz & Kim BROOKS, A.B.A., KENTUCKY: ADVANCING
JUSTICE:

AN

ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS

TO COUNSEL

AND QUALITY

OF REPRESENTATION

IN

DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 29 (2002) (noting that despite efforts to improve delivery of legal
services, large numbers of youths continue to appear without counsel) [hereinafter PuRrrz &
BROOKS, KENTUCKY]; PATRICIA PURrIZ ET AL., A.B.A., VIRGINIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO
COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 24-5 (2002) (estimating
that half or more of juveniles appeared without counsel, including many charged with serious
offenses) [hereinfter PURrrz ET AL., VIRGINIA];KIM BROOKS & DARLENE KAMINE, JUSTICE CUT
SHORT: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION INDELINQUENCY
PROCEEDINGS INOHIO 25 (2004) (reporting that juvenile courts processed as many as 80% of youths
without benefit of counsel); Susanne M. Bookser, Making Gault Meaningful: Access to Counsel
and Quality of Representation in Delinquency Proceedings for Indigent Youth, 3 WHITTIER J.
CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 297 (2004) (analyzing and identifying commonalities in the separate state
reports assessing delivery and quality of legal services).
184. Mary Berkheiser, The Fiction of Juvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver in the Juvenile Courts,
54 FLA. L. REv. 577, 633 (2002) (describing the lack of appellate counsel to challenge trial judges'
procedural short-comings).
185. See, e.g. Berkheiser, supra note 61, at 633 (describing low rate of appeals from
delinquency proceedings); Patricia Puritz & Wendy Shang, Juvenile Indigent Defense: Crisis and
Solutions, 15 CRIM. JUST. 22, 23 (Spring 2000) (reporting that public defenders and court appointed
counsel rarely, if ever, file appeals); Donald J. Harris, Due Process vs. Helping Kids in Trouble:
Implementing the Right to Appeal from Adjudications of Delinquency in Pennsylvania, 98 DICK. L.
REv. 209 (1993) (reporting that public defenders filed about ten times as many appeals for adult
defendants as for delinquents and attributing the differences to juvenile defense lawyers'
internalization of parens patriae ideology); Gary L. Crippen, Can the Courts FairlyAccount for
the Diminished Competence and Culpability of Juveniles? A Judge's Perspective, in YOUTH ON
TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 403, 411, 414 (Thomas Grisso &
Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) ("[Slervices of counsel . . . must be sufficient to create a
meaningful right of appeal. Without a healthy juvenile court appellate practice, legal rights are
often illusory... "); Bookser, supra note 60, at 306 ("Post-disposition advocacy is minimal with
defender offices not structured to support appeals. Excessive caseloads and restrictions on
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There are several reasons why so many youths appear in juvenile courts
without counsel. 186 Public-defender legal services may be inadequate or nonexistent in non-urban areas.' 87 Juvenile court judges may encourage and readily
find waivers of the right of counsel to ease administrative burdens on the
courts. 18 8 For example, judges may give cursory advisories of rights that imply
that it is just a technicality. 89 Judges in more traditional juvenile courts resent
lawyers who challenge their discretion. 90 In other instances, judges may not
appoint counsel for a juvenile if they expect to impose a non-custodial
sentence. 191
Waiver of counsel is the most common reason why so many juveniles are
unrepresented. 92 In most states, courts gauge juveniles' waivers of rights by
assessing whether they were "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" under the
"totality of the circumstances."' 193 In Fare v. Michael C., 194 the Court endorsed
compensation hamper willing attorneys. Frequently, appointments officially end at disposition,
making post-disposition advocacy a moot issue.").
186. See A.B.A., supra note 182, at 45.
187. Canon & Kolson, supra note 172, at 323 (noting that the unavailability of lawyers in rural
counties may deter judges from appointing counsel); A.B.A., supra note 182, at 45 (noting that "In
rural areas, where pressure from the legal community to appoint lawyers if virtually nonexistent,
youth waive counsel frequently. Furthermore, attorneys often have to travel hundreds of miles in
rural counties to reach their clients, and these long distances inherently limit clients' access to
counsel.").
188. Berkheiser, supra note 184, at 609-622 (analyzing 99 appellate cases reviewing validity of
juveniles' waivers of counsel and describing blatant judicial non-compliance with constitutional
and state law requirements); Canon & Kolson, supra note 172, at 321-322 ("[J]udges whose
juvenile workload is already heavy are reluctant to adopt a liberal policy of appointing counsel for
indigent defendants because it is likely to make the cases all the more time consuming and the
backlog that much greater."); A.B.A., supra note 182, at 45 (reporting that judges often induce
juveniles to waive counsel by suggesting that "lawyers are not needed because no serious
dispositional consequences are anticipated.").
189. Cooper et al., supra note 163, at 658 (reporting that judges rarely give juveniles as
complete a waiver colloquy as that received by adults prior to waiving counsel or pleading guilty);
Berkheiser, supra note 184, at 616 (describing waivers that "demonstrate a disturbingly cavalier
attitude by the juvenile courts toward a child's waiver of the right to counsel."); Bookser, supra
note 183, at 304 (reporting that "waiver is usually an uninformed decision made without consulting
with an attorney and based on limited and inadequate colloquy").
190. See, e.g., Berkheiser, supra note 184, at 617 (attributing failure of state laws and court
rules to assure delivery of legal services to "resistance of juvenile court judges to externally
imposed limits on their discretion"); Canon & Kolson, supra note 172, at 323 (reporting that
judges who see themselves as "counsellors [sic] to the misguided youth as well as judges ... feel
that an attorney would interfere with their counseling relationship by turning it into a legal battle").
191. Feld, supra note 79, at 190; Lefstein et al., supra note 171, at 531; BORTNER, supra note
173, at 140 (noting that court officials are likely to recommend counsel only in cases with the
potential for serious dispositions); see generally Burruss & Kempf-Leonard, supra note 178.
192. Feld, supra note 174, at 1324; Berkheiser, supra note 184, at 609-22 (analyzing all 99
appellate decisions reviewing validity of juveniles' waivers of rights); Cooper et al., supra note
164; A.B.A., supra note 182, at 44-45.
193. See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (articulating requirements for
adequate waiver of a juvenile's right to an attorney); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)
(finding that a defendant may waive her right to counsel); Berkheiser, supra note 184, at 602-07
(reviewing constitutional evolution of counsel waiver standard and its application to juveniles).
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the adult waiver standard - "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the
totality of the circumstances" - to evaluate juveniles' waivers of Miranda
rights.1 95 The Court rejected the idea that developmental or psychological
differences between children and adults required special procedures for
youths. 196 As a result, juveniles can waive constitutional rights, like the right to
counsel, without consulting with either a parent or an attorney.197 Fare asserted
that the adult standard provided trial judges with appropriate flexibility to assess
juveniles' waivers of Miranda rights.198 Trial judges use the same waiver
standard to evaluate juveniles' waivers of counsel at trial. 199
When trial judges decide whether a juvenile made a "knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary" waiver, they typically consider characteristics of the offender
such as age, education, I.Q., and prior contacts with law enforcement. 2 00 The
"totality" approach gives judges broad discretion with which to decide whether
youths understand and voluntarily waive their rights. However, a review of
appellate cases reports that juvenile court judges frequently failed to give
delinquents any counsel advisory, often failed to provide any record of a waiver
colloquy, and readily accepted waivers of counsel from manifestly incompetent
children.2 ° '

194. Fare, 442 U.S. at 726-27 (finding a "knowing, intelligent and voluntary" waiver of
Miranda rights by a 16V2-year-old offender with several prior arrests who had "served time" in a
youth camp).
195. Id. at 718-24. Fare held that a youth's request to speak with his probation officer when
police interrogated him constituted neither a per se invocation of his Miranda privilege against
self-incrimination nor the functional equivalent of a request for counsel which would have required
further questioning to cease. Compare, e.g., Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
196. Fare, 442 U.S. at 725. See Rosenberg, supra note 79 (decrying Court's failure to provide
additional procedural safeguards); McCarthy, supra note 74 (analyzing Fare's inconsistency with
earlier Court decisions); see generally Feld, supra note 79 (noting the Court's departure from
earlier concerns about the impact of immaturity on legal decision-making).
197. Berkheiser, supra note 184, at 602-07 (analyzing constitutional waiver standard and its
application in criminal and juvenile proceedings).
198. Id. at 722-24. The majority of states follow the "totality" approach approved in Fare and
eschew any special procedural protections for juveniles. See, e.g., Kimberly Larson, Improving the
"Kangaroo Courts": A Proposalfor Reform in Evaluating Juveniles' Waiver of Miranda, 48 VILL.
L. REV. 629, 645-46 (2003) (summarizing majority of states' use of "totality of circumstances" test
and factors they consider); Quick v. State, 599 P.2d 712 (Alaska 1979) (concluding that a juvenile
may waive Miranda rights without consulting parent or other adult); Carter v. State, 697 So.2d
529, 533-34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (affirming "totality of circumstances" test and trial court
rejection of "Grisso Test" to measure juvenile's understanding of Miranda warnings); Dutil v.
State, 606 P.2d 269 (Wash. 1980) (rejecting per se rule to require presence of parent, guardian or
counsel at interrogation).
199. Berkheiser, supra note 184, at 605 (concluding that courts apply the same standard to
juvenile and adult defendants in federal and state courts prohibiting waiver unless made
"competently and intelligently").
200. See, e.g., West v. United States, 399 F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1968) (listing factors for trial
judges to consider when they assess the validity of juveniles' waiver decisions); Fare, 442 U.S. at
725 (listing factors); State v. Benoit, 490 A.2d 295, 302 (N.H. 1985) (listing factors).
201. Berkheiser, supra note 184, at 609-22.
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223

Research on juveniles' adjudicative competence and ability to exercise
Miranda rights strongly questions whether they can make "knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary" waivers.
Thomas Grisso has studied juveniles' legal
competencies across several domains for three decades and reports that many
juveniles simply do not understand the meaning of a Miranda warning or
counsel advisory well enough to make a valid waiver.2 °2 If juveniles do not
understand Miranda warnings or judicial advisories, then they cannot exercise
their rights as effectively as adults.20 3 Significantly, juveniles most frequently
misunderstood the warning that they had the right to an attorney and to have one
present when police question them. 20 4 Although older juveniles understood
Miranda warnings about as well as did adults, substantial20 5minorities of both
groups failed to grasp at least some elements of the warning.
Even youths who understand the abstract words of a Miranda warning or
judicial advisory of counsel may not be able to exercise their rights effectively.
Juveniles may not appreciate the function or importance of rights as well as do
202. See THOMAS GRISSO, JUVENILES' WAIVERS OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
COMPETENCE 106-07 (1981) (reporting that only about half of mid-adolescents understand their

Mirandawarning, a rate lower than that of adults); Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacitiesto Waive
Miranda Rights: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1134, 1154-54 (1980) (reporting that
majority of juveniles who received Miranda warnings did not understand them well enough to
waive their rights; that only 20.9% of the juveniles, as compared with 42.3% of the adults,
exhibited understanding of all four components of a Miranda warning; and 55.3% of juveniles, as
contrasted with 23.1% of the adults, manifested no comprehension of at least one of the four
warnings) [hereinafter Grisso, Juveniles' Capacitiesto Waive]; Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Consent
in Delinquency Proceedings, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 131 (Gary B. Melton,
Gerald P. Koocher, & Michael J. Saks eds., 1983) [hereinafter Grisso, Juveniles' Consent].
203. Larson, supra note 75, at 648-49; J. Thomas Grisso & Carolyn Pomiciter, Interrogationof
Juveniles: An Empirical Study of Procedures, Safeguards, and Rights Waiver, I L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 321, 339 (1977) (reporting that juveniles invoked their rights in about 10% of cases
compared with 40% of adults); A. Bruce Ferguson & Alan Charles Douglas, A Study of Juvenile
Waiver, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 39, 53 (1970) (reporting that over 90% of the juveniles whom police
interrogated waived their rights, that an equal number did not understand the rights they waived,
and that even a simplified version of the language in the Miranda warning failed to cure these
defects); Marty Beyer, Immaturity, Culpability & Competency in Juveniles: A Study of 17 Cases,
15 CRIM. JUST. MAG. 27, 28 (Summer 2000) (reporting that more than half of juveniles did not
understand the words of the Miranda warning).
204. Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive, supra note 202, at 1159; see also, Beyer, supra
note 203, at 28 (reporting that juveniles' misunderstood role of defense counsel).
205. Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive, supra note 202, at 1157. See also, Rona
Abramovitch, Karen L. Higgins-Biss, & Stephen R. Biss, Young Persons' Comprehension of
Waivers in Criminal Proceedings,35 CANADIAN J. CRIM. 309, 319 (1993) ("[lIt seems likely that
many if not most juveniles who are asked by the police to waive their rights do not have sufficient
understanding to be competent to waive them."); Chevon M. Wall & Mary Furlong,
Comprehension of Miranda Rights by Urban Adolescents with Law-Related Education, 56
PSYCHOL. REP. 359 (1985) (reporting that urban, black high school students who participated in a
"Street Law" course that included information about Mirandarights did not understand their rights
well enough to assert them); Thomas Grisso, The Competence of Adolescents as Trial Defendants,
3 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 3, 11 (1997) (summarizing research on adolescents understanding of
Miranda warnings and reporting "good understanding for a majority of 16- to 19-year olds," both
delinquents and non-delinquents).
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adults. 20 6 They have greater difficulty than adults conceiving of a right as an
entitlement that they can exercise without adverse consequences. 2 7 Societal
expectations of obedience to authority and children's lower social status make
them more vulnerable than adults during police interrogation and more likely to
acquiesce to judges' pressures to waive counsel.20 8
Developmental psychologists' research on juveniles'
adjudicative
competence raises further concerns about juveniles' capacity to exercise legal
rights. 2 09 A defendant must be able to understand legal proceedings, make
rational decisions, and process information from and assist counsel in order to be
competent to stand trial.210 Mental illness or retardation normally produces the
disabilities that substantially impair defendants' competence. 21'
However,
206. Larson, supra note 198, at 649-53 (reviewing social psychological research and juveniles'
limited understanding of the concept of "rights" as an entitlement to be exercised); Grisso, supra
note 205 (distinguishing between understanding words of warning and appreciating functions of
rights that warning conveys); GRIsso, supra note 202, at 130 (reporting that majority of juveniles
view "a right as an allowance which is bestowed by and can therefore be revoked by the
authorities"); A.B.A., supra note 182, at 44 (reporting that youths who waived counsel explained
that they felt intimidated or did not understand the vocabulary used and did not listen closely).
207. Grisso, supra note 205, at 29; Larson, supra note 198, at 651-52; Grisso, supra note 205,
at 11 (arguing that a larger proportion of delinquent youths bring to the defendant role an
incomplete comprehension of the concept and meaning of a right as it applies to adversarial legal
proceedings.").
208. See, e.g., Larson, supra note 198, at 657-58 (summarizing psychological research reporting
that "children are more compliant and suggestible than adults"); Gerald P. Koocher, Different
Lenses: Psycho-Legal Perspectives on Children's Rights, 16 NOVA L. REV. 711, 716 (1992)
(noting that children are socialized to obey authority figures).
209. Thomas Grisso, et al.,Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of
Adolescents' and Adults' Capacitiesas Trial Defendants, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 335 (2003)
(explaining that adjudicative competence entails "a basic comprehension of the purpose and nature
of the trial process (Understanding), the capacity to provide relevant information to counsel and to
process information (Reasoning), and the ability to apply information to one's own situation in a
manner that is neither distorted nor irrational (Appreciation)."). Trying only competent defendants
assures the legitimacy of the criminal process, reduces the risk of erroneous convictions, and
protects the dignity and autonomy of the accused. Bonnie and Grisso argue that:
The dignity of the criminal process is undermined if the defendant lacks a basic
moral understanding of the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him
or her. The accuracy or reliability of the adjudication is threatened if the
defendant is unable to assist in the development and presentation of a defense.
Finally, to the extent that decisions about the course of adjudication must be
made personally by the defendant, he or she must have the abilities needed to
exercise decision-making autonomy.
Richard J.Bonnie & Thomas Grisso, Adjudicative Competence and Youthful Offenders, in YOUTH
ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 73, 76 (Thomas Grisso & Robert

G. Schwartz eds., 2000).
210. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) ("It has long been accepted that a person
whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the
proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be
subjected to a trial.").
211. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (requiring defendants to possess "sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" and a
"rational as well as factual understanding of proceedings against him").
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generic developmental limitations impair juveniles' ability to understand legal
proceedings, make rational decisions, and assist counsel. 212 Grisso's recent
research found significant age-related differences between adolescents' and
young adults' adjudicative competence, legal understanding, and quality of
judgment.2 13 Many juveniles below the age of fourteen were as severely
impaired as mentally-ill adult defendants who lacked competence to stand
trial.214 A significant proportion of youths younger than sixteen years of age
2 15
lacked competence and some older youths exhibited substantial impairments.
Age and intelligence interacted to produce higher levels of incompetence among
younger adolescents with lower IQs than among low IQ adults.2 16 Even formally
competent adolescents made poorer decisions than did young adults because they
21 7
emphasized short-term over long-term consequences and sought peer approval.
212. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due Process,
and Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REv. 793 (2005); Grisso, et al, supra note 209; Richard E.
Redding & Lynda E. Frost, Adjudicative Competence in the Modem Juvenile Court, 9 VA. J. Soc.
POL'Y & L. 353 (2001); Thomas Grisso, Juvenile Competency to Stand Trial: Questions in an Era
of Punitive Reform, 12 CRIM. JUST. 5, 7-9 (Fall 1997) (questioning youths' ability to understand
trial process, to assist counsel, and to make strategic legal decision); see, e.g., Steven A. Drizin &
Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REv. 891,
1005 (2004) (arguing that "juvenile suspects share many of the same characteristics as the
developmentally disabled, notably their eagerness to comply with adult authority figures,
impulsivity, immature judgment, and inability to recognize and weigh risks in decision-making,
and appear to be at a greater risk of falsely confessing when subjected to psychological
interrogation techniques...").
213. Grisso, et al., supra note 209, at 343-346; Redding & Frost, supra note 212, at 374-378
(summarizing research on adjudicative competence of adolescents and reporting younger age,
lower IQ, and mental illness combine to detract from juveniles' ability to understand proceedings
and to assist counsel).
214. Grisso, et al., supra note 209, at 344 ("30% of 11- to 13-year-olds, and 19% of 14- to 15year olds, were significantly impaired on one or both of these subscales" measuring Understanding
and Reasoning); Redding & Frost, supra note 212; Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 209, at 87 ("Some
youths, especially those who are nearer to the minimum age for waiver to criminal court, may have
significant deficits in competence-related abilities due not to mental disorder but to developmental
immaturity."); Vance L. Cowden & Geoffrey R. McKee, Competency to Stand Trial in Juvenile
Delinquency Proceedings: Cognitive Maturity and the Attorney-Client Relationship, 33 U.
LouIsvItLE J. FAM. L. 629, 652 (1995) (reporting that majority of juveniles fifteen and younger
failed to meet adult standard of competence).
215. Grisso et al, supra note 209.
216. Grisso et al, supra note 209, at 356. Reported that:
approximately one fifth of 14- to 15-year-olds are as impaired in capacities
relevant to adjudicative competence as are seriously mentally ill adults who
would likely be considered incompetent to stand trial by clinicians who
perform evaluations for courts.... Not surprisingly, juveniles of below-average
intelligence are more likely than juveniles of average intelligence to be
impaired in abilities relevant for competence to stand trial. Because a greater
proportion of youths in the juvenile justice system than in the community are of
below-average intelligence, the risk for incompetence to stand trial is therefore
even greater.
217. Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 209, at 91; Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The
Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 137 (1997); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, The Elephant in the
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In summary, research on juveniles' ability to exercise Miranda rights and their
adjudicative competence consistently reports that, as a group, younger
adolescents possess less ability than adults to understand legal proceedings and
to make rational decisions.
A few states recognize juveniles' developmental differences and prohibit
their waivers of counsel or incarceration without representation.21 8 Most states
allow juveniles to waive Miranda rights and the right to counsel in delinquency
proceedings without even consulting an attorney. 2' 9 Like many other states,
Kentucky has struggled to provide adequate legal defense representation for
delinquents. 220 A 1996 report described substantial deficiencies in access to and
quality of defense lawyers - excessive caseloads for full-time public defenders;
inadequate representation by court-appointed attorneys; many unrepresented
juveniles at detention hearings and court proceedings; lack of time for attorneys
to meet with clients, file motions, prepare for trials, or advocate for appropriate
221
Judicial and
dispositions; and lack of resources to pursue appellate remedies.
administrative changes in the late-1990s began to address those deficiencies.222
To avoid uninformed waivers of counsel, the Kentucky Court of Appeals in D.R.
v. Commonwealth required mandatory consultation with counsel prior to any
juvenile's waiver. 223 Despite that judicial impetus, a subsequent assessment of
juvenile indigent defense services reported continuing instances of excessive

Courtroom: A Developmental Perspective on the Adjudication of Youthful Offenders, 6 VA. J.

Soc. POL'Y & L. 389 (1999).
218. See Feld, supra note 79, at 187 & nn.152-53 (discussing Iowa and Wisconsin); see also
Institute of Judicial Admin. - ABA Joint Comm'n on Juvenile Justice Standards, Standards
Relating to Pretrial Court Proceedings 5.1 cmt. 81 (advocating that the juvenile should have the
mandatory and nonwaivable right to effective assistance of counsel at all stages of the proceedings).
219. See, e.g., Berkheiser who argues that:
The broad discretion granted to juvenile court judges by the court's founders
and later by state statutes, coupled with the informality of juvenile court
proceedings, have impeded the full recognition of juveniles' constitutional
rights... Juveniles do not have the capacity for sound decision making or an
understanding of the significance of right to counsel and the consequences of
waiving the right.
Berkheiser, supra note 184, at 649-50.
220. See Kim Brooks, Kim Crone, & James Earl, Beyond In re Gault: The Status of Juvenile
Defense in Kentucky, 5 Ky. CHILD. RTS J. I (Spring 1997); PATRICIA PURITZ & KIM BROOKS,
ADVANCING JUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS (2002).

221. Brooks et al., supra note 220 (reporting inadequate training and compensation for
attorneys who represent children and high rates of waiver of counsel by adjudicated youths and
incarceration without representation).
222. PURITZ & BROOKS, supra note 220 (describing creation of Blue Ribbon Group to Improve
Indigent Defense Services, creation of Juvenile Post-Disposition Branch to advocate on behalf of
incarcerated juveniles, and appropriations to increase salaries, provide additional staff, and reduce
case-load size).
223. D.R. v. Commonwealth, 64 S.W.3d 292 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) (deciding that "a child may
waive the right to counsel only if that child has first been appointed, and consulted with, counsel
concerning the waiver") (emphasis omitted).
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caseloads, high rates of waiver of counsel by non-detained youths, limited
advocacy by attorneys at dispositional hearings, and a variety of structural
barriers to effective representation.2 24
Providing effective assistance of counsel for juveniles is a two-step problem.
The first step is simply to assure that lawyers are available to represent juveniles
in delinquency proceedings. Secondly, once states secure the presence of
defense lawyers for delinquents, they must provide the resources necessary to
perform adequately.
Even when judges appoint lawyers for delinquents,
attorneys may not represent their juvenile clients effectively. 225 The juvenile
court as an institution functions to thwart the adversarial process. 226
Organizational pressures to maintain stable relationships and to cooperate with
other people in the system may impede effective advocacy. 227
Can lawyers even perform as adversarial litigants in a parens patriae
juvenile justice system?22 8 Lawyers' presence with juveniles in more traditional
juvenile courts places their clients at a disadvantage. 229 Judges incarcerate
juveniles
who appear with counsel more readily than they do those without a
lawyer. 230 Research that controlled for the influence of legal variables, such as
224. PURIrZ & BROOKS, supra note 220, at 3-5 ( reporting that "Effective representation is
adversely effected in some parts of the state due to crushing caseloads, court docketing, and
geographic challenges in multi-county officers.").
225. See e.g., A.B.A., supra note 182; see e.g., CELESE & PURITZ, THE CHILDREN LEFT BEHIND,
supra note 183 (describing inadequate quality of representation); PURrrz & BROOKS, KENTUCKY,
supra note 183 (noting that despite efforts to improve delivery of legal services, quality of
representation remains problematic); PURrTz ET AL., VIRGINIA, supra notel83 (reporting excess
caseloads and inadequate services to provide competent representation); BROOKS & KAMINE, supra
note 183 (reporting substantial deficiencies in quality of representation).
226. Feld, supra note 79, at 187 ("Organizational pressures to cooperate, judicial hostility
toward adversarial litigants, role ambiguity created by the dual goals of rehabilitation and
punishment, reluctance to help juveniles 'beat a case,' or an internalization of a court's treatment
philosophy may compromise the role of counsel in juvenile court."); Clarke & Koch, supra note
173, at 305 (noting juvenile courts' treatment of lawyers as an "impediment"); BORTNER, supra
note 173, at 136-39 (describing role of counsel in juvenile court).
227. See, e.g., BORTNER, supra note 173, at 138 (examining the influence of court personnel on
lawyer's perceived role in juvenile court); W. VAUGHAN STAPLETON & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, IN
DEFENSE OF YOUTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF COUNSEL IN AMERICAN JUVENILE COURTS 102-06
(1972) (discussing the juvenile court as a "quasi-cooperative system"); Abraham S. Blumberg, The
Practice of Law as Confidence Game: OrganizationalCooptation of a Profession, 1 L. & Soc'Y
REV. 15, 18-24 (1967) (arguing the impact of institutional pressures upon the ability of attorneys to
maintain advocacy posture); Burruss & Kempf-Leonard, supra note 178, at 61 (noting that
organizational climate within juvenile court may disincline counsel to advocate on delinquents'
behalf).
228. See, e.g., STAPLETON & TEITELBAUM , supra note 227, at 156-64 (finding juvenile court
philosophy limits the ability of lawyers to adequately perform as advocates).
229. See, e.g., BORTNER, supra note 173, at 139-40 (characterizing the disadvantages of
attorney representation for juvenile defendants); Clarke & Koch, supra note 173, at 304-06
(suggesting the absence of an attorney may benefit a juvenile client); Feld, supra note 174, at 1280
(describing the adverse impact of representation on juveniles' subsequent sentences); Burruss &
Kempf-Leonard, supra note 178.
230. BORTNER, supra note 173, at 139-40 ("[R]egardless of the types of offenses with which
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present offense, prior record, and pre-trial detention status, concluded that
"representation by counsel is an additional aggravating factor in a juvenile's
disposition., 23' Every study analyzing the presence and effectiveness of counsel
in juvenile court reports an adverse impact. 232
How to explain the consistent finding that juveniles represented by counsel
fare worse? 233 Perhaps the lawyers who appear in juvenile courts are so
incompetent that they prejudice their clients' cases.234 Even in jurisdictions
where judges routinely appoint counsel for juveniles, many lawyers provide
ineffective representation.235 Public defender offices may assign their least
capable or newest attorneys to juvenile court to get trial experience and the
neophytes may receive inadequate supervision. 236 Similarly, court-appointed
lawyers may be more concerned with maintaining an ongoing relationship with
they were charged, juveniles represented by attorneys receive more severe dispositions.");
STAPLETON & TEITELBAUM, supra note 227, at 63-96; Clarke & Koch, supra note 50, at 306; David
Duffee & Larry Siegel, The OrganizationMan: Legal Counsel in the Juvenile Court, 7 CRIM. L.
BULL. 544, 552 (1971); Burruss & Kempf-Leonard, supra note 178; Feld, supra note 177, at 41819 (reporting that "representation by counsel is an aggravating factor in a juvenile's disposition...
. While the legal variables [of seriousness of present offense, prior record, and pretrial detention
status] enhance the probabilities of representation, the fact of representation appears to exert an
independent effect on the severity of dispositions.").
231. Feld, supra note 174, at 1330.
232. Burruss & Kempf-Leonard, supra note 178, at 41 (reviewing research on impact of counsel
in juvenile court and reporting that "[i]n every study, attorneys had an adverse effect ....
").
233. See, e.g., BORTNER, supra note 173, at 138-40; Clarke & Koch, supra note 173, at 297;
Feld, supra note 177, at 419; Feld, supra note 174, at 1280.
234. See JANE KN1TZER & MERRIL SOBE, LAW GUARDIANS IN NEW YORK STATE: A STUDY OF THE
LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN 8-9 (1984); PLATr, supra note 3, at 139; STAPLETON &
TEITELBAUM, supra note 227, at 38; Lefstein et al., supra note 171, at 511-12.
235. The state of New York had the highest rate of representation, over 95%, in a six-state study
of the delivery of legal services in juvenile courts. Feld, supra note 177, at 400-02. Despite the
routine presence of counsel, however, Knitzer and Sobie reported
Overall, 45% of the courtroom observations reflected either seriously
inadequate or marginally adequate representation.... Specific problems center
around lack of preparation and lack of contact with the children. In 47% of the
observations it appeared that the law guardian had done no or minimal
preparation. In 5% it was clear that the law guardian had not met with the
client at all. . . . In addition, ineffective representation is characterized by
violations of statutory or due process rights; almost 50% of the transcripts
included appealable errors made either by law guardians or made by judges and
left unchallenged by the law guardians.
KNrTzER & SOBIE,supra note 234, at 8-9.
236. Barbara Flicker, Providing Counsel for Accused Juveniles, in CURRENT PoLIcY ISSUES
1983, at 2 (June 1983) (noting that "[in some defender offices, assignment to 'kiddie court" is the
bottom rung of the ladder, to be passed as quickly as possible on the way up to more visible and
prestigious criminal court assignments. Little attention may be paid by superiors to performance in
juvenile court, providing few incentives for hard work."). Indeed, commentators have noted that
judges avoid or resist assignment to juvenile court for similar reasons. "[Tihe juvenile court is
considered to be the lowest rung on the judicial ladder. Rarely does the court attract men of
maturity or ability. The work is not regarded as desirable or appropriate for higher judgeships."
Joel F. Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function and Form,
1965 Wis. L. REV. 7, 17 (1965).
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the appointing judge than with vigorously defending their frequently changing
clients. 237 Most significantly, the conditions under which many attorneys work
constitute a structural impediment to quality representation.238 Observations and
qualitative assessments in several jurisdictions report working conditions crushing caseloads, inadequate compensation, lack of support services,
inexperienced attorneys and inadequate supervision - that detract from or even
preclude effective representation. 39
Judges may appoint lawyers when they anticipate imposing more severe
sentences and this could account for the relationship between the presence of an
attorney and more severe dispositions. 24 In many jurisdictions, the same judge
presides at a youth's arraignment, detention hearing, adjudication, and
subsequent disposition. 24 However, if judges appoint a lawyer at a juvenile's
arraignment or detention because they expect to incarcerate him, have they
already prejudged the case? On the other hand, if judges only appoint an
attorney when a severe disposition appears more likely, then a lawyer may be
unable to provide an effective defense.242
Finally, judges may sentence delinquents who appear with counsel more
severely than those who do not because the presence of a lawyer effectively
insulates them from appellate reversal.243 While judges may not punish juveniles
237. Flicker, supra note 236, at 4 (commenting that court officials' hostility to counsel's efforts
has resulted in negative performance evaluations, slashed fees, and even pressure from the court to
remove the offending attorneys from the panel).
238. Cooper et al., supra note 163, at 658-63 (describing direct and indirect barrier to effective
representation); A.B.A., supra note 182, at 24 (describing systemic barriers to effective
representation, including "underfunding, low morale, high turnover, lack of training, low status in
,career ladders,' political pressures, low salaries, and huge caseloads.").
239. Analysts attribute the poor quality of attorneys' performance to lack of preparation,
crushing caseloads, and inadequate compensation. CELESE & PuRrrz, supra note 183, at 62-65
(grueling caseloads preclude any meaningful contact with clients); PuRrrz & BROOKS, supra note
220, at 31-35 (high caseloads and limited resources adversely affected quality of representation).
240. Aday, supra note 173, at 115; Canon & Kolson, supra note 172, 319-320 (reporting that
"Appointment of counsel is a sign that the judge is leaning toward or had made up his mind to the
effect that the defendant is going to be placed in the juvenile detention home or that the judge is
going to waive his jurisdiction .... The judge, often on the advice of the county attorney, wants to
protect his decision from collateral attack by insuring that the record shows that the accused was
represented by an attorney.")
241. Feld, supra note 79, at 240-241.
242. Burruss & Kempf-Leonard suggest that:
timing may affect the ability of attorneys to succeed in delinquency matters.
For example, juveniles may retain counsel too late in the process ...
[Aittorneys may not be appointed until court officials have decided informally
on disposition. .

.

. [B]ecause juvenile courts process cases so much more

quickly than adult criminal courts, the time constraints preclude preparation of
a successful defense strategy.
Burruss & Kempf-Leonard, supra note 178, at 61.
243. Duffee & Siegel, supra note 230, at 548-549 (contending that "When the appearance of
due process has been maintained, the juvenile court should feel secure about future challenges and
safer in prescribing even stricter control over its wards.").
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just because they have a lawyer, they can be more lenient with youths who
244
appear without counsel and "throw themselves on the mercy of the court.
But, what accounts for judicial hostility toward adversarial litigants?
The direct consequence of delinquency convictions and sentences makes the
quality of procedural justice increasingly critical. The use of prior delinquency
convictions to waive juvenile court jurisdiction and to enhance adult criminal
sentences makes the need for counsel to assure the quality of those convictions
all the more imperative. 245
B. Waiver to Criminal Court and Sentencing Juveniles as Adults
Waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction presents the stark choice between
rehabilitation in the juvenile system and punishment in the criminal justice
system. 246 The administrative details of transfer legislation vary considerably,
but judicial waiver, legislative offense exclusion, and prosecutorial direct-file
represent the three generic strategies that states use.247 Waiver laws implicate
sentencing policy choices and trade-offs, rely on different justice system actors
and processes, and elicit different information to determine whether to try and
sentence a young offender as an adult or as a child.248
Judicial waiver represents the most common transfer strategy.249 Juvenile
court judges may waive jurisdiction on a discretionary basis after conducting a
hearing to determine whether a youth is amenable to treatment or poses a danger
to public safety. 250
These case-by-case assessments reflect traditional
244. Canon & Kolson, supra note 172, at 320 (reporting that "when the judge feels that the case
can be settled with a probated sentence, little need is seen for counsel."); Burruss & KempfLeonard, supra note 178, at 61 ("Where attorneys appear least often, their unique presence may
serve most to disrupt routine procedures. In such cases, they are more likely to invoke formal
procedures that limit the ability of court officials to be lenient.").
245. Feld, supra note 88.
246. Jurisdictional waiver refers to the process by which states transfer youths to criminal court
for prosecution as an adult. E.g., HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT (2006) (discussing judicial
waiver, concurrent jurisdiction, and statutory offense exclusion as three legislative methods to
transfer juveniles for criminal prosecution); PATRICIA GRIFFIN, PATRICIA TORBET & LINDA
SZYMANSKI, TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS IN CRIMINAL COURT: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER

PROVISIONS 3-10 (1998).

247. See generally Feld, Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, supra note 106;
FELD, supra note 2, at 208-19; HOwARD SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: A NATIONAL REPORT 102-08 (1995); GRIFFIN, Er AL., supra note
246, at 2.
248. See, e.g., Franklin E. Zimring & Jeffrey Fagan, Transfer Policy and Law Reform, in THE
CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 407

(Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000) [hereinafter Zimring & Fagan, Transfer Policy]
(discussing multiple policy issues implicated in constructing waiver policy).
249. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 124, 102-04; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, JUVENILE
JUSTICE: JUVENILES PROCESSED INCRIMINAL COURT AND CASE DISPOSITIONS (1995).

250. See Feld, Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, supra note 106, at 487-94;
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (procedural due process in judicial waiver hearings).
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individualized sentencing discretion. 25 ' By contrast, legislatures possess wide
latitude to define juvenile courts' jurisdiction and to exclude youths based on
age and seriousness of the offense.252 Some states exclude the most serious
offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction and thereby circumvent judicial waiver
provisions. 3 About a dozen states allow prosecutors to decide in which justice
system to try some young offenders. Juvenile and criminal courts share
concurrent jurisdiction over certain ages and offenses (e.g., older youths and
and prosecutors may exercise their discretion to select either
serious crimes)
4
25

forum.

The sharp increase in black youth homicides in the late-1980s and early1990s caused almost every state to revise its transfer laws to facilitate
prosecution of more juveniles in criminal court. 5 These changes lowered the
minimum age for transfer, increased the number of offenses excluded from
juvenile court jurisdiction, and shifted waiver discretion from the judicial branch
- judges in a waiver hearing - to the executive branch - prosecutors who make
Transfer policies became especially
unreviewable charging decisions. 256
251. Proponents of judicial waiver endorse the juvenile courts' rehabilitative philosophy and
argue that individualized decisions provide an appropriate balance of flexibility and severity. See,
e.g., Franklin E. Zimring, The Punitive Necessity of Waiver, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 207 (Jeffrey Fagan &
Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000); Zimring & Fagan, Transfer Policy, supra note 125, at 407.
Critics object that judges lack clinical tools with which to assess amenability to treatment or to
predict dangerousness and that their exercise of discretion results in abuses and inequalities. See,
e.g., Barry C. Feld, Legislative Exclusion of Offenses from Juvenile Court Jurisdiction:A History
and Critique, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE
CRIMINAL COURT 83, 89-90 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000); Jeffrey Fagan &
Elizabeth Piper Deschenes, Determinates of Judicial Waiver Decisions for Violent Juvenile
Offenders, 81 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 314 (1990).
252. See generally, Feld, supra note 251, at 83-98.
253. Proponents of offense exclusion favor "just deserts" sentencing policies. They advocate
sanctions based on relatively objective factors such as seriousness of the crime, culpability, and
criminal history. They value uniform treatment of similarly situated offenders., See, e.g., Feld,
supra note 251, at 102-03. Critics question whether legislators can remove discretion without
making the process excessively rigid and over-inclusive. See, e.g., Zimring, supra note 25 1.
254. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 124; Francis Barry McCarthy, The Serious Offender
and Juvenile Court Reform: The Casefor ProsecutorialWaiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction,38
ST. Louis U. L.J. 629 (1994); Manduley v. Superior Court of San Diego, 27 Cal. 4th 537 (Cal.
2002). Proponents of prosecutorial waiver claim that prosecutors can act as more objective
gatekeepers than either "soft" judges or "get tough" legislators. See, e.g., McCarthy,, supra note
131. Critics observe that prosecutors often succumb to political pressures on crime issues, exercise
their discretion just as subjectively and idiosyncratically as judges, and create extensive geographic
variability in the administration of juvenile justice. See, e.g., Donna M. Bishop & Charles S.
Frazier, Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: A Case Study and Analysis of Prosecutorial
Waiver, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 281 (1991); Feld, Legislative Exclusion, supra
note 128, at 117-19.
255. See, e.g., TORBET ET AL., supra note 138, at 3-8; Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public
Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 966-97 (1995); Feld,
Responses to Youth Violence, supra note 106, at 194; NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL ET AL., supra note
33, at 204-09, 214-18.
256. See Feld, supra note 251, at 124-29.
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punitive toward youths charged with violent and drug crimes, offense categories
to which black youths contribute disproportionately.
Even prior to the recent "crack down," studies consistently reported racial
disparities in waiver decisions by juvenile court judges.25 7 As a result of "get
tough" statutory reforms, judges and prosecutors now transfer even more
minority youths to criminal courts and the disparities are greatest for youths
charged with violent and drug offenses.25 8 In nearly every jurisdiction, the
proportion of minority youths transferred to criminal court greatly exceeded their
proportional make-up of the general population. 259 As a result of the successive
screening and differential processing of youths by race, the majority of juveniles
transferred to criminal court and sentenced to prison are minority youths.26
1. Adolescent Culpability, the Death Penalty and Life Without Parole
Judges sentence juveniles transferred to criminal court as if they were adults,
send them to adult prisons, and, until the Supreme Court's recent decision in

257. See, e.g. DONNA M. HAMPARIAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MAJOR ISSUES IN JUVENILE
YOUTH IN ADULT COURT: BETWEEN Two WORLDS 104-05
(1982) (nationally, 39% of all youths transferred in 1978 were black and, in 11 states, minority
youths constituted the majority of juveniles waived); Joel Peter Eigen, The Determinants and
Impact of JurisdictionalTransfer in Philadelphia, in READINGS IN PUBLIC POLICY 333, 339-40
(John C. Hall et al. eds., 1981) (interracial effect in transfers in which black youths who murder
white victims are significantly more at risk for waiver); Jeffrey Fagan, Martin Forst, & Scott
Vivona, Racial Determinants of the Judicial Transfer Decision: Prosecuting Violent Youth in
Criminal Court, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 259, 276 (1987) ("[I]t appears that the effects of race are
indirect, but visible nonetheless."); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 249, at 59
(examining the effects of race on judicial waiver decisions); M. A. Bortner, Marjorie S. Zatz &
Darnell F. Hawkins, Race and Transfer: Empirical Research and Social Context, in THE CHANGING
BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 277 (Jeffrey
Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000) (analyzing racial disparity in juvenile transfer
proceedings).
258. EILEEN POE-YAMAGATA & MICHAEL A. JONES, AND JUSTICE FOR SOME 12-14 (2000); NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL ET AL., supra note 33, at 216 ("A high proportion of the juveniles transferred to
adult court are minorities.... The preponderance of minorities among transferred juveniles may be
explained in part by the fact that minorities are disproportionately arrested for serious crimes.");
Bortner et al., supra note 257, at 277 (analyzing sources of racial disparity in juvenile transfer
proceedings).
259. POE-YAMAGATA & JONES, supra note 258, at 17 (minority proportion of youths transferred
to criminal court was five times their make-up of the general population in Connecticut,
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island); MIKE MALES & DAN MACALLAIR, THE COLOR OF
JUSTICE: AN ANALYSIS OF JUVENILE ADULT COURT TRANSFERS IN CAUJFORNIA 7-8 (2000) (studying
juvenile transfer and criminal court sentencing practices in Los Angeles and reporting that
"[clompared to white youths, minority youths are 2.8 times as likely to be arrested for a violent
crime, 6.2 times as likely to wind up in adult court, and 7 times as likely to be sent to prison by
adult courts").
260. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL ET AL., supra note 33, at 220 ("In 1997, minorities
made up three-quarters of juveniles admitted to adult state prisons, with blacks accounting for 58
percent, Hispanics 15 percent, and Asians and American Indians 2 percent."); Bortner et al., supra
note 257, at 277 (analyzing cumulative consequences of racial disparities in transfer decisions).
JUSTICE INFORMATION AND TRAINING:
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Roper v. Simmons, executed them for crimes committed as children. 26 1 For a
decade and a half prior to Simmons, the Court repeatedly considered whether the
Eighth Amendment prohibited states from executing offenders for crimes they
committed while under 18 years of age. 262 In 1988, a plurality of justices in
Thompson v. Oklahoma concluded that fifteen-year-old offenders lacked the
culpability necessary to impose the death penalty.2 63 The following year, in
Stanford v. Kentucky, a majority upheld the death penalty for youths who were
sixteen or seventeen at the time of their offenses. 26 While Stanford recognized
that juveniles as a class were less culpable than adult offenders, the Court
rejected a categorical ban and allowed juries to decide whether some older
adolescents acted with sufficient culpability to justify their execution. 265 After
Stanford exhausted his state and federal remedies,266 outgoing Kentucky
261. See, e.g., Feld, Responses to Youth Violence, supra note 106, at 212-20; Barry C. Feld,
Competence, Culpability, and Punishment: Implications of Atkins for Executing and Sentencing
Adolescents, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 463 (2003) (analyzing the Court's juvenile death penalty
jurisprudence and arguing for constitutional prohibition on execution of juveniles); compare, e.g.,
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding the constitutionality of the death penalty for
juveniles 16 and 17 years of age) with Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the
execution of youths for crimes committed under the age of 18 violated the Eighth Amendment).
262. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIH. Earlier
decisions averred to the importance of considering youthfulness as a mitigating factor in capital
sentencing. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982) (remanding sixteenyear-old defendant for resentencing after trial court's failure to properly consider youthfulness as a
mitigating factor and noting that "youth is more than a chronological fact.... minors, especially in
their earlier years, generally are less mature and responsible than adults"); Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 608-09 (1978) (requiring sentencing jury to consider all relevant mitigating factors
including age of defendant); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 637 (1977) (per curiam)
("Circumstances such as the youth of the offender . . . are all examples of mitigating facts ...
which are considered relevant in other jurisdictions.").
263. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 822-23 (1988) (plurality opinion). The Thompson
plurality looked both to objective indicators of "evolving standards of decency," such as state
statutes and jury practices, Id. at 821-22, and the views of national and international organizations,
and to the justices' own subjective sense of "civilized standards of decency" when it conducted its
proportionality analysis. Id. at 830. The Thompson Court emphasized that deserved punishment
must reflect individual culpability and concluded that "[tihere is also broad agreement on the
proposition that adolescents as a class are less mature and responsible than adults." Id. at 834. The
justices asserted that "less culpability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a
comparable crime committed by an adult ....
Inexperience, less education, and less intelligence
make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while at the same
time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an adult.
The reasons why juveniles are not trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also
explain why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult." Id. at
835.
264. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380.
265. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 375-76 (arguing that juvenile waiver and capital sentencing
procedures were adequate to determine individual culpability unless there was a national consensus
"not that 17 or 18 is the age at which most persons, or even almost all persons, achieve sufficient
maturity to be held fully responsible for murder; but that 17 or 18 is the age before which no one
can reasonably be held fully responsible").
266. See In re Kevin Nigel Stanford, 537 U.S. 968, 968 (2002).

NORTHERN KENTUCKY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:2

Governor Paul Patton, as one of his final acts in office, commuted his death
he "believed sentencing a juvenile to death is an excessive
sentence because
267
punishment."
In 2005, the Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons overruled Stanford and
categorically prohibited states from executing youths for crimes committed prior
to eighteen years of age. 268 The Court found compelling evidence of a national
consensus against the death penalty for juveniles in legislative enactments and
juries' sentencing decisions.269 In assessing society's "evolving standards of
decency," the Court found that juveniles lacked the maturity and judgment
necessary to equate their culpability with that of adults. 7 ° Simmons emphasized
that "juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and
outside pressures, including peer pressure" which further diminished their
criminal responsibility. 27 1 Finally, because juveniles' personalities are more
transitory and less fully-formed, their horrific crimes provide less evidence of
confirmed depravity and culpability than do those of adults 2
Deserved punishment proportions sentences to the seriousness of the
offense. 2 73 Two elements define the seriousness of a crime - harm and
274
An offender's age has little bearing on assessments of harm, such
culpability.
267. Tom Loftus, Patton Has Short, Quiet Last Day as Governor, LOUISVILLE COURIER-J., Dec.
9, 2003, at lB.
268. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 578 (prohibiting execution of youths for crimes committed when
seventeen years of age or younger).
269. Id. at 564 (noting that legislative trends prohibiting executing children corresponded with
those in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), in which the Court held that the Eighth
Amendment barred execution of defendants with mental retardation); see also Feld, supra note
261, at 488-97 (analogizing between state laws and jury practices in executing defendants with
mental retardation and juveniles).
270. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 569 (finding that a "lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility are found in youth more often that in adults and are more understandable among the
young"); see also Feld, supra note 261, at 515-21 (analyzing developmental psychological and
neuroscience research on juveniles' diminished responsibility).
271. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 569. The Court further argued that "[t]he susceptibility of juveniles
to immature and irresponsible behavior means 'their irresponsible conduct is not as morally
reprehensible as that of an adult.' Their own vulnerability and comparative lack of control over
their immediate surroundings mean juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for
failing to escape negative influences in their whole environment." Id. at 570 (quoting Thompson,
487 U.S. at 835).
272. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 570 (noting that "the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as
that of an adult.").
See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, supra note 106, at 48 ("[P]unishing someone conveys in
273.
dramatic fashion that his conduct was wrong and that he is blameworthy for having committed it.");
see also ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 15 (1993) [hereinafter VON HIRSCH,
CENSURE AND SANCTIONS]; ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND
DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 31 (1985) [hereinafter VON HIRSCH, PAST OR
FUTURE CRIMES].

274. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 393 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he proportionality principle
takes account not only of the 'injury to the person and to the public' caused by a crime, but also of
the 'moral depravity' of the offender.") (citation omitted); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 815
(1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the offender's culpability--"the degree of the
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as the injury inflicted or the amount of property taken. 275 But youthfulness bears
quite directly on the character of blameworthy choices, the culpability of the
actor, and thereby the seriousness of the crime.
Youthfulness affects a
person's ability to reason and to exercise self-control and thus reduces somewhat
a juvenile's degree of criminal responsibility. 277 Younger offenders are less

defendant's blameworthiness"-is central to determining the penalty) (footnote omitted); Wayne A.
Logan, Proportionalityand Punishment: Imposing Life Without Parole on Juveniles, 33 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 681, 707 (1998) ("[A] sentence must correspond to the crime-not just to the harm
caused by the offense, but also to the culpability of the offender."); Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence
Steinberg, Blaming Youth 81 TEx. L. REV. 799, 822 (2003) ("Only a blameworthy moral agent
deserves punishment at all, and blameworthiness (and the amount of punishment deserved) can
vary depending on the attributes of the actor or the circumstances of the offense."); Franklin E.
Zimring, Penal Proportionalityfor the Young Offender: Notes on Immaturity, Capacity, and
Diminished Responsibility, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE

JUSTICE 271 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) ("But desert is a measure of fault
that will attach very different punishment to criminal acts that cause similar amounts of harm.").
275. Ernest van den Haag contends that:
There is little reason left for not holding juveniles responsible under the same
laws that apply to adults. The victim of a fifteen-year-old muggers [sic] is as
much mugged as the victim of a twenty-year-old mugger, the victim of a
fourteen-year-old murderer or rapist is [just] as dead or as raped as the victim
of an older one. The need for social defense or protection is the same.
ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG,PUNISHING CRIMINALS: CONCERNING A VERY OLD AND PAINFUL QUESTION

174 (1975).
276. Just deserts theory and criminal law grading principles base the degree of deserved
punishment on the actor's culpability. For example, a person may cause the death of another
individual with premeditation and deliberation, intentionally, "in the heat of passion," recklessly,
negligently, or accidentally. See JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 105-45 (2d

ed. 1960). The criminal law treats the same objective consequence or harm-for example, the
death of a person-differently depending on the nature of the choices made. In a framework of
deserved punishment, to impose the same penalty upon offenders who do not share equal
culpability would be unjust. When gauging the culpability of choices, youthfulness has central
importance because young people are neither fully responsible nor the moral equals of adults. See
Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, CriminalResponsibility, and Sentencing
Policy, 88. J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 121-23 (1997).
277. See generally Feld, supra note 261, at 515-21 (analyzing developmental psychological and
neurobiological research on adolescents' diminished responsibility). Peter Arenella argues that the
criminal law treats children differently than adults because, even though it expects them to adhere
to moral norms, it recognizes that they only gradually will
develop the capacity to understand their normative significance and abide by
their dictates. And when they make a rational and voluntary choice to engage in
morally objectionable conduct.., we may hold them accountable to some
sanction to teach them the significance of the rule they have broken.
But we do not treat young children as full moral agents, despite their
capacity for practical reason and their freedom to act on the basis of their
reasoned choices ....

[Tihey have not yet fully developed this capacity to respond
appropriately to moral reasons for action. This capacity for moral
responsiveness presupposes that moral agents appreciate the normative
significance of the moral norms governing their behavior. It also assumes that
moral agents can exercise moral judgment about how these norms apply in a
particular context. Acting on the basis of moral judgment also requires moral
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blameworthy than adults because they do not have the developmental capacity to
fully to control their actions. 278 While young offenders possess sufficient
culpability for the State to hold them accountable for their actions, their reduced
279
blameworthiness requires a qualitatively different youth sentencing policy.
The Court's decision in Simmons to bar the death penalty for adolescents has
broader implications for sentencing youths. The reduced culpability of youth
applies equally to sentences of Life Without Parole (LWOP) and the draconian
equivalents imposed on adult offenders. Although the Court's jurisprudence
insists that "death is different," no principled bases exist by which to distinguish
adolescents' diminished responsibility that bars the death penalty and their
equally reduced culpability that warrants shorter sentences for all serious
2 80

crimes.

motivation: the capacity to use the applicable moral norm as the basis for
acting.
Peter Arenella, Character,Choice and Moral Agency: The Relevance of Characterto Our Moral
Culpability Judgments, Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y, Spring 1990, at 67-68; see also Elizabeth S. Scott &
Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice
Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 176 (1997) (arguing that adolescents' "criminal
choices are presumed less to express individual preferences and more to reflect the behavioral
influences characteristic of a transitory developmental stage that are generally shared with others in
the age cohort. This difference supports drawing a line based on age, and subjecting adolescents to
a categorical presumption of reduced responsibility."); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman,
The Elephant in the Courtroom: A Developmental Perspective on the Adjudication of Youthful
Offenders, 6 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 389, 407-09 (1999) (arguing that youths lack "ability to
control [their] impulses, to manage [their] behavior in the face of pressure from others to violate
the law, or to extricate [themselves] from a potentially problematic situation," and these
deficiencies render them less blameworthy).
278. See Feld, supra note 261, at 508-12 (analyzing developmental psychological research on
adolescents' short-term and long-term risk calculus, maturity of judgment, and self-control that
impairs quality of choice); Jeffrey Fagan, Atkins, Adolescence, and the Maturity Heuristic:
Rationalesfor a CategoricalExemption for Juveniles from CapitalPunishment, 33 N.M. L. REV.
207, 235 (2003) (arguing that adolescents' "judgment is immature because they have not yet
attained several dimensions of psychosocial development that characterize adults as mature,
including the capacity for autonomous choice, self-management, risk perception, and the
calculation of future consequences"); Scott & Steinberg, supra note 274, at 823 ("[Alctors, whose
decisionmaking [sic] capacities are less severely impaired, or who are subject to compelling (but
not overwhelming) pressures and constraints that limit their freedom of choice, may pass the
minimum threshold of responsibility but be judged less culpable and deserving of less punishment
than the typical criminal actor.").
279. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 274, at 830 ("[Ylouths are likely to act more
impulsively and to weigh the consequences of their options differently from adults, discounting
risks and future consequences, and over-valuing (by adult standards) peer approval, immediate
consequences, and the excitement of risk taking. These influences are predictable, systematic and
developmental in nature (rather than simply an expression of personal values and preferences), and
they undermine decisionmaking [sic] capacity in ways that are accepted as mitigating culpability.").
280. Professor Zimring argues that
[d]octrines of diminished responsibility have their greatest impact when large
injuries have been caused by actors not fully capable of understanding and selfcontrol. The visible importance of diminished responsibility in these cases
arises because the punishments provided for the fully culpable are quite severe,
and the reductive impact of mitigating punishment is correspondingly large.
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Lionel Tate's case graphically illustrates the hazards of disproportionate
sentences and adjudicative incompetence when states try young offenders in
criminal court. A grand jury indicted twelve-year-old Tate for first-degree
murder for brutal injuries he inflicted on a six-year-old girl. 28 1 Under Florida
waiver law, 2 82 Tate's indictment for a capital crime required the state to
prosecute him as an adult and his conviction of first-degree murder required the
judge to impose a mandatory sentence of life without parole. 283 The Court of
Appeals reversed his conviction because the trial judge failed to conduct a
hearing to determine whether he was competent to stand trial. 284 However, it
rejected the claim that imposing a mandatory LWOP sentence on 285
a twelve-yearold child was disproportionate or "cruel and unusual punishment.,
For two decades the Court has vacillated about whether the Eighth
Amendment contains a "narrow proportionality principle" that "applies to
noncapital sentences."' 2 86 In Rummel v. Estelle, the Court held that the Eighth
Amendment does not prevent a state from sentencing a three-time property
offender to life in prison with the possibility of parole.287 In Solem v. Helm, the
Court held that a sentence of life without possibility of parole for a recidivist
28 8
convicted of a minor property crime violated the Eighth Amendment.
But if the doctrine of diminished responsibility means anything in relation to
the punishment of immature offenders, its impact cannot be limited to trivial
cases. Diminished responsibility is either generally applicable or generally
unpersuasive as a mitigating principle.
ZIMRING, supra note 124, at 84.

281.
See Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
282. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.225 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) (current version at FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 985.56).
283.

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.225(1) (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) (current version at FLA. STAT.

ANN. § 985.56(1)); see also Tate, 864 So. 2d. at 46; David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin,
"Owing to the Extreme Youth of the Accused": The Changing Legal Response to Juvenile
Homicide, 92 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 641, 678-81 (2003) (summarizing waiver procedures,

rejected plea offers, and failed defense strategy that ultimately led both prosecutor and defense
attorney to recommend that Governor Jeb Bush commute Tate's mandatory LWOP sentence
imposed following conviction for murder as manifestly unjust for a twelve-year-old).
284. See Tate, 864 So. 2d at 48 ("[A] competency evaluation was constitutionally mandated to
determine whether Tate had sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding and whether he had a rational, as well as factual, understanding of
the proceedings against him.").
285. See id. at 54 (discussing other Florida cases affirming sentences of life without parole
imposed on defendants convicted of murder at ages thirteen and fourteen years).
286. E.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996-97 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment).
287. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284-85 (1980) (approving Rummel's sentence under a
recidivism statute for his third conviction for relatively minor property crimes).
288.
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 281 and 303 (1983). The Court noted that the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments "prohibits... sentences that are
disproportionate to the crime committed," id. at 284, and that the "constitutional principle of
proportionality has been recognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century." Id. at 286. Solem
identified three factors that a court must consider to determine whether a sentence is so
disproportionate that it violates the Eighth Amendment: "(i) the gravity of the offense and the
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Subsequently, in Harmelin v. Michigan, a fractured Court rejected a
proportionality challenge
and upheld a sentence of life without parole for a first2 89
time drug offender.
In his Harmelin concurrence, Justice Kennedy asserted that "Itihe Eighth
290
Amendment proportionality principle also applies to noncapital sentences"
and his opinion provides the operative judicial test for disproportionate
sentence.29
Kennedy identified four factors - the primacy of legislative
judgments about penalties, the multiplicity of legitimate penal goals, the limited
role for federal judicial oversight of state sentences, and the importance of
objective factors to inform proportionality review - that bear on whether a
penalty is "grossly disproportionate. ' 292 In Ewing v. California, the Court
upheld a sentence of twenty-five years to life for 293
the theft of three golf clubs
under California's "three-strike" sentencing statute.
Courts have
they apply the Court's proportionality principle
• • foundered when 294
to juvenile LWOP sentences.
Although proportionality requires an
appropriate penal relationship between the seriousness of a crime - harm and
culpability - and the sentence imposed, courts focus only on the gravity of the
crime - harm - rather than the culpability of the actor when they conduct
proportionality analyses. 2 95 Thus, a serious crime is a serious crime because of
harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and
(iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions." Id. at 292.
Despite the elements of recidivism, the distinguishing factor in Solem was the imposition of an
LWOP sentence for a minor property crime. See id. at 297.
289. Compare Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994 (Scalia., J.) (announcing the opinion of the Court
and arguing that the proportionality principle only limited application of the death penalty, but did
not constitute a general feature of Eighth Amendment analysis) with id. at 997, 1009 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (upholding sentence by finding it proportional under an Eighth Amendment analysis).
Neither Justice Scalia's nor Justice Kennedy's legal reasoning was agreed to by a majority of the
Court.
290. Id. at 997.
291. Id. at 1001 (arguing that the Eighth Amendment prohibits "only extreme sentences that are
'grossly disproportionate' to the crime.").
292. See id. at 998-1001 (Kennedy J., concurring). According to Justice Kennedy,
[a]ll of these principles-the primacy of the legislature, the variety of
legitimate penological schemes, the nature of our federal system, and the
requirement that proportionality review be guided by objective factors-inform
the final one: The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality
between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are
"grossly disproportionate" to the crime.
Id. at 1001.
293. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 19 and 30-31 (2003) ("We hold that Ewing's sentence
of 25 years to life in prison, imposed for the offense of felony grand theft under the three strikes
law, is not grossly disproportionate and therefore does not violate the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments.").
294. See generally Logan, supra note 274, at 703-09 (reviewing cases upholding LWOP
sentences on juveniles).
295. For example, see State v. Massey, 803 P.2d 340 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991), where the court
upheld a mandatory sentence of life without parole imposed on a thirteen-year-old juvenile
convicted of aggravated murder:
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the harm caused, regardless of the culpability of the actor. The court in Harrisv.
Wright rejected a constitutional challenge to a mandatory LWOP sentence
296
imposed on a fifteen-year-old convicted of
Harris held that the
. murder.
.. .297
sentences and insisted
Eighth Amendment bars only grossly disproportionate
that
Youth has no obvious bearing on this problem: If we can discern no
clear line for adults, neither can we for youths. Accordingly, while
capital punishment is unique and must be treated specially, mandatory
life imprisonment without parole is, for young and old alike, only an
outlying point on the continuum of prison sentences. Like any other
prison sentence, it raises
no inference of disproportionality when
29 8
imposed on a murderer.

Defining the gravity of the offense solely by the harm caused excludes from
a proportionality inquiry an meaningful consideration of blameworthiness and
diminished responsibility.
By contrast, the Justices who dissented in Stanford
and later prevailed in Simmons recognized that proportionality analyses require a
broader culpability inquiry. Justice Stevens emphasized that
Proportionality analysis requires that we compare "the gravity of the
offense,"
understood to include not only the injury caused, but also the
defendant's culpability, with the "harshness of the penalty."...
[Jiuveniles so generally lack the degree of responsibility for their
crimes that is a predicate for the constitutional imposition of the death
penalty that the Eighth Amendment forbids that they receive that
punishment. 3 °

The test is whether in view of contemporary standards of elemental decency,
the punishment is of such disproportionate character to the offense as to shock
the general conscience and violate principles of fundamental fairness. That test
does not embody an element or consideration of the defendant's age, only a
balance between the crime and the sentence imposed. Therefore, there is no
cause to create a distinction between a juvenile and an adult who are sentenced
to life without parole for first degree aggravated murder.
Id. at 348 (citation omitted). See also State v. Stinnett, 497 S.E.2d 696, 701-02 (N.C. Ct. App.
1998) (upholding mandatory LWOP sentence imposed on fifteen-year-old convicted of murder and
noting that "when a punishment does not exceed the limits fixed by statute, the punishment cannot
be classified as cruel and unusual in a constitutional sense").
296. Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581, 583-85 (9th Cir. 1996).
297. See id. at 584 ("Disproportion analysis, however, is strictly circumscribed; we conduct a
detailed analysis only in the 'rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and
the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality."').
298. Id. at 585 (citation omitted).
299. See Logan, supra note 274, at 703 ("By divorcing 'crime' from offender culpability in
proportionality analysis, these courts subscribe to an essentially circular inquiry: because murder,
for instance, is a very 'serious' crime in the eyes of the legislature, it can be met with a very
'serious' statutory punishment.").
300. In re Stanford, 537 U.S. at 969 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Stanford, 492 U.S. at
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Although Simmons barred the death penalty for crimes committed by those
younger than eighteen years of age, the Court has found no constitutional
While trial
minimum age for imposing sentences of life without parole.
302
judges may consider an offender's youthfulness when they sentence them,
appellate courts routinely uphold LWOP and very long sentences and rebuff
claims that youthfulness is a mitigating factor that should trump mandatory
LWOP sentences.3 0 3 The Florida court in Tate v. State "reject[ed] the argument
that a life sentence without the possibility of parole is cruel or unusual
punishment on a twelve-year-old child." 3° 4 In State v. Green, the North Carolina
Supreme Court approved a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment imposed on
a thirteen-year-old convicted of a first-degree sexual offense. 30 5 Green noted
that many states transfer very young offenders to criminal court, 30 6 that age is
not dispositive "in determining whether a punishment is grossly disproportionate
to the crime," 30 7 and that retributive and incapacitative sentencing policies apply
even to young offenders. 308 In Edmonds v. State, the Mississippi Court of
394-96).
301. But cf. Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 947 (Nev. 1989) (questioning the
constitutionality of imposing an LWOP sentence on any thirteen-year-old, but overturning sentence
on more narrow grounds).
302. Cf. Adams v. State, No. CR-98-0496, 2003 WL 22026043, at 59 (Ala. Crim. App. Aug.
29, 2003) (refusing to grant weight as a factor mitigating against execution to the fact that
defendant was seventeen years old at the time he committed the crime leading to his death
sentence).
303. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Hargett, 200 F.3d 1279, 1284 (10th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that "age
is a relevant factor to consider in a proportionality analysis"); State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819, 832
(N.C. 1998) (upholding life imprisonment sentence for thirteen-year-old convicted of rape,
recognizing that "the chronological age of a defendant is a factor that can be considered in
determining whether a punishment is grossly disproportionate to the crime," but emphasizing that
Green was morally responsible for the crime because he possessed sufficient mental capacity to
form criminal intent).
304. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 54. Tate cited other recent Florida cases approving LWOP sentences
imposed on young offenders, including Blackshear v. State, 771 So. 2d 1199, 1200-02 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2000) (approving three consecutive life sentences imposed for three robberies committed
when Blackshear was thirteen years of age and noting that "[s]entences imposed on juveniles of life
imprisonment are not uncommon in Florida Courts") and Phillips v. State, 807 So. 2d 713, 714 and
717-18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (approving LWOP sentence imposed on fourteen-year-old
convicted of murder and rejecting the idea that an LWOP sentence for first-degree murder could
ever be so "grossly disproportionate" as to require a finding of unconstitutionality). Tate, 864 So.
2d at 54-55.
305. Green, 502 S.E.2d. at 827-28; see also Paul G. Morrissey, Do the Adult Crime, Do the
Adult Time: Due Process and Cruel and Unusual Implications for a 13-Year-Old Sex Offender
Sentenced to Life Imprisonment in State v. Green, 44 VmLL. L. REv. 707, 738 (1999) ("Green's
young age does not lend itself to a per se ruling of unconstitutionality. Once a juvenile of any age is
transferred to superior court, charged with a violation of state law and convicted, the juvenile must
be 'handled in every respect as an adult."' (footnote omitted)).
306. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 831 (finding that because at least 18 other states permit waiver of
offenders thirteen or younger to criminal court, the North Carolina practice did not violate
"evolving standards of decency").
307. Id. at 832.
308. See id. at 833 (emphasizing the judicial deference to legislative sentencing policy
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Appeals upheld an LWOP sentence for a youth who was thirteen years of age at
the time of his crime. 30 9 In Hawkins v. Hargett, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals approved sentences totaling 100 years for burglary, rape, and robbery
imposed for crimes committed when a juvenile was thirteen years of age.
Around the nation, appellate courts regularly uphold sentences of life with or
without possibility of parole and for extremely long terms imposed on thirteen-,
fourteen-, or fifteen-year-old youths. 3 11 Few courts find such sentences imposed
on young offenders disproportional. 3 12 In contrast with the Court's juvenile
judgments and concluding that "the adult justice system, with its primary goals of incapacitation
and retribution, is the appropriate place for violent youthful offenders, such as defendant.").
309. Edmonds v. Mississippi, No. 2004-KA-02081-COA, 2006 WL 1073460, at
1, 4 (Miss.
App. April 25, 2006). The court rejected the juvenile's request for a jury instruction as to
sentencing consequences if convicted and found that LWOP sentence does not need to take account
of the degree of culpability of the actor. Id. at 1 86-90, 95-98.
310. Hawkins, 200 F.3d. at 1285 (rejecting, on habeas appeal of state conviction, argument that
imposing consecutive sentences for crimes committed as a thirteen-year-old constituted cruel and
unusual punishment).
311.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH -

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE

WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1, 7 (2005) (criticizing states for

incarcerating at least 2,225 youths with LWOP sentences for crimes committed prior to their 18th
birthday and advocating abolition of LWOP sentences for juveniles and legislative changes to
allow states retroactively to resentence them). See, e.g., People v. Moya, 899 P.2d 212, 219-20
(Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that sentence of life imprisonment with possibility of parole after
forty years was not cruel and unusual punishment when imposed on juvenile convicted of robbery
and murder); Brennan v. State, 754 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1999) (vacating death penalty imposed on
sixteen-year-old convicted of murder and reducing sentence to life imprisonment without a
possibility of parole); State v. Broadhead, 814 P.2d 401 (Idaho 1991) (overruled on other grounds)
(affirming life sentence with fixed minimum of fifteen years imposed on fourteen-year-old
convicted of murdering his father); State v. Shanahan, 994 P.2d 1059, 1061-63 & n.1 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1999) (holding that life sentence for murder imposed on fifteen-year-old did not constitute
cruel and unusual punishment); State v. Mitchell, 577 N.W.2d 481, 488-91 (Minn. 1998) (holding
that mandatory life imprisonment for fifteen-year-old convicted of first-degree murder was not
cruel and unusual punishment); State v. Ira, 43 P.3d 359, 361 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (approving
sentence of ninety-one years imposed on fifteen-year-old for rape); State v. Jensen, 579 N.W.2d
613, 623-25 (S.D. 1998) (holding that life imprisonment without possibility of parole for fourteenyear-old convicted of murder is not cruel and unusual punishment); State v. Massey, 803 P.2d 340,
348 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (approving mandatory LWOP sentence imposed on youth convicted of
committing murder at thirteen years of age).
312. See e.g., Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. 1968) (holding that life
sentence for fourteen-year-old convicted of rape violated Eighth Amendment); Naovarath, 779
P.2d at 948-49 (Nev. 1989) (finding that LWOP sentence imposed on thirteen-year-old convicted
of murder constitute cruel and unusual punishment, but granting only limited right to be considered
for parole eligibility at some point). The Court in Naovarath did not necessarily endorse a
categorical prohibition and emphasized the youth's mental and emotional disabilities as well:
To say that a thirteen-year-old deserves a fifty or sixty year long sentence,
imprisonment until he dies, is a grave judgment indeed if not Draconian. To the
make the judgment that a thirteen-year-old must be punished with this severity
and that he can never be reformed, is the kind of judgment that, if it can be
made at all, must be made rarely and only on the surest and soundest of
grounds.
Id. at 947.
A few courts have reduced youths' lengthy sentences because of their age or immaturity. See, e.g.,
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death penalty jurisprudence, trial judges perversely may regard youthfulness as
an aggravating factor and 3sentence
juveniles more severely than their similarly
13
situated adult counterparts.
Although the Constitution does not require state legislators to enact or courts
to formally recognize youthfulness as a mitigating factor in sentencing, they
should explicitly adopt and apply such a principle as part of a fair and just youth
sentencing policy. Mitigating punishment because of youthfulness is a principle
that applies equally to capital and non-capital sentences and recognizes reduced
culpability without excusing criminal conduct. 3 14 The criminal choices that
children make are not the moral equivalents of those of adults. 3 15 A youth
sentencing policy can simultaneously hold them accountable
and yet mitigate the
3 16
culpability.
diminished
of
because
sanctions
of
severity
People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 726-27 (Cal. 1983) (reducing life sentence imposed on seventeenyear-old convicted of felony murder because he "was an unusually immature youth"); People v.
Miller, 781 N.E.2d 300, 308 (Ill. 2002) (rejecting as disproportional an LWOP sentence imposed
on a fifteen-year-old, passive accessory to a felony-murder and holding that "a mandatory sentence
of natural life in prison with no possibility of parole grossly distorts the factual realities of the case
and does not accurately represent defendant's personal culpability such that it shocks the moral
sense of the community").
313. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 124, at 178 (reporting that "juvenile transfers
convicted of murder received longer sentences than their adult counterparts. On average, the
maximum prison sentence imposed on transferred juveniles convicted of murder in 1994 was 23
years 11 months. This was 2 years and 5 months longer than the average maximum prison sentence
for adults age 18 or older, and 8 months longer than the average maximum sentence for under-18
adults convicted of murder."); Donna Bishop & Charles Frazier, Consequencesof Transfer, in THE
CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT

227, 236-37 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000) (comparing the sentences imposed
on youths transferred to criminal courts with those of adults and reporting that "transferred youths
are sentenced more harshly, both in terms of the probability of receiving a prison sentence and the
length of the sentences they receive. In other words, we see no evidence that criminal courts
recognize a need to mitigate sentences based on considerations of age and immaturity.");
Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 283, at 665 (citing the impact of "get tough" politics and arguing
that "[b]y the mid-1990's [sic], youth had ceased to be a mitigating factor in adult court, and
instead had become a liability").
314. Zimring, supra note 274,'at 278 (arguing that "even after a youth passes the minimum
threshold of competence that leads to a finding of capacity to commit crime, the barely competent
youth is not as culpable and therefore not as deserving of a full measure of punishment as a fully
qualified adult offender"); Scott & Grisso, supra note 217, at 174 (arguing that youthfulness does
not excuse criminal liability, but "the evidence disputes the conclusion that most delinquents are
indistinguishable from adults in any way that is relevant to culpability, and supports the creation of
two distinct culpability categories-although, of course, there will be outlyers [sic] in both groups.
In short, the predispositions and behavioral characteristics that are associated with the
developmental stage of adolescence support a policy of reduced culpability for this category of
offenders.").
315. See ZMRING, supra note 124, at 144 ("[W]henever a young offender's need for protection,
education, and skill development can be accommodated without frustrating community security,
there is a government obligation to do so."); Feld, supra note 276, at 99; Scott & Grisso, supra
note 217, at 182 ("Subjecting thirteen-year-old offenders to the same criminal punishment that is
imposed on adults offends the principles that define the boundaries of criminal responsibility.").
316. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, Criminal Responsibility in Adolescence: Lessons from
Developmental Psychology, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE
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Adolescents are "works in progress ' 3 17 who make mistakes as they gain
experience and who need some protection from the consequences of their
immature judgment. 3 18 Adolescence is the period during which youths learn to
exercise self-control and to make responsible choices.3 19 Most adolescent
criminality is transitional and does not indicate a serious commitment to a
criminal career. 32 In the interim, their poor decisions reveal less about their
32 1
character and blameworthiness than do the criminal choices that adults make.
A youth sentencing policy must manage the risks that juveniles pose to
themselves and to others, preserve their life chances for a future in which they
will learn to make more responsible choices, avoid life destructive consequences,
and provide them with "room to reform. ' 322 As the Supreme Court repeatedly
has recognized,

JUSTICE 291, 309 (arguing that adolescents' choices "reflect immaturity and inexperience and are
driven by developmental factors that will change in predictable and systemic ways. A legal
response that holds young offenders accountable, while recognizing that they are less culpable than
their adult counterparts, serves the purposes of criminal punishment without violating the
underlying principle of proportionality.").
317. See David E. Arredondo, M.D., Child Development, Children's Mental Health and the
Juvenile Justice System: Principlesfor Effective Decision-Making, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 13,
14 (2003) ("Other than infancy, no stage in human development results in such rapid or dramatic
change as adolescence."). Youth is a time of experimentation and exploration. See Laurence
Steinberg & Robert G. Schwartz, Developmental Psychology Goes to Court, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A
DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 9, 23 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz

eds., 2000) (arguing that adolescence "is an inherently transitional time during which there are
rapid and dramatic changes in physical, intellectual, emotional, and social capabilities," as well as
"a period of tremendous malleability, during which experiences in the family, peer group, school,
and other settings have a great deal of influence over the course of development.").
318. Professor Franklin Zimring long has argued that adolescence is a time of semi-autonomy, a
"learner's permit" on the road to adulthood, and that young people require special dispensations in
order to learn to be responsible adults. See, e.g., FRANKLIN ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL
WORLD OF ADOLESCENTS 89-96 (arguing that adolescents require a "learner's permit" to become

responsible); Zimring, supra note 274, at 283 ("At the heart of this process is a notion of
adolescence as a period of 'learning by doing' in which the only way competence in decision
making can be achieved is by making decisions and making mistakes.").
319. See Zimring, supra note 274, at 279 ("[Slelf-control is a habit of behavior developed over
a period of time-a habit dependent on the experience of successfully exercising self-control. This
particular type of maturity, like so many others, takes practice.").
320. Franklin E. Zirning argues that most youthful criminality is a relatively normal adolescent
phenomenon that youths will outgrow without the necessity of major intervention; formal social
control may cause more harm than good. See id. at 284; see also Terrie E. Moffitt, AdolescenceLimited and Life-Course-Persistent Antisocial Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy, 100
PSYCHOL. REV. 674, 675-77 (1993) (arguing that most youthful offending is "adolescence-limited,"
that most delinquents mature into law-abiding adults, and only a relatively small group become
life-course-persistent offenders).
321. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 274, at 801 ("Youthful involvement in crime is often a
part of this [developmental] process, and, as such, it reflects the values and preferences of a
transitory stage, rather than those of an individual with a settled identity."). An adolescent's
criminal act may not be as indicative of "bad moral character" as an adult's because youths, "whose
identity is in flux and character unformed, are less culpable than typical adult criminals." Id. at 825.
322. See ZIMRING, supra note 124, at 81-83; Zimring, supra note 274, at 283-84.
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[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of
life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to
psychological damage. Our history is replete with laws and judicial
recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are
less mature and responsible than adults. Particularly 'during the
formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often
323 lack the
experience, perspective, and judgment' expected of adults.

A youth sentencing policy that recognizes this simple, developmental truism
would protect
young people from the full penal consequences of their bad
3 24
decisions.

Simmons hinged, in part, on whether to evaluate juveniles' culpability on an
individualized or categorical basis. Although the Court's death penalty
jurisprudence consistently emphasizes the importance of individualized
assessments of culpability, Simmons adopted a categorical prohibition because
"[tihe differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too marked and well
understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty
despite insufficient culpability. ' 325 The Court feared that the impact of a
heinous crime on a jury would overpower the mitigating force of youthfulness
.326
and immaturity.
Moreover, Simmons concluded that clinicians could not
assist jurors to distinguish between the vast majority of immature juveniles
and
327
the rare youth who might be sufficiently culpable to be death-eligible.
Simmons' categorical treatment of youthfulness as a mitigating factor has
broader implications for youth sentencing policy. Courts typically reject
categorical bright-lines and consider youthfulness as part of a broader inquiry
into culpability and blameworthiness.
However, in Bryant v. State, the Court
323. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834 (citation omitted) (quoting Eddings 455 U.S. at 115-16).
324. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning in Adolescent Decisionmaking, 37 ViLL.
L. REv. 1607, 1656 (1992) ("[I]f the values that drive risky choices are associated with youth, and
predictably will change with maturity, then our paternalistic inclination is to protect the young
decisionmaker... from his or her bad judgment."); see also ZIMRING, supra note 318, at 96;
ZIMRING, supra note 124, at 142-45.
325. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 572-73.
326. Id. at 553-54 (reasoning that "[ain unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or coldblooded nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as a
matter of course, even where the juvenile offender's objective immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of
true depravity should require a sentence less severe than death").
327. Id. at 573 (noting that "[i]t is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate
between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the
rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption").
328. See, e.g., Eddings, 455 U.S. at 116 (defining youthful age to include more than
chronological age and requiring evaluation of "the background and mental and emotional
development of a youthful defendant"); Graham v. Collins, 950 F.2d 1009, 1030 & n.25 (5th Cir.
1992), affd, 506 U.S. 461, (1993) (finding youthful mitigation even for a twenty-two-year-old
defendant and noting that chronological age provides an indicator of maturity and stated observing
that "inexperience with resultant diminished judgment and self-control" are salient mitigating
factors); Giles v. State, 549 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Ark. 1977) (recognizing particular importance of
chronological age in determining youthfulness, stating that although "chronological age does not
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of Appeals of Maryland concluded that while non-chronological factors are
relevant to an adult defendant's maturity and blameworthiness,
the closer his or her chronological age is to the eighteen year old
baseline... [the more] such factor alone tends to support the
establishment of immaturity and inexperience and, hence, triggers the
need to consider youthful age as a mitigator. Thus, youthful age as a
mitigating circumstance is determined, in the first instance, by the
chronological age of the defendant, abiding evidence of atypical or
unusual maturity and experience that bears
329 on the weight to be accorded
that mitigator in the ultimate weighing.
A bright-line rule that categorically treats youthfulness as a mitigating factor
based on age alone is preferable to a system of guided discretion because a rule
that occasionally under-punishes the rare, fully-culpable "adolescent still will
produce less aggregate injustice than a discretionary system that improperly[,
harshly sentences many] more undeserving youths."
Even though Simmons
recognized individual variability
in
culpability,
the
Court
nevertheless endorsed
33 1
bright-line.
categorical
a
The qualities that distinguish juvenile from adults do not disappear
when an individual turns 18. By the same token, some under 18 have
already attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach....
The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many
purposes between childhood and adulthood. It is, 332
we conclude, the age
at which the line for death eligibility ought to rest.

necessarily control in the jury's determination whether a defendant's youth is a mitigating
circumstance, nevertheless, it is certainly an important factor," but further stating that "[a]ny hard
and fast rule as to age would tend to defeat the ends of justice, so the term youth must be
considered as relative and this factor weighed in the light of varying conditions and
circumstances"); Hurst v. State, 819 So.2d 689, 698 (Fla. 2002) (concluding that in order "to give a
non-minor defendant's age significant weight as a mitigating circumstance, the defendant's age
must be linked with some other characteristic of the defendant or the crime, such as significant
emotional immaturity or mental problems"); Foster v. State, 778 So.2d 906, 920 (Fla. 2000)
(stating that there is no bright-line, chronological rule for applying youthfulness as a mitigating
factor, and the inquiry "entails an analysis of factors which, when placed against the chronological
age of the defendant, might reveal a much more immature individual than the age might have
initially indicated"); State v. Bey, 610 A.2d 814, 842 (N.J. 1992) (finding that determinations of
youthful age require consideration of both chronological age and other indicators of maturity, but
stating that "juries should give greater weight to a defendant's chronological age").
329. Bryant v. State, 824 A.2d 60, 84-85 (Md. 2003).
330. Feld, supra note 261, at 547.
331. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 573 (arguing that "[i]f trained psychiatrists with the advantage of
clinical testing and observation refrain, despite diagnostic expertise, from assessing any juvenile
under 18 as having antisocial personality disorder, we conclude that States should refrain from
asking jurors to issue a far graver condemnation - that a juvenile offender merits the death
penalty").
332. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 574.
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Adolescents' reduced criminal responsibility represents a normative
judgment about deserved punishment. 333 A sentencing policy that integrates
youthfulness and reduced culpability with penal proportionality should provide
334
all young offenders with categorical reductions of adult sentences.
Formalizing youthfulness as a mitigating factor represents a social, moral, and
criminal policy judgment about diminished responsibility and asserts that no
adolescent deserves
to be sentenced as severely as an adult convicted of a
3 35
comparable crime.

There are two reasons to prefer categorical bright-lines to individualized
discretionary sentencing decisions. The first is the inability to define or identify
qualities of adult-like culpability among offending youths. 336 The second is the
inevitable tendency to subordinate abstract consideration of youthfulness to the
reality of a horrific crime. 337 Development is highly variable and a few youths
may be mature and blameworthy prior to becoming eighteen years of age while
many others may not attain maturity even as adults. 3 38 Because the vast majority
of juveniles lack the culpability of adults, efforts to identify those few who might
be as responsible as adults will founder on the difficulties of defining and
333. See e.g., Enmund, 458 U.S. at 825 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[Plroportionality requires a
nexus between the punishment imposed and the defendant's blameworthiness .... "). Scott and
Steinberg, argue that in contemporary criminal law theory, penal proportionality may reflect either
the quality of an actor's choice or what that choice indicates about the actor's moral character. The
former focuses on the blameworthiness of the quality of choices made, while the latter focuses on
what that choice indicates about the actor's bad character. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 274,
at 801-02; see also R. A. Duff, Choice, Character,and Criminal Liability, 12 LAw & PHIL. 345,
367-68 (1993); MICHAEL MooRE, Choice, Character,and Excuse, in PLACING BLAME 548, 574-92
(1997).
334. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 274, at 801 ("Because these developmental factors
influence their criminal choices, young wrongdoers are less blameworthy than adults under
conventional criminal law conceptions of mitigation.").
335. See, e.g., Fagan, supra note 344, at 242 (arguing that adolescence, per se, is a mitigating
status because youths' developmental deficits "are not the deficits of an atypical adolescent but are
,normal' developmental processes common to all adolescents. To the degree that there is variation
among adolescents, whether offenders or not, these differences are predictable and subject to a
variety of contextual, circumstantial, and intra-individual factors. In this jurisprudence, the crimes
of adolescents are a function of immaturity, compared to the crimes of adults, which are the acts of
morally responsible, yet possibly cognitively and emotionally deficient, actors.").
336. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 396-99 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
337. Id. at 397-98 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[i]t is thus unsurprising that
individualized consideration at transfer and sentencing has not in fact ensured that juvenile
offenders lacking an adult's culpability are not sentenced to die").
338. Jeffrey Fagan notes that:
[t]he age at which adolescents realize the developmental competencies that
constitute culpability will vary: a significant number of juveniles will be
immature and lacking in the developmental attributes of culpability well before
age eighteen, and some may still lack these competencies after age eighteen: a
few may have attained full maturity by the age threshold of sixteen set by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Stanford v. Kentucky, but most will not. (footnote
omitted).
Fagan, supra note 344, at 209.
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measuring immaturity and will introduce a systematic
bias that will redound to
339
youths.
less-culpable
the
of
disadvantage
the
A categorical approach avoids the risk of error inherent in discretionary
culpability assessments. 34
Recognizing youthfulness as a mitigating factor
constitutes a normative judgment about deserved punishment, rather than a
clinical assessment of diminished responsibility about which an expert could
usefully testify. 34 1 It conclusively presumes that youths' criminal choices differ
qualitatively from those of adults. A "youth discount" provides fractional
reductions of sentences based on age-as-a-proxy-for culpability. 34 2 A youth
could establish eligibility for categorical mitigation - a "youth discount" - with
only a birth certificate. Shorter sentences enable young offenders to survive
serious mistakes with their life chances intact. 34 3 Such a policy recognizes that
same-length sentences impose a greater
"penal bite" on younger offenders than
3
they do on their older counterparts. 4
339. See, e.g., id. at 248 (arguing that "[t]he difficulties and statistical error rates in measuring
immaturity for juveniles invite complexity in the consistent application of the law"). Fagan
contends that:
[e]ven when individualized assessments are conducted using modem scientific
and clinical tools, the risks of error due to measurement and diagnostic
limitations suggest that it is neither reliable nor efficient for each court to assess
the competency of each juvenile individually. The precise conditions of
immaturity, incapacity, and incompetency are difficult to consistently and fairly
express in a capital sentencing context. Further, cognitive and volitional
immaturity might be easily concealed by demeanor or physical appearance and,
more importantly, obscured by the gruesome details of a murder and its
emotional impact on the victim's family.
Id. at 253. See also Robin M.A. Weeks, Note, Comparing Children to the Mentally Retarded:
How the Decision in Atkins v. Virginia Will Affect the Execution of Juvenile Offenders, 17 BYU J.
PUB. L. 451, 479 (2003) (noting that when the Court requires individualized culpability
assessments it raises difficult definitional questions: "What is the 'normal' adult level of
culpability? How do we measure it?").
340. Elizabeth Scott and Laurence Steinberg note that:
we currently lack the diagnostic tools to evaluate psycho-social maturity
reliably on an individualized basis or to distinguish young career criminals
from ordinary adolescents who, as adults, will repudiate their reckless
experimentation. Litigating maturity on a case-by-case basis is likely to be an
error-prone undertaking, with the outcomes determined by factors other than
immaturity.
Scott & Steinberg, supra note 274, at 836-37.
341. Cf. Fagan, supra note 344, at 247 ("[I]ndividualized assessments leave triers of fact at the
mercy of imperfect diagnostic assessments to determine which adolescents are 'mature' and which
are not."); Scott & Steinberg, supra note 274, at 836-37.
342. See Joseph L. Hoffmann, On the Perils of Line-Drawing:Juveniles and the Death Penalty,
40 HASTINGS L.J. 229, 233 (describing age as an imperfect "proxy" for a complex of factors,
"includ[ing] maturity, judgment, responsibility, and the capability to assess the possible
consequences of one's conduct," that constitute culpability); Feld, supra note 276, at 121-23.
343. See ZIMRING, supra note 318, at 89-96; Franklin E. Zimring, Background Paper, in
CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON
SENTENCING POLICY TowARD YOUNG OFFENDERS 27,66-69 (1978).

344. See Andrew von Hirsch, ProportionateSentences for Juveniles: How Different than for
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States should adopt a categorical "youth discount" and sentence youths
based on a sliding scale of criminal responsibility. 345 The "maturity of judgment
and adjudicative competence of the youngest adolescents is qualitatively lower"
than that of older youths or adult offenders. 34 6 When sentencing youths
according to a sliding scale of diminished responsibility, a fourteen-year-old
offender, for example, might receive a sentence twenty-five percent of the length
of the adult penalty and a sixteen-year-old defendant might receive a sentence
half the length of the adult sentence. And, of course, the "youth discount"
precludes LWOP and other draconian sentences. The deeper discounts for
younger offenders correspond with their developmental differences in culpability
and self-control. 347 Younger adolescents are less responsible and deserve
proportionally shorter sentences than do older youths or than adults.
C. Racial Disparitiesand DisproportionateMinority Confinement

From its inceptions, juvenile courts have used their discretion to discriminate
between "our children" and "other peoples' children. ' 348 Evaluations of juvenile
Adults?, 3 PUNisHMENT & SOC'Y 221, 227 (2001) (arguing that "[a] given penalty is said to be
more onerous when suffered by a child than by an adult. Young people, assertedly, are
psychologically less resilient, and the punishments they suffer interfere more with opportunities for
education and personal development."(citation omitted)); see also Arredondo, supra note 317, at
19 (arguing that "[b]ecause of differences in the experience of time, any given duration of sanction
will be experienced subjectively as longer by younger children"); Jeffrey Fagan, This Will Hurt Me
More Than It Hurts You: Social and Legal Consequences of CriminalizingDelinquency, 16 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PUB. POL'Y 1, 21-22 (2002) (describing the substantive quality of punishment
that adolescents experience in adult incarceration as far harsher than the sanctions they experience
as delinquents); Feld, supra note 16, at 112-13 (contending that "youths experience objectively
equal punishment subjectively as more severe").
345. Feld, supra note 276, at 118-21. See also Scott & Steinberg, supra note 274, at 837 ("[A]
systematic sentencing discount for young offenders in adult court, might satisfy the demands of
proportionality."); Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 283, at 697-98 ("We endorse Feld's proposals
[for a youth discount] because they respect the notion that juveniles are developmentally different
than adults and that these differences make juveniles both less culpable for their crimes and less
deserving of the harsh sanctions, which now must be imposed on serious and violent adult
offenders."); von Hirsch, supra note 344, at 226 (arguing for categorical penalty reductions based
on juveniles' reduced culpability: "While actual appreciation of consequences varies highly among
youths of the same age, the degree of appreciation we should demand depends on age: we may
rightly expect more comprehension and self-control from the 17-year-old than a 14-year-old, so
that the 17-year-old's penalty reduction should be smaller. Assessing culpability on the basis of
individualized determinations of a youth's degree of moral development would be neither feasible
nor desirable."); Zimring, supra note 274, at 288 (arguing that the penal law of youth crime should
develop "a sliding scale of responsibility based on both judgment and the practical experience of
impulse management and peer control").
346. See Feld, supra note 261, at 552.
347. Zimring, supra note 274, at 288 ("[A]dolescents learn their way toward adult levels of
responsibility gradually. This notion is also consistent with ... long periods of diminished
responsibility that incrementally approach adult standards in the late teens.. . [and with] less-thanadult punishments that gradually approach adult levels during the late teen years.").
348. FELD, supra note 2, at 75-76; Darnell F. Hawkins and Kimberly Kempf-Leonard,
Introduction in OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES
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court sentencing practices report two consistent findings. First, the ordinary
principles of the criminal law - present offense and prior record - explain most
of the variance in juvenile court sentencing practices. Because every state
defines juvenile courts' delinquency jurisdiction based on the commission of a
criminal act, 349 juvenile court judges focus primarily on the seriousness of the
present offense and prior record when they sentence delinquents. 350 Because
judges emphasize legal variables when they process youths, real differences in
rates of criminal behavior by black youths account for part of the racial
differences in justice administration. Various measures of delinquency - official
arrest and conviction data, self-report surveys, and surveys of crime victims indicate that black youths engage in higher rates of violent offending than do
white juveniles. 35 ' Part of the real differences in black youths' rates of offending
reflect differential exposure to a host of risk factors associated with crime and
violence - for example, poverty, segregation and isolation in crime-ridden
neighborhoods, single-parent households, unsafe and deficient schools, and poor
health care - as a result of the structural changes described earlier.352

INAMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 1-16 (Darnell F. Hawkins & Kimberly Kempf-Leonard eds., 2005).

349. Feld, Race and the "Crack Down", supra note 5, at 382 ("[Sltates define juvenile court
jurisdiction based on a youth committing a crime, a prerequisite that detracts from a compassionate
response.... Juvenile courts' defining characteristic strengthens public antipathy to 'other people's
children' by emphasizing primarily that they are law violators.").
350. See Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Race Effects in Juvenile Justice DecisionMaking: Findings of a Statewide Analysis, 86 J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 392 (1996); Jeffrey
Fagan, et al., Blind Justice? The Impact of Race on the Juvenile Justice Process, 33 CRIME &
DELINQ. 224 (1987); Belinda R. McCarthy & Brent L. Smith, The Conceptualization of
Discrimination in the Juvenile Justice Process: The Impact of Administrative Factors and
Screening Decisions on Juvenile Court Dispositions, 24 CRIMINOLOGY 41 (1986); PETER W.
GREENWOOD, ALBERT J. LIPSON, ALLAN ABRAHAMSE, & FRANKLIN ZIMRING, YOUTH CRIME AND
JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CAUFORNIA: A REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 51 (June 1983) ("[C]omparisons

ofjuvenile and adult sentencing practices suggest that juvenile and criminal courts in California are
much more alike than statutory language would suggest, in the degree to which they focus on
aggravating circumstances of the charged offense and the defendant's prior record in determining
the degree of confinement that will be imposed.").
351. See. e.g., Janet L. Lauritsen, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Juvenile Offending in OUR
CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN:

CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN AMERICAN

JUVENILE JUSTICE 83, 87 (Darnell F. Hawkins & Kimberly Kempf-Leonard eds., 2005) (analyzing
arrest data and reporting that "black youth are disproportionately arrested for violent index crimes
and drug and weapons violations... ");NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL ET AL., supra note 33, at 235-

38; see also supra text accompanying notes 129 & 130.
352. See also supra text accompanying note 123. See also, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL ET AL.,

who report that:
from the early days of childhood, black juveniles have more experience with
poor health care and health conditions and with poor economic conditions, and
they are more likely to live in segregated, isolated neighborhoods with
concentrated poverty than are white juveniles. Concentrated disadvantages in
poor neighborhoods, with low mobility and little racial heterogeneity, have
been found to be strongly correlated with [involvement in crimes].
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL ET AL., supra note 33, at 238.
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Research that controls for legal variables - present offense, prior record, pretrial detention status, and the like - and thereby accounts for differences in rates
of offending by race, consistently reports that individualized juvenile justice
produces racial disparities in sentencing. 353 Juvenile courts' parens patriae
ideology legitimates individualized dispositions and inevitably subjects
disadvantaged youths to more extensive controls.3 54 In a society marked by
economic and racial inequality, minority youths are most "in need" and therefore
most "at risk" of juvenile court intervention.35 5 The structural context of
juvenile courts also places minority youths at greater risk of intervention. Urban
juvenile courts are procedurally more formal and sentence all delinquents more
severely.356 Urban courts have greater access to detention facilities and detained
youths typically receive more severe sentences than those who remain at
Because proportionally more minority youths live in urban
liberty.357
environments, the geographic and structural context of juvenile justice
administration interacts with race to produce minority overrepresentation in
detention facilities and correctional institutions.358 The recent legislative "crack
down" on delinquents disproportionately affects minority youths who experience
higher rates of pretrial detention and incarceration in the more punitive juvenile
system.

35 9

353. See, e.g., Donna M. Bishop, The Role of Race and Ethnicity in Juvenile Justice Processing
in OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN AMERICAN

JUVENILE JUSTICE 23, 61 (Darnell F. Hawkins & Kimberly Kempf-Leonard eds., 2005) (reviewing
literature and reporting that "disparities that cannot be explained by race differences in offending
are apparent at nearly every stage in the juvenile justice process"); MINORITIES INJUVENILE JUSTICE
23-27 (Kimberly Kempf Leonard et al., eds., 1995); FELD, supra note 2, at 267-72; BARRY
KRISBERG & JAMES F. AUSTIN, REINVENTING JUVENILE JUSTICE 116-34 (1993)

(discretionary

decisions at various stages of the juvenile process amplify racial disparities as minority youths
proceed through the system and produce more severe dispositions than for comparable white
youths).
354. FELD, supra note 2, at 272.
355. E.g., id. at 271-272 (more affluent white parents can purchase private services for their
troubled children, whereas poorer minority juveniles proceed by default through the juvenile justice
system).
356. Barry C. Feld, Justice By Geography: Urban, Suburban, and Rural Variations in Juvenile
Justice Aministration, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 156 (1991); BARRY C. FELD, JUSTICE FOR
CHILDREN: THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE JUVENILE COURTS, 158-162 (1993); Bishop, supra note

353, at 62-65 (attributing some racial disparities in juvenile justice administration to class
differences and social structural factors that place minority youths at greater risk of formal
processing).
357. E.g., Clarke & Koch, supra note 173, at 263, 294 ("being detained before adjudication had
an independent effect on the likelihood of commitment, entirely apart from the fact that both
detention and commitment had some common causal antecedents"); Feld, supra note 174, at 133739 ("[N]egative effects of pretrial detention on subsequent sentencing.").
358. See generally, FELD, supra note 2, at 271-72; SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 124, at
154-55. POE-YAMAGATA & JONES, supra note 258, at 9 (summarizing racial differences in rates of
detention and reporting that "In every offense category, a substantially greater percentage of
African American youth were detained than White youth.").
359. See, e.g., POE-YAMAGATA & JONES, supra note 258, at 9, 14.

2007]

A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE

The juvenile justice process entails a succession of decisions - intake,
petition, detention, adjudication or waiver, and disposition - and the compound
effects of even small disparities produces larger cumulative differences. In
1997, black youths comprised about 15% of the population aged ten to
seventeen, 26% of juvenile arrests, 30% of delinquency referrals, one-third of
the petitioned delinquency cases, and 40% of the inmates in long-term public
institutions. 36 0 Minority youths, especially Blacks, are overrepresented at each
successive step of the decision-making process, with the greatest disparities
occurring in the initial stages. 361 For example, probation officers who decide
whether or not to file a formal delinquency petition often perceive minority
juveniles as more threatening and more likely to offend in the future than they do
similarly-situated white juveniles.36 2 A recent analysis of the effects of
discretionary decision-making reported that "at almost every stage in the juvenile
justice process the racial disparity is clear, but not extreme.' ' 363 "However,
because the system operates cumulatively the risk is compounded and the end
result is that black juveniles
are three times as likely as white juveniles to end up
364
in residential placement.,
In 1988, Congress amended the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
(JJDP) Act and required states receiving federal juvenile justice funds to
note 33, at 231. See also, POE-YAMAGATA &
note 258.
361. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 124; POE-YAMAGATA & JONES, supra note 258, at 16
(index constructed by dividing minority youth proportion in pretrial detention by minority
proportion in the youth population indicated that in 43 of 44 states, proportion of minority youths
in detention was 2.8 times (280%) higher than their make-up in the general population); MILLER,
supra note 140 at 69-72 (racial disparities occur most often in the earlier and the later stages of
juvenile justice processing); Edmund F. McGarrell, Trends in RacialDisproportionalityin Juvenile
Court Processing: 1985-1989, 39 CRIME & DELINQ. 29, 46 (1993) (disproportionate referral of
minority youths results in corresponding increases in pre-trial detention); Bishop, supra note 353,
at 66 (reporting that race effects are more pronounced at earlier stages of juvenile justice decisionmaking).
362. See George S. Bridges and Sara Steen, Racial Disparities in Official Assessments of
Juvenile Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms, 63 AM. Soc. REV. 554
(1998); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL ET AL., supra note 33, at 251 (finding "pronounced differences
in officers' attributions about the causes of crime committed by white and minority youth."); see
also, Bishop & Frazier, supra note 350, at 399-403; Sara Steen, Christine E.W. Bond, George S.
Bridges, and Charms E. Kubrin, Explaining Assessments of Future Risk: Race and Attributions of
Juvenile Offenders in PresentencingReports, in OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN: CONFRONTING
RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 245 (Darnell F. Hawkins &
Kimberly Kempf-Leonard eds., 2005).
363. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL ET AL., supra note 33, at 257.
364. Id.; see also, POE-YAMAGATA & JONES, supra note 258, at 18, 20 (minority proportion of
youths in public correctional facilities about double that of whites (66% vs. 34%); black youths
with no prior admissions were six times more likely than white youths to be confined); R. J.
Sampson & Janet L. Lauritsen, Violent Victimization and Offending: Individual-, Situational-,and
Community-Level Risk Factors in UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE 362 (1994)
(reporting that minority youths "are more likely to be detained and receive out-of-home placements
than whites regardless of 'legal' considerations" and that these disparities also contribute to the
construction of a prior record that, in turn, affects future processing).
360. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL ET AL., supra

JONES, supra
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examine the sources of minority overrepresentation in detention facilities and
institutions and to develop mechanisms to assure equality of treatment. 365 A
number of states responded to the JJDP Act mandate and reported racial
disparities in their juvenile justice systems. 366 After controlling for legal
variables, forty-one of forty-two states found minority youths overrepresented in
secure detention facilities and all thirteen states that analyzed institutional
commitments decisions reported disproportionate minority confinement.367 A
recent assessment of disproportionate minority confinement in Kentucky
reported that in 1999 black youths comprised about 10% of the juvenile
population, but 41% of those held in detention - four time greater than their
proportion of the population - and one-quarter (25%) of those committed to the
Department of Juvenile Justice.368 Judges sentence disproportionately more
minority delinquents to out-of-home placements than they do white youths, and
provide white juveniles proportionately more probationary dispositions than they
do black youths. 369 Moreover, incarcerated black juveniles370spend more time in
custody than do white youths convicted of similar offenses.
Recent amendments to juvenile sentencing laws had a substantial negative
impact on disproportionate minority confinement. The overall numbers of
youths in custody on any given day increased almost 40% between 1985 and
1995, the decade of "get tough" changes in sentencing laws. 371 Despite the
overall increase of youths in correctional custody, the proportion of white
juveniles confined in public facilities declined 7%, while the percentage of black
juveniles confined increased 63%.372 Thus, the overall increase in the numbers
and racial composition of correctional inmates reflects the sharp growth of
minority youths in institutions. As a result, the proportion of white juveniles in
custody declined from 47% to 32% of all incarcerated delinquents, while the
proportion of black youths increased from 37% to 43% and that of Hispanics
increased from 13% to 21% of all confined juveniles.373

365. See 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(15) (1994); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL ET AL., supra note 33, at
228-29.
366. See FELD, supra note 2, at 268.
367. See Carl E. Pope, Racial Disparities in Juvenile Justice System, OVERCROWDED TIMES,

December 1994, at 1,5.
368. See Building Blocks for Youth, Disproportionate Minority Confinement Factsheet at
http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/statebystate/kydmc.html;
ASSESSMENT
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369. POE-YAMAGATA & JONES, supra note 258, at 14-15.

370. Id. at 21.
371. See FELD, supra note 2, at 270-7 1.
372. Id. at 271.
373. Id. see also, KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 353, at 124-28 (disproportionate minority
confinement in institutions).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The juvenile court emerged in response to social structural changes a century
ago and spread across the nation during the first two decades of the twentieth
century. Economic modernization and the social construction of childhood
provided the structural, political and ideological context within which
Progressive policy-makers created new institutions for the social control of
children. Juvenile courts did not emerge fully formed but evolved over several
decades time - marked as a "work in progress."
The standard features of
juvenile courts - separation from adults, procedural informality, confidentiality,
euphemistic vocabulary, petitions, probation, and dispositions in the child's
"best interests" - reflected the outcomes and accommodations to contending
political, social and economic interests. The juvenile courts' broad and mutable
mission and their ability to adapt to changes in their organizational environment
explain their continued endurance despite persistent failure to achieve their
professed rehabilitative goals.375
The issue of race has shaped the political and legal contours of juvenile
justice policy and practice over the second half of the twentieth century and has
evoked two separate and contradictory responses. Initially, racial injustice
propelled the Warren Court's "due process revolution" and its myriad efforts to
enhance civil rights and to protect minority citizens. Gault extended some
procedural rights to delinquents in juvenile courts, but McKeiver declined to
provide procedural parity with adult criminal defendants. The constitutional
shift in juvenile courts' legal environment precipitated decades of judicial
decisions, legislative amendments, and administrative modifications. By the
1980s and early-1990s, several decades of macro-structural, economic, and racial
demographic changes led to a black underclass living in concentrated poverty
and a concomitant rise in gun violence and youth homicides. Increasingly,
politicians campaigned to "get tough" on youth crime, which the public
understands as a code word for harsher treatment of young black males. 376 The
punitive transfer laws and harsher delinquency sentences they enacted have
transformed the system into a scaled-down, second-class criminal court for
374. TANENHAUS, supra note 1, at 54 (emphasizing that "It took more than a generation to pour
form and substance into the idea of a juvenile court.... [I]t is much more instructive to view the

juvenile court as a work in progress whose 'defining features' were a series of additions that only
later became standard practices.").
375. SUTrrON, supra note 3, at 148-53; Ira M. Schwartz et al., Nine Lives and Then Some: Why
the Juvenile Court Does Not Roll Over and Die," 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 533, 550-52 (1998).
376. See GARLAND, supra note 18, at 198 (1990); see also BECKETr, supra note 18, at 107
(noting that proponents of "get tough" crime policies are "fundamentally uninterested in the social
causes of criminality or in reintegrating offenders and assume instead that punishment,
surveillance, and control are the best responses to deviant behavior); HACKER, supra note 51, at
225 (asserting that "few white Americans feel any obligation to make any sacrifices on behalf of
the nation's principal minority. They see themselves as already overtaxed, feel that the fault is not
theirs, and have become persuaded that public programs cannot achieve a cure. Instead, calls are
heard for a tougher posture toward what is seen as the misbehavior of many blacks").
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juveniles. These changes represent a cultural and legal inversion of the
Progressives' conception of youths as innocent and dependent children into our
contemporary perception of "super-predators" as responsible, almost adult-like
offenders.
Political leaders and policy makers have forgotten that delinquents are
children and differ from adults in competence and culpability. Juveniles are
substantially less competent than adults to exercise or waive their legal rights.
States that use the adult waiver standard to measure juveniles' relinquishment of
counsel posit a functional equality that severely disadvantages most youths.
States readily allow juveniles to waive counsel in a juvenile system that has
become increasingly legalistic, complex, and punitive. Even when juveniles do
receive the assistance of counsel, their lawyers often fail to provide the effective
advocacy that youths need and the Constitution requires. Would any adult
charged with a serious crime and facing the prospect of incarceration for years
consent to be tried under the conditions that routinely prevail in juvenile courts?
Four decades after Gault, states have yet to put the justice in juvenile justice.
For the past two decades, states have transferred more and younger juveniles
to criminal court for prosecution as adults. "Get tough" politicians' sound bites
- "adult crime, adult time" or "old enough to do the crime, old enough to do the
time" - characterize youths as criminally responsible and advance policies that
fail to recognize youthfulness as a mitigating factor in sentencing.37 7 The Court
in Simmons finally acknowledged what every parent knows - children are
different. Adolescents differ in qualities of judgment, self-control, appreciation
of consequences, and preferences for risks that diminish their responsibility and
reduce their culpability. These developmental differences exist whether a state
tries a youth in a juvenile or criminal court. Despite these differences,
politicians and policy makers enact criminal statutes that require judges to
sentence children just like adults and to impose grossly disproportional and
LWOP sentences on young, immature offenders.
The cumulative consequence of punitive policies inflicts the most severe
adult sentences on black youths and disproportionately confines minority youths
in the juvenile justice system. For a century, juvenile courts have discriminated
between "our children" and "other peoples' children." Progressive reformers
had to choose between initiating social structural reforms to alter conditions that
contribute to criminality - poverty, inequality and discrimination - or to apply
"band-aids" to children damaged by those adverse circumstances. Social class
and ethnic antagonisms caused them to avoid broad social structural changes and
instead to "save children." A century later, we face the same policy choices and
continue to evade our responsibilities to "other peoples' children."

377. See e.g., Feld, supra note 276, at 113-15 (arguing that adolescent developmental
psychology supports differences in culpability of juveniles and adults which require formal
recognition of youthfulness as a mitigating factor in sentencing).
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The prevalence of violent crime in certain urban areas is a reflection of
power, politics, and social inequality. Concentrated poverty and racial isolation
are the cumulative consequences of public policies that amplify crime and
Political and public
violence within inner-city minority communities.
discussions about poverty, allocation of resources and benefits, inequality, and
crime function as proxies for addressing issues associated with race.
Conservative politicians exploit white voters' racial animus with coded messages
to sustain a right-wing coalition.378 As a result, Americans engage in a
"subterranean discourse" about race based on misleading images and potent
symbols. 379 As long as the public and politicians identify long-term poverty and
its associated problems - unemployment, drug abuse, criminality, illegitimacy as a condition of Blacks that is separate from the American mainstream, then
policy makers can evade government's responsibility to address them. 380 The
political and public association of urban black males with crime has fostered
punitive incarceration policies rather than efforts to expand the employment and
educational opportunities to prevent crime. Although public policies and
political economy contribute both to racial inequality and the skewed
distribution of crime, politicians manipulate and exploit racially tinged
perceptions of young offenders for electoral advantage. The transformation of
the juvenile court into an explicitly punitive agency to control "other people's
children" is an instance of politicians' exploiting the connection between race
and youth crime.38 ' Politicians and the public view the juvenile courts' clients as
young criminals of color and refuse to commit resources necessary to improve
their life conditions or to create a juvenile system that provides real justice.
After a century of change - a "work in progress" - the primary virtue of juvenile
courts is simply that they are not the criminal justice system. 382 Regardless of
378. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 7, at 281 (arguing that "[riace will remain an exceptionally
divisive force in politics as long as the debate is couched in covert language and in coded
symbols-and as long as major participants fail to be explicit about their goals"); Jon Hurwitz &
Mark Peffley, Public Perceptions of Race and Crime: The Role of Racial Stereotypes, 41 AM. J.

POL. Sci. 375, 396 (1997) (arguing that race contributes to irrational and divisive analyses of crime
policies that reflect passion more than reason).
379. See e.g., Gilens, supra note 153, at 602 (arguing that explicit claims associated with race
can be debated and rebutted, "but when blacks are linked with crime, welfare, or drug use only
implicitly, such links are less likely to be challenged"); MENDELBERG, supra note 63, at 268
(arguing that "racial stereotypes, fears and resentments shape our decisions most when they are
least discussed .... It is this strong but implicit reference to race that is most effective in priming
racial predispositions and racializing the political choices of white citizens.").
380. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 7, at 243 (arguing that the growth of white suburbs

around the deindustrialized urban core isolates poor blacks and issues of joblessness, criminality,
income inequality, and welfare dependency from the concerns of mainstream voters); HACKER,
supra note 51, at 228-29 (attributing black youth homicide, guns and drugs in the inner city to
social structural inequality and arguing that "It is white America that has made being black so
disconsolate an estate. Legal slavery may be in the past, but segregation and subordination have
been allowed to persist. Even today, America imposes a stigma on every black child at birth.").
381.

FELD, supra note 2, at 245-86.

382. Zimring, supra note 17, at 2481 (arguing that "[T]he first great virtue of the juvenile court
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their ability to help or rehabilitate juveniles, they do less harm than when states
process children in the adult criminal justice system.

was that it would not continue the destructive impact of the criminal justice system on children.
This theory of justification for juvenile court, the diversionary rationale, argues that the new court
could do good by simply doing less harm than the traditional criminal processes.").

